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ABSTRACT 
Ghosting Images: Haunted by and Haunting Filmic Images 
Watching a film can be a haunting experience. Sometimes a filmic image may 
stay with us long after our viewing experience, inhabiting our body, so to speak, like 
the ghost of a person we once knew, or a place we once visited, or an event or traumatic 
memory. There may be ghost images from films we saw long ago that occasionally still 
haunt us; or at other times, we may feel like we are ghosts haunting the world on 
screen, moving through the filmic world like an unseen witness. By using the metaphor 
of ghosts when we talk about films, we can better articulate our experiences with 
characters we can’t forget, our feelings of occupying space in an imagined world, and 
our emotional responses to witnessed events.  
In this dissertation, I intend to answer two questions: How do we make ghosts of the 
images on film? and How might we become ghosts to the images on film?  For both questions, 
I employ the conceptual metaphor of ghosting images1 as the process made possible by 
our experience viewing a film. I will apply ghosting images to four filmic-image types: 
characters, events, space, and trauma. As active participants in a world separated from 
us by space, for example, it is the illusionary effects of movement through filmic space 
enabled by a director’s camera though which we can enter (at least partially) into the 
filmic world. Moreover, I propose ghosting images as the ways to describe 
metaphorically why some characters and events are memorable, why we may seem to 
occupy filmic space, or why our witness of traumatic images can provoke such 
powerful affects. Ghosting images is how we are haunted by filmic images, and how our 
presence/non-presence within a film is inherently haunting.  
Although the vagueness of ghosting images is potentially overwhelming, I do 
believe it is a productive way for remembering what an image may mean and an 
effective way to describe something very particular though unnamable. Ultimately, my 
hope may rest in the vagueness of ghosts.    
 
1 Alternately, image ghosting. 
INDEX WORDS: Hauntology, Ghosts, Ghosting images, Character subjectivity, Event-
images, Spatial-images, Trauma-images  
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1 INTRODUCTION: GHOSTING IMAGES 
Watching a film can be a haunting experience. Sometimes a filmic image may 
stay with us long after our viewing experience, inhabiting our body, so to speak, like 
the ghost of a person we once knew, or a place we once visited, or an event or traumatic 
memory. And there may be ghosts from films we saw long ago that haunt us even now; 
like an old favorite, for example, that seems to bring up many of the emotional, 
physiological, and psychological affects we may remember now as having had then, the 
first time we saw it. At other times, we feel as if we are ghosts haunting the world on 
screen. We may seem to move through the filmic world like an unseen witness—a ghost 
following strangers through cities at war or in moments of peace, or guiding loved ones 
through historical events or future landscapes, a force occupying a space again, revived 
in the constancy of now. Or, we may be the creator/bearer of ghost images from other 
texts, ghosts which are of our own making. In filmic adaptations, for example, the ghost 
image from an earlier text may haunt our viewing of the same image on film. But, these 
images are mostly images that we have created. The filmic image is not haunted by the 
ghost image of the earlier text, but our viewing may be haunted by the image we have 
ghosted.  
Even the term film is haunted by a 120 year-old technology. The study of film is 
rife with ghostly possibilities because experiencing film can be an allowance to revel in 
uncanny feelings. I believe that by using the metaphor of ghosts (spectrals, revenants, 
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haints, spirit guides, etc.) when we talk about films, we can better articulate our 
experiences with characters we can’t forget, our feelings of occupying space in an 
imagined world, and our emotional responses to witnessed events. Furthermore, I hope 
to demonstrate how “ghosting the image” from a film may unleash multiple 
compossibilities, as Gilles Deleuze might say, for understanding how and why we 
respond to images. As I begin to investigate the paradox of dead/undead that ghosting 
implies, I intend to answer two questions: How do we make ghosts of the images on film? 
and How might we become ghosts to the images on film?  My answer for both questions is 
by ghosting images.  
Ghosting images2 is a dual process made possible in the experience of viewing a 
film. When a viewer experiences a film, she may remember some part of the filmic 
world, as if she, or the ghost of her, were haunting the images onscreen. From 
projection to reception, adding (dis)embodiment and the layering effect of adaptations, 
and as memories stored in our bodies, image ghosting is a multifaceted process by 
which my experience with an image from a film (a novel, a poem, a work of philosophy, 
etc.) is transformed from onscreen image into a memory with a physical trace, a ghost of 
the image that I helped shape. Some images seem alive in our memory, evoking both 
cognitive and visceral responses, like a ghost who appears to remind me of something 
important, or to move me to action, or to remind me of my mortality. I have had 
 
2 Alternately, image ghosting. 
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experiences with some remembered images that are more intensely haunting than 
others, and I have had experiences with some images where my presence within the 
image seems assured. I’ll discuss later some of the reasons why ghosts may appear, but 
my intent with ghosting images is to add a new conceptual metaphor for understanding 
our relationship with images to the conversation of spectrality in film. Whether as the 
process by which we remember and are haunted by an image from a film, or as when 
we move like ghosts through the images on screen, ultimately ghosting images is a way 
to talk about how we might experience film. 
I’ll start in Chapter One with describing how filmic characters can become ghost 
images for us. I will consider the social, cultural, and historical associations we might 
hold for the two lead characters, Jesse James and Bob Ford, in The Assassination of Jesse 
James by the Coward Robert Ford (2007). By describing two ways that we might ascribe 
subjectivity/selfhood to the two lead characters, Jesse through the hermeneutic 
narrative and Bob in the experiential performance, I hope to demonstrate how ghosting 
the image can be a means by which we give our imagined characters life.  
In Chapter Two I will discuss the palimpsest in filmic adaptations as a means of 
ghosting images. My focus here is on Wings of Desire (1987) as the palimpsest of two 
earlier, German works: the poetry of Rainer Marie Rilke and Walter Benjamin’s Thesis 
on History. Though Wim Wenders’s film does not address the Benjaminian aura, I will 
propose an ontology of the aura that originates within the viewer/reader through the 
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feelings produced by the appearance of ghosts. Ghosting images from a source text and 
our affected responses to them not only shape the ghosts we produce in the adaptation, 
but also changes our experience of the filmic event. 
Chapters Three and Four will analyze scenes from The Wall (2012) and Children of 
Men (2006) as allegories for an afterlife. In these chapter I will address how these films 
create ghosts that haunt viewers, but furthermore, I will describe how camera 
movements and POV in both films create moments where the viewer feels viscerally 
moved through the filmic world in a ghost-like way. We are both haunted by and 
haunting a world that doesn’t exist. I will also discuss the possibilities for haunting 
space that The Wall allows in Chapter Three, and I will propose that the experience of a 
traumatic event produces a visceral memory which lives in our bodies in Chapter Four. 
That memory is the ghosted images viscerally revived, triggering our bodies to mimic 
the neuro-physiological responses experienced in the moment of extreme stress or 
traumatic event.  
Again, the dissertation is broadly organized around one conceptual metaphor—
ghosting images—with two means of employing that metaphor. Ghosting images can be 
the process by which we remember images, or it can be the process by which we appear 
to enter the imagined world onscreen.  
All four of the films discussed are adaptations of written texts—they adapt the 
voice, plot, themes, and ideas of written images created in the minds of readers. I did 
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not choose these films because they were adaptations; I choose them instead because I 
found resonance with them, their images haunted me, their ghosts were multiple and 
held common purpose. Having said that, I will at times address directly how ghosting 
images is particularly helpful for discussing filmic adaptations, especially when 
considering our layering of imagined characters, events, spaces, and traumas.3  
1.1 Images, ghosts, and mediation. 
As conceptual metaphors deployed by film philosophers, ghosts and spectrality 
evolved primarily in response to two sources—Freud’s interpretive work on the 
uncanny (das Umheimliche), an experience in which one is unable to explain the 
simultaneous feelings of familiarity and repulsion, and Derrida’s hauntology, a term he 
coins in Specters of Marx to describe the continuing influence of Marxist philosophy in 
other ideologies, including his own thoughts on deconstruction theory. More recently, 
the range of application and relevancy for debates on subjectivity is articulated clearly 
in Maria del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren’s description of the “spectral turn”:  
At the end of the twentieth century, a specific metamorphosis occurred of 
ghosts and haunting from possible actual entities, plot devices, and clichés of 
common parlance (“he is a ghost of himself,” “we are haunted by the past”) into 
influential conceptual metaphor permeating global (popular) culture and 
 
3 We see this image anew: the old intertextuality chant—we see the old anew and we see the 
new anew. 
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academia alike. A conceptual metaphor, Mieke Bal suggests, differs from an 
ordinary one in evoking, through a dynamic comparative interaction, not just 
one another thing, word, or idea and its associations, but a discourse, a system of 
producing knowledge.4  
As for its usefulness, this is how I see ghosting images—as ‘a system of producing 
knowledge.’ For my system to work, however, I must rely on several post-Freudian 
interpretations of the concept of the uncanny.  
As Anneleen Masschelein describes the evolution of the concept, Freud’s 
uncanny could be seen as a “mise-en-abyme for the logic of Freudianism,” a negative 
concept to unconsciousness itself.5  In other words, whereas we may hold that our 
actions may seem unexplainable from a conscious level, if we enter into analysis we 
might find ‘evidence’ that in some way mitigates our lack of ‘proof.’ But, in the mise-en-
abyme, the ‘proof’ of the uncanny is completely dependent on a ‘belief’ in a subjective 
experience despite even the most rational evidence.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I define “uncanniness” as an aesthetic quality produced in the affectual 
responses of a viewer upon seeing an incomprehensible image which is also strangely 
familiar—like an intense memory of an event that you did not personally experience. 
The more intense the affectual response, the more likely it will be remembered 
 
4 Del Par and Peeren. “Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities.” The Spectralities Reader, 1.  
5 Masschelein, The Unconcept, 8.  
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viscerally. In Chapter Four, I will further examine and differentiate the uncanny from 
experiences of or witness to trauma. In an effort to explain how traumatic images from a 
film are remembered, I will draw parallels to recent treatments of patients with post-
traumatic stress disorder. Since Freud developed his ideas about the uncanny while 
working with patients traumatized by the great war, the connection between uncanny 
feelings and the ghost-images haunting victims of trauma is clear. But as for viewers, 
images and the memory of images can provoke an experience so intense that the details 
of the terror reveal themselves in physiological responses. These physical symptoms 
may be substantive proof that the image in the mise-en-abyme exists.  
The first time I saw Guillermo del Toro’s Pan’s Labyrinth (2006), for example, a 
movie chock full of fantastic creatures and otherworldly mores and laws, I was most 
haunted by the scene where the fascist commander interrogates a Spanish farmer near 
the gates of the camp. The commander searches the farmer’s bag and finds a shirt and a 
bottle of wine. It is the image of the colonel turning on the farmer, holding the wine 
bottle by the neck, raising it above his head and then smashing the bottle’s flat-bottom 
across the bridge of the farmer’s nose that haunts me. This was the (first) scene I 
shielded my daughter’s eyes from when we watched it together, because for me it was 
too much. The violence and grotesquery of Pan’s underworld was never as “traumatic” 
for the viewer than those events that happened in the real world of the Spanish Fascists. 
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When reality holds greater terror than nightmare (or fantasy), the more likely we will be 
haunted by the images and their corresponding uncanny feelings.  
In Derrida, we get Hamlet’s father as the ghost seeking vengeance, or who, as 
Fredric Jameson calls this ghost, is the archetype of mourning and melancholia wherein 
“a present that has already exorcized all of its ghosts and believes itself to be without a 
past and without spectrality.”6 In Specters of Marx, we are presented a shared purpose 
for all  ghosts—because they are neither present nor absent, they remain as intrusions of 
incomprehensibility in our intellectual frameworks.7 My examination of ghosts presents 
some as having multiple purposes, and others whose purpose remains elusive and 
undefined. Ghosts rarely declare their purpose as explicitly as Hamlet’s father; more 
frequently, the anxiety for the witness who has seen or heard the ghost comes from the 
inability to explain why it has appeared. Ghosting images resembles Derrida’s 
hauntology in that when I describe my experiences with certain filmic images, I am 
calling forth the ghosts which are always already combined with other images from 
other experiences (especially as in the case with adaptations). Because this assemblage 
of ghosted images expands and animates my memories of persons, places, times, and 
events, the assemblage becomes an unwieldy intrusion in my memory of how I 
perceived those experiences.  
 
6 Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” Ghostly Demarcations, 58. 
7 Davis, Colin. “Hauntology, spectres and phantoms,” French Studies. 
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Some of the earliest criticisms of Derrida’s hauntology came from the Marxists 
and the deconstructionists.8 How, some questioned, could Derrida justify hauntology as 
material quality when his own works break every truth (not to mention belief) into a 
multiplicity of ambiguities and contradictions? Marxists saw Derrida not as necessarily 
indifferent or intentionally ignorant of the realities of torture, abuse, war crimes, 
traumatic events, etc., but if we are to take deconstruction at its face, then the specter 
Derrida sees can never be believed in. And if the ghost of a war crime can’t be believed 
in, we slip, as humans, backwards. In many of his late recorded interviews,9 Derrida 
speaks of various experiences which convincingly affirm his belief in ghosts. But as 
concerns haunting, “what is there” for Derrida not only must account for the social, 
historical, cultural, but what is there also accounts for the unseen, shaping force made 
material in our collective responses to it.  I’m less concerned about “what is there” when 
I see or feel a ghost; instead, I want to understand how I create “what is there” in my 
experiences of images. All this to say, I agree with Derrida that hauntology is not an 
answer that provides a precise meaning, but instead it is a function of our constant and 
disturbed search for meaning. Therefore, my process starts from a hauntological search 
 
8 An excellent collection of direct critical responses is Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on 
Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, first published by Verso in 1999. The collection includes 
essays by Antonio Negri, Frederic Jameson, Terry Eagleton, et al., and concludes with an essay 
in response by Derrida.  
9 Derrida. Directed by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, And Bernard Steigler on Jacques 
Derrida, Hauntology, and “Ghost Dance.” Youtube.  
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for meaning, but it is the ghosting of images that will account for the ways our bodies 
react to those remembered images.  
If the process by which an image is ghosted were precise, like a spell or 
incantation, I would try to devise an application that yielded a grand theory; but, image 
ghosting resists this type of precision. Because many of the terms I’m using in 
describing this process are inherently vague, speculative, or contradictory, ghosting 
images might seem nothing more than an incomprehensible metaphor, a model for 
describing imprecisely how we might hold memories of images, of people, places, and 
events.10 Underlying my claims about the conceptual metaphor of ghosting images is my 
belief that imprecision in language opens. Opens to what or where, or to or for whom? As 
I show in Chapter Two, the Open, where angels (and ghosts) exist, may only be 
accessible to us through metaphor and other imprecise images.  
Just as the palimpsestic process generates a creative response, so, too, does the 
process of ghosting images generate creative and participatory responses. But ghosting 
adds more than just another layer. Whether we call them ghosts, specters, haints, 
revenants, spirits, whatever, images can haunt us. The images may be mediated and/or 
witnessed first-hand, they might be textual and/or filmic, fictional and/or historical, but 
when we remember them and an uncanny feeling overcomes us, it is the ghosted image 
 
10 This is why I link the process of ghosting images to two physiologically perceived viewer 
responses—the uncanny sensation or the auratic reverberance. More to follow. 
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that we have recalled. Other ghosted images may charm us with close-ups or long 
takes, like a spell moving us in non-human ways through a world of our own 
imagining. The ghosted image differs from the palimpsest in that the former opens the 
image to multiple, opposing, and mysterious meanings. Ghostly imprecision is not a 
limiting factor; it is an expansive function.  
Because I refer to ‘images’ repeatedly throughout the dissertation, I should first 
explain how I apply the term, as well as some of the limitations my usage may incur.  
Although I believe an individual can create and hold a perfectly unique and singular 
image their mind, and I believe that a singular image could allow a mandalaic or mantric 
affect, for my purposes I will instead focus on images that have been mediated by an 
artist, novelist, philosopher, poet, or filmmaker. I start then from the assumption that 
images exist, but for an image to exist independent from its creator, it has to be 
mediated. Poetry spoke off the cuff at dinner after two drinks has mediation, through 
language, through context, through form. And even in the sparse couplet, the image 
becomes, for the listener and the poet, a ghost residing in each. The ghosts of textual 
images, for example, can seem particularly animate for those readers who most actively 
complete the imagining of the image. We can experience the image multiple times and 
in various forms, and each new reading/viewing may add one or more layers to or take 
one or more layers from the collective that is our ghosted image. As we experience one 
image (for example, a character from a novel) and then another (that character 
12 
portrayed in the adaptation) the ghost image that you, the reader/viewer imagined 
upon reading, is reshaped visually by that which you’ve seen. So, in its mediation the 
image exists as first shaped by public contexts, some of which we reader/viewers may 
be unaware; but then, as reader/viewers experience the image, we each reshape it, each 
adding details the others cannot know, each refining the image to reflect most 
presciently our own personal and private inner contexts.  
The ghosted image haunts us because mediation has a transformative power to 
make a material object into something subjectively immaterial. More specifically, 
mediated images can be of material objects, but also people, events, or physical space; 
they can be emblematic of ideas or concepts; they can be emotively effusive or 
restrained, traumatizing or inert.  And to further complicate how we remember images, 
when we bring the image back to life, we may also be haunted by the contexts that 
shaped the image on our first viewing. Images are constantly becoming—transformed 
by the viewer’s changing position to the public contexts, those systemic, political, 
ideological and historical geists exterior to the viewer, and the private contexts, those 
complex, mythological, and self-conscious interiorities giving shape and form to the 
image. We view or hear or feel the image, and it is made a ghost by our reception, 
appearing out of the frenzied vortex of our conscious and self-referencing memory, 
given ghost-body by the contexts in which the image was experienced.   
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Images and mediation together birth ghosted images for the viewer of a film, the 
reader of a text, the consumer of media. An image may have the potential for ghosting, 
but it is the viewers/readers/consumers who, consciously or not, decide which images 
will be ghosted. By looking to the neurophysiological affects produced by traumatic 
events11 in victim and witness alike as a model for how we hold memories of images, in 
my consideration of mediated images I will draw parallels to the affects that the 
ghosting of traumatic filmic images12 (or textual images, etc.) have on the viewer. A 
filmic image is more likely to haunt if, when first viewed, it produces an uncanny 
sensation. Although there is considerable difference between the haunting images of a 
traumatic event and ghosted images of an uncanny sensation experienced while 
watching a film, applying what is known about traumatic memories to the ghosts of 
filmic images of persons, space, and event may help explain the ghost’s purpose. The 
ghosts of traumatic images are likely to have purposes. They can be there to remind us 
to never forget, to relive something fearful, or to bring back a lost love. Just as ghosts 
remain with survivors of trauma, one explanation for why the ghosts of certain filmic 
images tend to stay in our memories longer than ‘normal’ images may be because we 
haven’t been able to find a reasonably acceptable purpose in their existence.  
 
11 An experience of an image without mediation. 
12 An experience of a mediated image.  
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Ghosts exist in contradictions (here/somewhere else), negations (alive/not alive), 
and oppositions (presence/absence). And though they may be borne in our imagination, 
and thereby immaterial, as memories these ghosts are alive in our bodies, materialized 
in our physical reactions. Sometimes, when the memory of the images or events are 
intense, the whole body feels possessed by ghosts. Other times, the ghost is a fleeting, 
visceral memory: an unexpected tightening of the chest or random twitch of leg—
memory made flesh. We remember an image and we see a ghost. How fully we 
experience these ghosts likely depends on how we first witnessed the image. Do we 
know the person? Were we there when it happened? Was the event mediated? How has 
our relationship with the world around us changed? 
A ghost may have a purpose, and a ghost may have an aura. I begin with the 
belief that an aura does not originate in the object, the text, or the image; the aura is 
always brought to a work by us, the viewers. In other words, while ghosting the image, 
the viewer may feel compelled to accept a meaning for the image that is beyond 
ordinary language. Ghosting images may also activate an auratic sensation when the 
viewer has previous experiences with the image. For example, the ghost of a character 
from a novel has an aura, and the same character on screen may have share that aura, or 
have a completely separate aura, or even no aura at all. In some ways it may not matter, 
except to the individual viewer, for she is the one who ultimately ascribes aura to 
ghosted images. Viewers bring ghosts with them, especially in adaptations, and each 
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viewer’s ghost is a completely personal version of the textual character. It’s hard not to 
compare, as one character-image erases the other; or when all the character-images 
meld together like in a lumpy mass of Hamlet’s fathers.  
In my system, an auratic sensation and an uncanny sensation can both be 
physical manifestations of a viewer’s ghosting as well as sensations which elude 
explanation. The auratic and the uncanny are separate scales of sensation—the greater 
the intensity of the experience, the higher on the scale the sensation scores. However, 
the difference lies in the viewing experience. Whereas the uncanny sensation may be a 
symptom of an image’s enchanting and affecting potential, the auratic sensation is the 
viewer’s recognition of an aesthetic intensity present in the ghosted image. In other 
words, the uncanny evokes with the supernatural, the auratic with the sublime. I will 
spend more time in Chapter Two differentiating between the uncanny and the auratic, 
but for now I will simply assert that remembering ghosts may evoke emotional, 
psychic, and/or physical sensations. Determining which sensations are evoked may 
help us clarify why the ghost appears, because whether uncanny or auratic, the 
sensations are physical evidence of the ghost’s purpose and liveliness.  
Roughly hewn, my idea is this: when the viewer enters the theater, she enters 
with a soul full of perceptions, a mind full of concepts, and a body full of memories. 
Sometimes the viewer sees an image onscreen that produces an auratic sensation. This 
reaction can be physical, emotional, intellectual, etc., but it is a sensation in response to 
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the internal contexts she holds for the image. The aura is an internal, subjective feeling 
that an image is more than what is there. Other times, a viewer may feel as if she is alive 
in the filmic world, as if she could exert influence on what she sees. However, she is 
aware that she does not exist in that world; she is witnessing it as a ghost. Like the 
sympathetic nervous response registered on the vagal nerve in a traumatic event, an 
image can leave a trace that the witness experiences as an uncanny sensation when the 
image is seen again. Ghosted images may haunt us long after they appear onscreen; and 
when we remember them, the ghosts may appear to us glowing in the aura of the 
image, or the ghosts may awaken multiple uncanny responses, or they may do both.  
1.2 The Ghost of Deleuze   
I recognize that when trying to make sense of images, I’m haunted by images 
produced from my readings of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. I am haunted by 
certain Deleuzian images and concepts—the rhizome, the body-machine, the body 
without organs; those contradictory, mostly surreal, Deleuzian images that make sense 
(if only on an intuitive level) to me. And also, I’m haunted by him, his filmic-image, 
from the three DVD set—Gilles Deleuze from A to Z with Claire Parnet  (2012). He is in his 
home office, smoking, dying of an impending suicide or accidental fall, talking with his 
former student, the journalist Claire Parnet. I am haunted by this image of Deleuze in 
deep conversation. It is clear his thoughts are layered with complexity and intrigue, but 
as he speaks the words crackle under the rasp; they come with apology and deference 
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between coughs and chuckles. His laugh sounds rough, yet kind and curious. She gives 
him a word, “Animal,” then another “Boire,” and then another “Culture.” It’s when she 
gets to “Enfance” that the old philosopher drops into a discourse that he claims to 
eschew—memoir. Though he isn’t against the form per se, he says very directly that it is 
the subject of his memoir—his life—that he found unappealing. He begins to argue that 
‘who he is’ is completely separate from who he was and how he viewed life and all that 
was in it. But Parnet implores him, as only a student can, to elucidate, to explain more. 
And in that moment, I ghost the image—leaning in, entering the room to forgive him his 
struggling breath with the words to tell the story from his childhood of learning to 
think. Deleuze becomes haunted by his former image of himself. He tells of learning to 
think, and how a teacher, while on a walk near the ocean, encouraged him to be curious 
and creative because that’s where the real philosophy happens. And even now, when I 
remember that scene, I have multiple ghosts of Deleuze—the speaker telling the story of 
his youth and the child I imagined. The ghost image of Deleuze remains with me, living 
though the man is dead. So, I believe in ghosts. I also believe in post-human ghosts. The 
mediated Deleuze is a post-human ghost in that the image I have of the philosopher only 
exists in mediation. This ghost image is also constantly becoming—continually shaped 
and reshaped by external contexts which were not present when the human Deleuze 
was alive. His writing, his interviews, the Manuel DeLanda’s European Graduate 
School lectures, the youtube videos attempting to explain his work, the books and 
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articles in response to other critical books and articles—for me, Deleuze exists as a post-
human ghost, a mediated image that exists only as shaped by my interior contexts. The 
ghosting of Deleuze is a material trace of the human and the post-human Deleuze living 
in and for me. Likewise, it is not only the people or characters in a film, but also the 
space in the diegetic world, and the events (fictional and historical), and the personal 
and cultural traumas that become ghosts for me. Their insubstantial existence leaves a 
material trace in me.  
To further explain how this process might work, I am using a hauntologic 
assemblage of filmic images as a framework for considering the affectual responses that 
ghosted images produce. I apply the conceptual metaphors of ghosts and ghosting to filmic 
images in four ways: the ghost of character, the image that holds subjectivity; the 
ghosted images of an event; our ghosting the image of space, within and outside; and 
ghosting the image of trauma, witness to the personal and public. When the viewer 
leaves the theater, she carries with her, in her bodily memory (her conscious, her mind, 
spirit, imagination, whatever), ghosts of these and other filmic images. The assemblage 
I’m proposing is not a grand theory for divining meaning applicable to every image; it 
is a framework of inquiry into how we experience and remember images. Ultimately 
my questions cannot prove, but can affirm, our belief that the images that haunt us and 
the images that we haunt exist.  
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The bulk of the chapters will consist of reading one film in relation to one of four 
image types. There are other image types we could consider, but these four in particular 
haunt us and our relationships with others. Filmic characters, both fictional and 
biographical, may coexist and coincide with historical events or the personal events. 
And as we pass through the images of space or as witness to trauma, we may become 
aware of the sensation that we are there/not there in the world onscreen. The common 
experience with ghosts is that they appear to us for a reason, a purpose we may have to 
work out on our own, often in a space where in traumatic events occurred. As Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok explain, the “secret of the ghost is a riddle…to be explained. 
Spectrals must be restored to order of knowledge with the result of exorcising effect on 
the living” (qtd. in Cinquegrani).13 Traditionally, ghosts appear to act with one of five 
purposes: in order to motivate us to act, like Hamlet’s father; or they come to heal and 
reconcile, or to reconnect with the living who mourn their loss; they seek justice or 
revenge, especially if they are victims of violent acts or atrocities; they desire to remain 
in a place, haunting spaces and revealing themselves to interlopers; or they work to 
protect the living, as a guiding influences or guardian spirits. The attempt to unravel 
the paradox that Slavoj Žižek calls the desire to keep the dead with us and get rid of them14  
may be a fool’s errand. But I believe ghosts can have a purpose grounded in the events 
 
13 Cinquegrani, Maurizio. “Shadow of Shadows: The Undead in Bergman’s Cinema.” Cinematic 
Ghosts. 
14 Looking Awry, 22.  
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leading to their states of being undead. And, for this reason, I believe we should try to 
understand and explain the philosophical implications of ghosts, and how their filmic 
presence can change who we are. 
I will also assert that when viewed together, character, event, space, and trauma 
work like a constellation from which we try to divine meaning from their positions in 
relation to each other and in contrast to the dark sky. Although my concept of the image 
uses Deleuzian terms to define it, my concept of image differs from his most 
significantly in that I believe our subjective experience is unavoidable.  Our efforts to 
view a character, event, space, or trauma from an objective perspective may not only be 
reductive of that which makes us most human, but also physically impossible, 
especially in light of what we are now learning about how the body responds 
neurologically and physically to trauma. Memories are physiological receptacles—
gathering places for ghosts which haunt our subjective experience. We cannot simply 
ignore their persistent existence because we prefer to clearly distinguish who we are 
from who we once were. The constant becoming that Deleuze sees us as simply gets to 
that us we once had been.  
1.3 Part I: Ghosts from History 
A brief comment on why I find Walter Benjamin’s work so compelling—History 
is filled with ghosts. When we think of historical figures, we call forth the ghosts we 
have created out of nothing more than our experiences with images read, seen, or heard 
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about them. Or while visiting a historical site, we may feel sensations that we believe 
are like psychic echoes returning from a collective past experience.  As Avery Gordon 
describes it, haunting is the product of the social imagination, and, in terms we could 
use to describe our subjective experience of history, haunting occurs:  
in the world of common reality. To be haunted is not a contest between animism 
and a discrediting reality test, nor a contest between the unconscious and 
conscious faculties. It is an enchanted encounter in a disenchanted world 
between familiarity and strangeness.15 
I would argue further that these “enchanted encounters” are not limited to a subject’s 
interaction with the ghosts of people, but encounters can also occur between the subject 
and place, or time, or even extreme situation. We tend to think of ghosts as resembling 
us, as having our physicality. But we may see them also as disembodied bodies—
humanlike characters with narratives but no medium to speak for them. Because film is 
especially efficient in embodying/disembodying images, it is the medium best suited for 
interacting with the ghosts of history. The Polish poet Cesław Miłosz proposed that we 
are all witnesses to history, and therefore, we have a moral imperative to speak for and 
with these ghosts.16 The first two chapters attempts to demonstrate how a film that 
presents historical characters and events can do these two things—give voice to the 
 
15 Ghostly Matters, 54-55 (italics in original). 
16 The Witness of Poetry.  
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ghosts of those who may suffer the events of history and allow us presence as witness 
to the events. We will always be in that unique historical position of Jetztzeit—the now 
before revolution.  If history can only spring forward in revolution when released by the 
artist’s created image, then how else can the image be ghosted but with an awareness of 
our shared national, political, or cultural history.    
1.3.1 Chapter One: Ghosting Characters: Mediation in The Assassination of Jesse 
James by the Coward Robert Ford 
Although it’s easy to understand why we might think the characters onscreen are 
alive, the dilemma becomes more complex when we consider why these characters are 
alive/not alive. When we view the character image as having presence, immediacy, 
agency, we may convince ourselves that the image is ‘alive,’ ‘having life’; or we might 
think the characters we see in film are always already nonliving things; or we might see 
the characters as becoming alive (and as the character is constantly becoming, a trace of its 
former non-existence is left in the viewer’s memory). So, by starting with an extended 
definition of the image of character, the character as it appears onscreen, I hope to pre-
emptively settle some questions about subjectivity, and speculate on how characters are 
ghosted through the mediation of their image.  
A common complaint among movie-goers after watching an adaptation is that 
the book was better than the film. This complaint is understandable when we compare 
the character we imagined while reading against the character we view onscreen. Even 
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though our subjective experience of the written text creates images and characters as we 
read, film embodies and substantiates these character-images more fully with actors. 
With a written text, we participate in creating the character-image, completing the 
metaphor, so to speak, by pulling ghosts out of the infinite interior that creativity 
enables. However, with a film this infinite source of creativity is partially stifled. In 
other words, written characters allow the reader to imagine them metaphorically, 
whereas in a film the images function more like simile or synecdoche.17 As a simile, the 
image-character you see is always-only-similar-to, they are only like the image you 
created; or as synecdoche, the onscreen image always-stands-as-a-part-of-an-
impossibly-large-number-of-possibly-imagined images. What we are asked to do while 
watching a movie is to take an image (a character, an embodiment, an animal, a 
landscape, etc.) and have that image stand in for all those ghosted images we have 
already created, as well as for all the potential images that we have not yet created.  
In my reading of The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford (The 
Assassination), I will begin with the ghost of Jesse James (Brad Pitt), an image mediated 
by contemporaneous dime-novel characterizations, which haunts Bob Ford (Casey 
Affleck). In his lifetime, Jesse James was considered the most celebrated person in the 
U.S., despite the fact that the image most people held of him was fabricated. His image 
 
17 Perhaps, once we note the difference in our relationship to the image—between 
reader/metaphor and between viewer/synecdoche—we can change the way that we remember, 
and possibly change how we view the ghosts that haunt us. 
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appeared in multiple forms of media, from newspaper accounts to popular songs, from 
dime-novel to stage play. Both the novel and the filmic adaptation of The Assassination 
encourage readers/viewers to consider how the multiple versions of Jesse and Bob hold 
sway over the images we may already know. Just as the image that Bob holds of Jesse 
changes after he witnesses the reality of the pathological, murderous Jesse James, so, 
too, may we find our image of Jesse James is not reliable. The image of Jesse James that 
Pitt embodies is one with multiple subjectivities, formed out of the juxtaposition of a 
reliable third-person narration against the manic homicidal threat underlying Jesse’s 
every move. Because the film The Assassination imbues each character image with 
selfhood in multiple ways, it is particularly useful in exemplifying how we ghost 
character images. 
Adapted from the historical novel by Ron Hanson, the third-person, voice-over 
narration recalls the dime-novel descriptions which initially ghosted the image of Jesse 
for Bob. Telling the story through a disembodied voice-over narrator is just one of the 
many stylistic choices that director Andrew Dominik makes to reinforce our sense of 
haunting: he also uses shallow-focused images and sepia-toned scenes to imply a 
remembered past; he de-materializes Jesse and Bob by framing them behind opaque 
glass, or by reflecting their bodies in pictures or windows at night; and he makes us 
witness to the acts of violence which Jesse recounts in a third-person tale. Although the 
focus of this chapter will be on the modes of ascribing a subjective selfhood to Jesse 
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(though the hermeneutic narrative) and Bob (through the embodied gestural 
performance), I hope to show how the mediation of images can add multiple, if not 
paradoxical, layers of ghosted images.  
The first ghost is borne from the images Bob has culled from the dime-novels 
glorifying the crimes of Jesse and Frank James and their gang. As we are told in the 
voice-overs, as evidenced by his collection of fan-boy memorabilia, and as we witness in 
Affleck’s performance, Bob idolizes Jesse. But Bob is also traumatized by the reality of 
James’s murderous tendencies. I argue that Affleck is able to embody the temperament 
and physical accents of a character who decides, after measuring the real Jesse against 
the mediated ghost of his hero, that the real Jesse must die. In addition, the explicit 
expressions of Jesse’s suicidal thoughts and tendencies leaves the viewer with the 
impression that Bob understands Jesse’s intention and can thereby justify the murder.  
The final half hour of the film is spent with Bob, the surviving witness to the 
eponymous event that bolstered Jesse’s celebrity and that brought Bob infamy. Haunted 
by the ghost conjured publicly in newspaper accounts, popular songs, and even the 
Fords’ own staged re-creations, Bob’s final years demonstrate his demise as a symptom 
of the mediated images. For us viewers, the image of Bob is ghosted not only in the 
narrative of his remaining years, but more importantly by Affleck’s physical, gestural 
embodiment. We watch as the Affleck-embodied-Bob wrestles with the multiple ghosts of 
Jesse, and witnessing this struggle may give new context to our own ghosts. Despite the 
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easy parallels we may find between the celebrated images of Brad Pitt in our time and 
Jesse James in his, for many viewers it is Casey Affleck’s embodiment of Bob Ford who 
has the strongest ghostly presence. The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert 
Ford provides two clearly differentiated examples of how a viewer may assign  
subjectivity/selfhood to characters.  
1.3.2 Chapter Two: Angels of the Event: Palimpsests of Grief and Desire 
In Chapter Two, I discuss intertextual ghosting of the image of the angel. My case 
study will explore issues of influence, translation, and the creative palimpsest in three 
diverse texts—Rilke’s Duino Elegies, Benjamin’s “Ninth Thesis of History,” and 
Wender’s Wings of Desire. The shared visions between this poet, this philosopher, and 
this filmmaker demonstrate Thomas Leitch’s description of adaptation as “Janus-faced” 
view that looks simultaneously backward and forward. I also agree with Linda 
Hutcheon’s summary description of the adaptation as a palimpsest:  
• An acknowledged transposition of a recognizable other work or works 
• A creative and an interpretive act of appropriation/salvaging 
• An extended intertextual engagement with an adapted work 
Therefore, an adaptation is a derivation that is not derivative—a work that is 
second without being secondary. It is its own palimpsestic thing.18 
 
18 A Theory of Adaptation, 8-9. 
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So, while it may be true that we as viewers participate in the creation of adapted images 
in response to our previously held interpretations, I believe ghosting images is a more 
refined description of the palimpsestic process. My assertion is that what is created in 
this “creative and interpretive act” is a ghosted image. Whereas the palimpsest limits 
our subjective, phenomenological, emotional experiences to the uppermost layer, 
ghosting images allows us to participate in the creative process only because we also 
know of and recognize those underlying images erased and reimagined. If we did not 
know of the earlier images, we may simply mistake the trace left behind as part of the 
image in the fore. Just as ghosts don’t necessarily know the witness to whom it appears, 
filmic adaptations of character, events, and place can appear to us from seemingly out 
of nowhere. Sometimes while watching a film, the image onscreen may seem to 
produce an auratic sensation—a physically perceptible response to an image, which in 
this case calls a visceral memory back to life. The aura here, to mix my metaphors, 
emerges when the ghosted image rises to the top. 
In Wings of Desire, the images of angels are ghosted when conjoined with our 
imagined ghost images of Rilke’s schreckliche Engel, with Klee’s Novo Angelus, and 
Benjamin’s angel of history. When I see Damiel (Bruno Ganz), for example, he becomes 
the angels of the Duino Elegies, ghostly beings embodying grief and desire. He also 
becomes the angel of history, pushed forward in time by one man-made disaster after 
another. Remembering Rilke’s angels in the context of Wings of Desire imbues my 
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aesthetic response with greater potential; my ghosted image of angels carries with it an 
aura that I apply to the image of Damiel. By applying this process to a specific image, 
joining together the schreckliche Engel with a consumptive ‘desire for contact with 
another’ with the image of ‘Damiel reaching for Marion’ for example, our response 
evokes a more complex set of sensations. 
Ghosts of the event World War II appear directly in Wings of Desire in the images 
of the citizens of Berlin rummaging through the ruins in black-and-white newsreel clips 
or in official Nazi party footage; they are images of the soldiers and victims as 
portrayed by modern actors in the film within the film. Wenders layers the ghosted 
images thickly, and at times he lets us see Berlin as the angels do, with time out of 
joint—the ghostly images from Berlin ‘41 projected on the half-demolished buildings in 
Berlin ’87. History is a ghost in Wings, and Berlin is haunted by angels. Our perspective 
moves between human and angel, or, as Benjamin might describe these worlds, 
between the creaturely and open. This movement between the world known to us as 
humans and another, purely imaginable other world beyond is a creative aspect 
ghosting the image may allow. Here the viewer is ghosting images in the film—shifting 
perspectives from an inhabitant of one world to an inhabitant of the other in single 
scene. A scene may begin in black-and-white. We stand next to an angel who presses 
his head against the wall and watches the dancers fill the dancefloor. Then, we cut to 
full color, standing by the acrobat in a red sweater dancing among the bright lights to 
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Nick Cave and the Bad Seeds. This visual perspectival movement between the 
“creaturely” and the “open” demonstrates one of the limits of the palimpsest.19 These 
shifts in perspective are only possible in filmic mediation; no matter how proficient 
Rilke or Benjamin were in creating visual-textual images, readers cannot experience the 
different visual sensations that black-and-white images and color images produce with 
the same immediacy.  
The themes of three works are also connected by the historical Events to which 
the artists are responding. Although the themes of alienation, grief, and desire, as well 
as the angels and circus performers archetypes, go through a palimpsestic process, it 
would be wrong to say each artist is writing about only one Event. Benjamin responds 
to World War II, but his work can also be read as responding to Berlin in 1987 (or 2019). 
And we would not consider World War II as a palimpsest for World War I. However, 
when Peter Falk arrives in Berlin to film a movie set in 1941, at the height of Nazi 
power, the film within the film retains a trace of the real events.  The set of the film is 
populated by actors and actresses made to appear as victims and soldiers—the 
uniforms and costumes carrying the weight of the Event. Peter sketches the “extras” 
with a pencil and pad in between takes, and beside him Damiel listens as Peter’s inner 
voice describes “extra people.” The onscreen Event has passed, and the actors are 
 
19 The palimpsestic process as a way of explaining adaptations, it seems to me, may work better 
when the layered works are of the same medium. 
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onscreen versions of ghosts.20 Throughout the chapter I will return to the ghosting of the 
event-image, especially as we see the juxtaposition of historical Event to the personal 
event.   
1.4 Part II: Ghosts in the Afterlife  
Another useful way for seeing aspects of haunting and ghosts in film is through 
an analysis of two allegories for the afterlife. In my discussions of the two films, The 
Wall in Chapter Three and Children of Men in Chapter Four, my focus will shift from 
how the image is remembered to how we can seemingly live among the onscreen 
images. The afterlife is an appropriate allegory for ghosting images as it allows the 
reader/viewer the dual perspective of contrary space. In the allegory, we are 
nonexistent in the diegetic world, yet we seem to haunt those who are in it. By applying 
ghosting images from this perspective—a process by which the viewer experiences 
mediated images of people, events, space, or trauma from the point of view of first-
hand witness—I hope to show how current research on traumatic memories can 
provide a useful framework for understanding how we may remember some mediated 
images. Furthermore, if our response to the allegory, our response to the image of space 
and event, our belief in ghosts, comes after the experience, then the afterlife is a good 
position from which we can reflect on how our actions among the living shape who we 
 
20 I strongly believe history has compelled us to a moral obligation—as a species, to survive an 
Event like World War II we must keep within us the living ghosts of those who lived through it. 
31 
become. Stories of the end times, natural or human generated cataclysms, dystopian 
landscapes, are common thematic and symbolic tropes that filmmakers can use to sway 
us from a catastrophic future event we should hope to avoid.  
Although I address issues of adaptation in my discussion of Wings of Desire, I will 
spend a portion of the third chapter discussing how the text (the novel Die Wand) 
haunts the film (The Wall), because for both versions, images of textuality are 
purposefully subjective. The bulk of my discussion in this chapter, however, will focus 
on the image of space. In the final chapter on Children of Men, my focus will be most 
intensely on the affect that mediated trauma may have on the viewer. Because of 
Cuarón’s use of innovative camera-work—specifically long takes and the ghostly 
POV—this film provides many opportunities to create viewing experience where we 
are image ghosting.  
1.4.1 Chapter Three: Ghosting Spatial-Images: Entering the Filmic Space of The 
Wall 
Space has natural linkage between the metaphors of haunting and ghost. A space 
occupied by a ghost is haunted. When we watch a movie, we may enter into the filmic 
space as a participating ghost; we experience filmic space as if being moved from the 
now of where we are into the now of another space. In addition, if we allow inward 
movement as the movement from where we are to another space, and outward 
movement as from another space to where we are, we begin to break through the 
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liminal space that the screen implies. The films discussed all create spatial barriers, both 
visible and invisible, through which the characters appear unable to cross; therefore, 
movement within the space will become a crucial point of further review. When a 
character moves inward, she may move either deeper into the onscreen space or out of 
frame completely; moving outward for the character-image is a movement in which the 
character has no agency. For a character to move outward, it is the viewer’s subjective 
experience that activates the agency necessary for the image to cross over. As I discuss 
in Chapter One, ghosting a character may involve moving the image from the public 
exhibition to private embodiment for the viewer; in Chapter Three, I will consider the 
spaces into and out of which the ghosting of character-images and viewers move. 
Viewers enable character-images to move outward through ghosting, taking the ghost 
away from the screen and out of the theater. And later, at dinner they may pull the 
ghost out, revive it to join in their conversation, allow it to be shaped and reshaped 
communally. They may take it home, and tuck it away in their memories where it stays 
until re-awoken. In this way, filmic character-images cross the liminal that ‘screen’ 
implies. But, we also must remember that even though the outward movement of a 
character is possible through the subjective experience of the viewer, moving inward for 
the viewer is a form of experiential agency that only he or she can measure or control. 
The movement of the viewer inward, breaching the liminal space separating the 
internal and external experiences, can happen quite easily.  
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One of the most striking elements in The Wall is director Julian Roman Pölsler’s 
foregrounding of liminal space, which allows viewers to clearly distinguish between 
internal movements and external movements. Although the obvious physical 
limitations that separate viewers from the diegetic world are currently unbreachable, 
Pölsler positions the viewer in multiple and sometimes simultaneous layers of space 
and time. We are allowed to move between two afterlives—one that is within the wall 
and the other outside of the wall. We occupy the same space as the woman, but time is 
circular and repetitive. We watch her watching the ghost of a younger version of herself 
walking down past paths, moving again always back to a specific moment in a specific 
place. Because our positions within the world onscreen shift so frequently, we can chose 
to see our position in the ‘real world’ as just another one in the layered experience. 
Generally, we decide, consciously or not, how far inward we can allow ourselves to go. 
But, it is through the visual limitations of space in The Wall that we are reminded that 
even as active subjective viewers, our existence among filmic images must always be 
neither fully here/not here. We are ghosting the image when we experience the filmic 
space as one where our presence is both impossible yet affirmed.  
Based on German author Marlen Haushofer’s 1968 novel, Die Wand, the film 
adaptation is the story of a lone woman enclosed by an unexplained transparent wall 
encircling several miles high in the Alps. The novel and film are narrated through the 
woman’s journal entries as she learns to survive in a world alone with her animal 
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companions—the only other living creatures. Although she cannot comprehend what 
life outside the wall is, she can see others on the outside apparently caught in a constant 
moment of now. Shortly after her first encounter with the wall, for example, she sees an 
old couple in the cabin down the road frozen in time; the man’s back permanently bent, 
his hands stuck cupping running water from a well pump. Furthermore, because she 
has started the journal after two years inside the wall, we can assume our “reading” of 
the journal is only possible after her death. We see her at times younger and soft from 
city life, then hardened by the years of hard work, and then young again. Her dog Lynx 
is her constant companion, and his fate becomes the turning point around which she 
starts writing.  
Another aspect of this adaptation that I will discuss involves Marlen Haushofer 
and the actress who portrays the woman, Martina Gedeck. Haushofer was a young 
rising literary star in Germany—a strong feminist voice who died of cancer shortly after 
the novel was published. Pölsler’s adaptation resurrected attention for the novel and 
revived international academic interest in Haushofer’s work. Although the novel is a 
haunting fairy-tale with serious philosophical and political overtones, the main 
thematic questions about how one lives and dies seem to echo Haushofer’s personal 
beliefs. Without delving too deeply into performance, I believe it will be helpful to 
discuss Gedeck’s embodiment of The Woman because the physical transformation we 
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see her undergo during the fourteen-month process of filming acts as a narrative device 
giving voice and existence to the ghost of the woman earlier in the afterlife. 
The Wall is an excellent film for discussing filmic space and habitation of filmic 
space because it provides several examples of how space is haunted, is haunting, and 
can be haunted by viewers. As the first film in the Afterlife section, I hope to 
demonstrate how Gedeck’s embodiment of the woman not only creates multiple ghosts 
of herself that haunt her, but our position as witness to the multiple embodiments 
makes us a ghost to ‘actual’ woman. Furthermore, Pölsler’s vision of space produces 
uncanny affects with simple special effects. The effects are not innovative, but the 
philosophical implications provoked in the spatial images ask us to consider where we 
are located within this space. A question posed in both the novel and the film concerns 
our place as readers/viewers: we inside the wall, alive/dead, or outside the wall, 
alive/dead?  Through a close reading of The Wall, I want to show how the viewer may 
experience ghosting of spatial images through the Polsler’s mise-en-scene, in the 
embodied textual narrative, in the aging of the Woman, and the women’s reactions to 
our haunting presence.  
1.4.2 Chapter Four: Witness to trauma, we are ghosts in Children of Men 
The last chapter will examine the dystopian world of Alfonso Cuarón’s 
adaptation of Children of Men as an allegory of the afterlife. The world, in Cuarón’s 
vision, is haunted by mourning and trauma. Humankind faces a literal existential crisis, 
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and for many living is a constant reminder that they are the last generation. They are 
traumatized by their very existence. Because viewers move through the world in 
Children of Men as a witness to multiple traumas, I want to explore how our ghosting 
presence among those traumatic images can give purpose to our viewing experience. 
But first, for understanding how we might remember mediated images of trauma, I 
look at how the body responds to a traumatic experience for clues. 
 Perhaps because we may hold strong clinical, familial, or even personal 
associations with trauma, traumatic-images are loaded with greater ordinance than other 
image types. Images of trauma haunt us with greater frequency and force. According to 
the DSM-V21 the clinical definition of trauma excludes the watching of ‘non-work 
related’ media as a possible cause or event. However, after considering the work of 
leading neuroscientists specializing in trauma Steven Porges and Bessel van der Kolk, 
as well as current research on mediated trauma by Amit Pinchevski and others,22 I 
argue that filmic images, even fictional ones, can be potentially traumatic. Pinchveski 
contends that trauma is a priori visually mediated, and that “trauma, being a clash 
 
21 One point that Pinchveski makes in “Screen Trauma: Visual Media and Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder” about the DSM is especially useful. He writes:  
The DSM is obviously much more than a diagnostic manual. As Ian Hacking (2013) 
notes, the primary readers of the DSM are not mental health professionals but 
bureaucrats of various governmental and corporate branches, who rely on its categories 
to process mental health claims. As a key tool in legislation, insurance, and policy, the 
DSM has been in the fray of a number of public campaigns that sought recognition for 
yet unacknowledged conditions. PTSD is an exemplary case in this regard. (56) 
22 Others include Bill Shaffer (2001), Wilma Bucci (2008), and Ella L. James (2016).  
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between outside and inside, can be viewed as the result of failed mediation, a pathology 
of intermediacy. […] Trauma is what happens when the medium does not hold.”23 
Literary trauma theorist Cathy Carruth describes the experience of survivors of PTSD 
telling their stories as a paradox—the more terrifying the event, the greater its 
inexpressibility. Even when they know that sharing their story can lead to healing, 
many survivors simply cannot. The traumatic events are suppressed, intentionally 
unremembered, because they are simply too terrifying.  
However, van der Kolk’s work may confound these earlier assumptions. The 
psychological impact of trauma on a subject, which is often coupled with physical 
injury—simultaneous traumas marking an event—is ‘remembered’ by the body as the 
slowing of time. Van der Kolk demonstrates how the body reacts when a trauma occurs 
by continuing to secrete more adrenaline, which enables one to retain memory in more 
precise detail, until, “confronted with horror—especially the horror of ‘inescapable 
shock’—this system becomes overwhelmed and breaks down.”24  Time doesn’t slow, 
but our adrenaline-cranked sensory receptors are open so wide, our perception of time 
expands with the sudden flood of detailed images, distinct sounds, particular smells, 
etc. Mediated filmic images are not usually accompanied by physical trauma, but the 
images can mimic the speed and detail of a traumatic event and they can evoke 
 
23 Pinchevski, “Screen Trauma,” 54.  
24 The Body Keeps the Score, 176. 
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uncanny sensations. A mediated image may not cause trauma; but, if the image induces 
a mimicking of our physiological response to trauma (slow motion, close-up, color 
saturation, etc.) and the image evokes feelings that elude explanation, we are, again, 
ghosting the image of trauma.  
In considering image ghosting in relation to trauma, I turn to treatment methods 
for PTSD patients as an analog for how ghosting images may help mitigate the physical 
distress that the image evokes. Narrative based therapies coupled with visual 
stimulation (like, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing—EMDR) prompt 
patients to unravel the story of their trauma and to engage with the ghosts that haunt 
those memories.25 Since image ghosting considers the phenomenological affect an image 
has on our bodies, it may be an effective method for unraveling the story from a 
distance we deem safe. Although the DSM-V explicitly excludes most mediated images 
as a source of trauma, I will draw parallels between how a witness remembers a trauma 
and how a viewer experiences a trauma-image. Children of Men is the best example I can 
find of ghosting the trauma-image because every shot is from a ghost’s perspective, and 
almost every scene has a traumatic event. Like a ghost floating through the world as it 
nears its end, we follow, we guide, we move along in real time with Theo (Clive Owens) 
and others. We are witness to the bombing of a coffee shop, to the public abuse of 
 
25 The ghosts and haunted memories of PTSD patients are dangerously obtrusive, and I believe 
that we all have a moral obligation to relieve the pain and fear those memories induce. 
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refugees, to the kidnapping of Theo, and more. Physically, we are safe from the violence 
onscreen, but still we feel pulled inward. Cuarón’s camera moves us through a multi-
sensory experience where we may respond to Theo, then Julian, then Jasper, then Kee. It 
is through his camera that we appear as a ghost to them.  
Children of Men is set in a future dystopian Britain, and the world has become a 
place where children are no longer born. The film shows us a world after life has ceased 
to make more. The main character Theo is haunted by the child he and Julian (Julianne 
Moore) lost to “the bug.” He moves as if dead to most others, until a near fatal 
explosion followed by renewed contact with Julian motivates him to live again, to 
become alive again. Cuarón’s long takes and his innovative shooting and editing 
techniques create images of trauma occurring in a space we viewers seem to inhabit and 
move through. We haunt Theo as he moves through overpopulated urban landscapes, 
as he finds respite in Jasper’s farmhouse, or in an abandoned schoolroom as he listens 
to Miriam’s story of the beginning of the end of life. We move with Theo freely past 
imprisoned refugees and sit next to him in a tightly enclosed interior during moments 
of terrorist attacks. We are not traumatized as witness to a single act of violence, but 
Cuarón’s camera forces us to confront the slow accumulative power of violence and 
absence. 
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1.5 ‘Haunted by’ and ‘Haunting’ 
Filmic images are haunting and filmic images can be haunted. Watching a film, 
we can be active participants in a world separate from us and our space. The illusionary 
effects of movement through filmic space that a director’s camera enables, for one thing, 
brings us into that world, though never fully. In this dissertation I am proposing 
ghosting images as a way for us to reflect on and to talk about our experiences with 
images onscreen. My aims are to explain why we may remember some characters and 
events, and to consider how we might bring our world into theirs. As a conceptual 
metaphor I expect that ghosting images can potentially do many things at once. But, 
herein I will apply it mainly in two ways: first, the ghosts of filmic images appear for us in 
our uncanny or auratic memories of characters, events, spaces, or traumas; and second, we 
haunt filmic images, illusioned by a system of technics into believing that we have presence in 
the same space, events, and traumas as the characters onscreen.   
Although I admit, the vagueness of ghosting images is potentially overwhelming,26 
I do believe it is a productive way to remember what an image can mean, and a visceral  
way to feel something very particular though unnamable. Although I prefer to think of 
my imagined system of images and feelings and memories and experiences as a 
rhizomatically expanding space opening to the unknown of unknowns, where meaning 
 
26 Perhaps this apprehension stems more from writing about the subjective experience with images 
at a time when our nation seems overwhelmed by a perpetual vagueness that the lack of truth 
in images, words, narratives, etc., compels. 
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has truth or something more than we can know, it’s all just as likely a hamster cage of 
cards. In the chapters that follow I will try to constrain the concepts of ghosting the 
images in films to metaphors of ‘haunted’ and haunting’; however, I may at times enjoy 
different lines of flight that vagueness invites. I want ghosting to remain vague so that it 
can be applied widely to the ways almost anyone thinks or feels about their experiences 
and memories of film. The more vague, the more easily adapted and widely applied, 
the more it may potentially add to the conversations on spectrality and trauma. So, 
ultimately my hope may rest in the vagueness of ghosts. 
 
2 CHAPTER ONE: GHOSTING CHARACTERS: THE ASSASSINATION OF 
JESSE JAMES BY THE COWARD ROBERT FORD 
A ghost, we can assume, generally takes a human-like form. We may be haunted 
by the ghosts of animals, especially beloved pets, but other than that when most of us 
think of ghosts we think of them as having once been human. The image that haunts me 
when I think of my grandfather, for example, is of an old man, roughened-up by years 
of hard work. Yet, in this conjuring, the imagined image I have for him is never static; it 
is always becoming something else. The image I have is a ghost resurrected in my 
imagination and alive in the sense that it is constantly adapting in response to the 
cluster of myths, memories, and emotions that I hold for the image. My grandfather is a 
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ghost to me; and to remember him now is to imagine a man who could have never 
existed.  
When we consider the human images we see in film, actors portraying characters 
who may or may not have existed, we may wonder, can filmic characters haunt us? 
And if so, how are we haunted by them? And Why? Because the ghosts of filmic 
characters have such potentially strong haunting affects on viewers, I will begin my 
discussion of ghosting images with character. I argue that when viewers remember a 
filmic character, they may be haunted by the perception that an onscreen character is 
capable of subjective actions, emotions, or agency. In other words, often those character 
(both fictional and nonfictional) who haunt us are ones we have allowed ourselves to 
see as alive, even if only in the context of a novel or film. As we read a novel, a short 
story, or a historical account, or when we watch a film, we can join in the mimetic world 
of the fiction. We willingly accept that the events portrayed are happening and the 
people inhabiting this world have human capabilities much like our own. However, 
unlike mimesis, in which the events and characters present imitations of actions, 
emotions, responses, and so on, ghosting the character image takes into account our 
complicity in the conjuring of the ghost. We create the ghost out of our imagined 
images of the filmic character—we have ghosted the image. To better explain ghosting a 
character image, I must first describe the process which may account for the immediate 
and the prolonged phenomenological responses an image elicits in a viewer. For my 
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purposes, an image from a text, or song, or film may produce a visceral affect in the 
reader/listener/viewer though mediation. 
2.1 Mediating filmic characters 
Mediation posits an accumulative, affectual, and comprehensive understanding 
of reality and existence between an audience and the character appearing in a story or 
on the screen. Furthermore, mediation merges our own conscious perceptions of self-
identity with the selfhood (the subjectivity) of the character portrayed in the medium. 
In other words, instead of identifying with characters from film, mediation allows us to 
create them in our own image—not as reflections of ourselves, but as the ghosts whom 
we believe we saw.  
In this chapter, I will discuss two forms of character mediation—a narrative 
hermeneutic and an experiential performance—for the historical figures Jesse James and 
Robert Ford. I then propose it is from these mediated images that the ghosts, who may 
haunt us, are born.  By explaining how we can ascribe a “perceived subjective 
experience” to characters through the mediation of images, I hope to demonstrate how 
we may bring the ghosts of filmic characters to life, and how they may haunt us 
afterwards. In order to demonstrate how the narrative hermeneutic and experiential 
performance work in film, I will use close readings of scenes from Andrew Dominik’s 
2007 film adaptation of Ron Hansen’s 1983 historical novel, The Assassination of Jesse 
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James by the Coward Robert Ford. 27 The novel and the film each present the two main 
characters as the accumulation of stories, including both the historically accurate and 
dramatically fictionalized, that surround James and Ford. The film also, however, 
exemplifies how a viewer may ghost the images, as well as how the ghost may 
change—as first imagined from the stories and tales of the two historical men, and then 
re-imagined in the performances of the two lead actors, Brad Pitt and Casey Affleck. For 
viewers of this film, Pitt’s and Affleck’s embodiments of James and Ford may give 
physical form to the character images; but when a viewer ascribes selfhood or 
subjectivity to these filmic character images and then enjoins those images with others 
remembered from different sources, the viewer is ghosting the character-image.    
The hermeneutic circle may give these characters agency within the collective 
narrative, but the story we perceive is created and adapted in our reception. Wolfang 
Iser describes the hermeneutic circle as a process in which the reader fills in the gaps 
and blanks left as function of language. In his How to do Theory, Iser describes how the 
gaps and blanks function: 
Stimulate the process of ideation to be performed by the reader on terms set by 
the text. There is, however, another place in textual system where text and reader 
converge, and that is marked various types of negation. Blanks and negation 
both control the process of meaning assembly in their own different ways. The 
 
27 Abbreviated as The Assassination when referencing the film.  
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blanks […] outline the author’s view through the perspective of the narrative, the 
characters, the plot, and the fictitious reader inscribed in the text. […] The 
various types of negation invoke familiar and determinate elements of 
knowledge only to cancel them out. What is canceled, however, remains in view, 
and thus brings about modifications in the readers attitudes to what is familiar or 
determinate.28  
When we watch a movie and the gaps and blanks of a character image appear to us, we 
may not be looking to identify with the characters, but to co-create them, to fill the gaps 
and thereby glean meaning from them. It is in this way the characters seem alive. 
Identifying with a character doesn’t always sufficiently describe what happens when 
we see a character onscreen and then remember him or her later. Although we may 
perceive the experience as identification, it is more akin to a movement towards our 
subjective experience—the stories pulling us towards a compilation of aspects about the 
character which in some way haunts us. We may imagine uncanny resemblances 
between how we remember and how we want to remember the character’s story, but it 
is our subjective viewing experience around which the meaning of the character’s 
narrative pivots.  
The ghosts in The Assassination are multiple and layered. Bob is haunted by the 
ghost of ‘the outlaw Jesse James,’ which he has created from dime novel narratives that 
 
28 How to do Theory, 64-65. 
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he has read repeatedly; and he is haunted by his memory of Jesse juxtaposed against his 
brother’s performance in the staged dramatizations of the assassination scene. Jesse 
himself is also haunted by the ghost of ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ brought to life in 
newspaper accounts and dime novels. Viewers may be haunted by the ghost-images 
from previously read stories or from the other previously viewed film versions of Jesse 
and Bob. Or, having read Hansen’s novel, we may be haunted by the ghosts of 
character-images from the source for the adaptation. Our responses—physical, 
emotional, psychological, visceral, etc.—to the mediated images of Jesse and Bob when 
we watch The Assassination may be scant evidence that ghost-images exist, but that is 
why ghosting may more accurately describe how we remember filmic images.  
Watching a film is like how Iser may read a text in that for the viewer the 
participatory act creates, “another place in textual[/filmic] system where text[/film] and 
reader[/viewer] converge.” When we watch a film, we fill in the blanks or affirm the 
negations (especially of a subjective experience), and thus we are engaged in the 
creative processes by which we (reader/viewers) can control the assemblage of meaning 
ascribed to an image. There may be multiple applications of ghosting, each with its own 
distinct function or purpose, but watching (or viewing) a film opens a place where the 
ghost a filmic image can appear for a viewer. We could be haunted by Brad Pitt’s 
embodiment of Jesse James or Casey Affleck’s Bob Ford, or we could remember ghosts 
of ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ from other mediated images, but when we watch a film, our 
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ghosts co-mingle and appear as the new form of the image, co-created from our past 
experiences in our present. 
Hansen’s novel takes the voice and style of a dime novel, even occasionally 
quoting lines directly from those late-nineteenth century texts. However, both the novel 
and film present a more ostensibly authentic account than those contemporaneous 
stories of the historical man. Hansen’s narrative reinforces what we know of Jesse 
James, his historical and cultural relevance, in a voice-over that credibly attempts to 
disentangle the legendary stories from the historical events. Instead of portraying the 
exploits heroically as in the contemporaneous accounts of Jesse James, Hansen creates a 
character who is troubled potentially by a personality disorder, a man who can act 
impetuously with violence as well as exhibit moments of perpetrator guilt; a man 
whose suicidal tendencies might indicate a desire for and complicity in his own demise. 
Again, this reading of Jesse attempts to explain his actions in terms and descriptions 
that today’s viewer would understand. So, even though we may know the stories, and 
remember the ghosts of images from other films, television shows, etc., when we layer 
our ghost onto Pitt’s performance, a new ghost emerges. We may always be creating 
new ghosts, as the contextual situations of the image changes. In our viewing of The 
Assassination the ghost of Jesse we may create is one whose subjectivity is shaped by our 
modern psychological interpretation of a man whose actions seem otherwise 
inexplicable.   
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Hanson’s novel and Dominik’s film tells Robert Ford’s story from the time he 
meets Jesse until his own murder. In the aftermath of the assassination, Ford’s story is 
of a man haunted by at least three ghosts: the ghost of his hero, his friend, and his 
victim. However, where the novel presents both Jesse’s and Bob’s narrative objectively 
in an empathetic light, The Assassination is able to create two filmic characters with 
specifically different subjectivities. I assert that this film is especially useful for noting 
how we create ghost-imagess through the narrative hermeneutic of Jesse James and 
through the experiential performance in which Bob Ford is embodied. In other words, 
in The Assassination, Jesse James and Robert Ford are given subjectivity in two distinct 
ways—Jesse through the newspaper accounts, the myths and legends, and other 
popular cultural images, and Bob through Affleck’s performative gestures and an 
experiential dimension.29   
When we imagine that a character has subjectivity in their diegetic world, we 
imagine that character is alive. Whether as readers of books, listeners of tales and songs, 
or spectators and viewers, by imagining either fictional or non-fictional characters as 
capable of doing those things we do—making decisions, expressing emotion, 
responding to a world of others—we are creating a selfhood which, from our 
 
29 “Experiential dimension of self” is how Dan Zahavi explains ipseity, a term he connects to 
Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Henry. The experiential differences of Edmund 
Husserl further explain how we can give fictional characters subjectivity as they express the 
“givenness” of “what it is like.”  
49 
perspective, may feel more real to us than the self of some people we know. By 
exploring how filmic character images appear to have subjectivity because they have 
stories told about them and because they are embodied in the gestures of actors, I hope 
to demonstrate how characters may appear to us as alive through mediation, and then 
remembered by us as ghosts of character-images. Ghosting the character image, as 
exemplified in textual and filmic images of Jesse James and Robert Ford, is a process of 
co-creation whereby our previously imagined ghosts of Jesse and Bob are comingled 
with the present experience, and then distilled into a new form of that same image. The 
new image is conjured before us in our present experience only when combined with 
our past ghosts. The ghosts that live within us are always becoming new things.  
2.2 The hermeneutic narrative 
2.2.1 ‘The outlaw Jesse James’ 
We may ascribe subjectivity to onscreen characters through the stories we we 
bring to the filmic experience, through the narrative events that play out in the diagetic, 
through the stories they tell about themselves and the stories others tell about them. The 
earliest stories we have of Jesse James (and his gang) from newspaper accounts and 
dime novels not only created the ghost image of a man with contemporaneous 
influence, but the stories have also become like origin myths haunting the many 
subsequent mediated images of Jesse James.  
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At the time of Jesse James’s death, his name was the most recognized in the 
United States. Few of the dime novels that brought Jesse celebrity and infamy during 
his life remain, but if we can take R.T. Bradley’s Bradley’s Lives of Frank and Jesse James, or 
J.W. Buel’s The Border Outlaws. An Authentic Thrilling…, or J.A. Dacus’s Life and 
Adventures of Frank and Jesse James the Noted Outlaws as typical of that period, then we 
can understand how a young man like Bob Ford might idolize Jesse. In these 
exaggerated tales and fictionalized adventures, Jesse James is praised for his intelligence 
and his innate leadership qualities; he’s portrayed as a kind-hearted Robin Hood. Dacus 
goes further, describing James as a man whose “fertile brain” influenced honorable 
men, whom he names and describes as respected in their communities and willing to 
testify on James’s behalf.30 Buel touts the veracity of his accounts, though they seem to 
stretch credulity: Frank James taking the names and addresses of victims with the 
promise to repay; Jesse showing mercy to a child while escaping a Mexican Army trap 
in a flurry of bullets and horses’ hooves.31 The images of Jesse James these fabulators 
constructed were so pervasive and ubiquitous they sparked public outcry, especially 
among concerned parents who considered the dime novels dangerous and corrupting 
of young minds.   
 
30 Life and Adventures, 289. 
31 The Border Outlaws, 262, 382, and 404. 
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The most well-known, sympathetic, and contemporaneous “biographer” of the 
James brothers was Missouri newspaper editor John Newman Edwards. Edwards first 
knew of the James brothers as guerillas in Quantrill’s raiders, a confederate band of 
Bushwackers whose tactics and successes were glorified by pro-Confederate 
sympathizers (like Edwards) in Southern papers. As Jesse’s reputation as an outlaw 
grew, it was Edwards’s sensationalized newspaper accounts and the dime novels that 
created the image that many Americans of the time held of Jesse James. Both Hansen 
and Dominik use the dime novels extensively—quoting lines directly in the voice-over 
narration, showing us Bob’s collection of dime novels hiding under his bed, and 
including Jesse’s reference to Newman Edwards.  
For those viewers of the film who are unaware of James’s celebrity and notoriety, 
the references to these dime novels has two effects. First, it establishes Jesse’s identity 
and subjectivity. Even though Jesse dismisses each reference to a dime novel as a lie, in 
The Assassination he is acutely aware that others hold a manufactured image of him, and 
he is willing to exploit that image when it suits him.  The emphasis on dime novels also 
allows us as modern viewers to explain Bob’s actions as that of an obsessed fan, whose 
idealization is based on the hyperbolic and often fictitious accounts of Jesse’s exploits. 
Throughout the film, Bob demonstrates an encyclopedic knowledge about the James 
boys in what we see as nervous attempts to ingratiate himself among the gang. 
However, often what Bob thinks he knows about Frank and Jesse is wrong. In the 
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scenes where Bob’s obsession with the James boys is most evident, the other characters 
often mock him, noting how Bob is (in modern terms) star-struck. The dime novels are 
important to the film because they add counter-weight to the more purportedly 
accurate narrative, and they help give viewers a way to interpret Bob’s actions in the 
context of a modern dilemma—how does celebrity affect the famous and those who 
want fame?   
Despite Jesse’s protestations against these stories as lies, several sources indicate 
that the historical Jesse James actually contributed to the exaggerated tales, most 
notably through his correspondence with Edwards.32  The hermeneutic narrative may 
include the stories others tell about us, but, as Paul Ricoeur explains, the image we hold 
for ourselves is shaped by stories that confirm how we think others see us. We become 
complicit in the story-telling, and we imbue a subjective experience on the object of our 
stories (ourselves). This is especially evident in those moments when we dissociate from 
our experiences. Zahavi paraphrases Ricoeur:  
The self is assumed to be constructed. It is the product of conceiving and 
organizing one’s life in a certain way. When confronted with the question ‘Who 
am I?’ we will tell a certain story and emphasize aspects that we deem to be of 
 
32 Jesse tells Charley, “You know what John Newman Edwards wrote about me, he said I don’t 
trust two men in ten thousand, and even them I was cautious around.”  
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special significance, to be that which we present to others for recognition and 
approval.33  
Jesse is not only aware of the stories about him, but he also uses those stories to justify 
actions that seem otherwise unjustifiable. About an hour and a half into the film, Jesse 
wakes up Charley (Sam Rockwell) to confess his murder of Ed Miller (Garrett 
Dillahunt). As he describes the event, he begins to refer to himself in the third-person: 
“So, Ed and Jesse, they argue on the road.” The scene cuts to Jesse and Ed riding quietly 
together on the road at night. They are not arguing. We know that Ed suspects that 
Jesse has brought him here to kill him, and he is cautious not to offend Jesse. 
Throughout the film, members of Jesse’s gang have witnessed first-hand his intense fits 
of anger, cruelty, and bloodlust, but Ed’s murder seems different because Jesse is 
completely emotionally detached. The scene cuts back to the dark interior parlor room 
where Jesse tells Charley, “And when push come to shove, Jesse shot and killed him.” 
Charley, confused, repeats, “Jesse did.” The story reminds Charley how cold-blooded 
Jesse James is, and all he can say in response to this image is to ask, “you?” Telling this 
story in the third-person, Jesse mediates the character ‘the outlaw Jesse’ by creating a 
ghost that gives narrative distance to Jesse’s murderous deed. He dissociates from the 
murder, putting it instead on this living ghost who commits the heinous acts.  
 
33 In Subjectivity and Selfhood, 105, Zahavi cites Ricoeur’s Temps et recit III: Le temps raconté. Paris: 
Editionś du Seuil.  
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‘The outlaw Jesse James’ is an image that haunts anyone who comes in contact 
with this filmic version of the real man. In this scene, Jesse uses the ghost not only to 
dissociate from this murder, but then also to pressure Charley into confessing what he 
might know about Wood Hite (Jeremy Renner), another member of the gang gone 
missing.  Everyone in the diegetic knows what happens to those who cross ‘the outlaw 
Jesse,’ and everyone knows this ghost lives within Jesse and is waiting to appear at the 
slightest provocation. ‘The outlaw Jesse James’ is an assemblage of images that 
exaggerate the real-life actions, skills, and characteristics attributed to the historical 
person. Pitt’s version of Jesse in The Assassination understands the fear that this ghost’s 
infamy evokes, and we see this version of Jesse willingly use that infamy to his 
advantage whenever he can.  
Readers/viewers trust that the images of Jesse James presented in both the novel 
and film versions of The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford are truthful 
portrayals of the historical figure because the voice-over narration seems credible and 
unbiased. The dialogue in voice-over throughout the film often comes directly from 
Hansen’s novel, who describes his method for constructing the story as one based more 
on the objective newspaper accounts from the period rather than on earlier films, dime 
novels, or other media, which distorted the complexities of the two historical men.34 
 
34 From Ron Hansen’s epilogue to The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford. 
Reissued in 2007.  
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Writing about his process, Hansen declares his intention: “my rules are fairly simple: 
honesty and fidelity throughout—meaning no hard facts, however inconvenient, may 
be diminished and no crucial scenes, however wished for, may be turned to ends that 
may be more pleasing to a contemporary audience.”35 In other words, he intends that 
the voice sound authentic to the time. This voice-over narrative is presented in the film 
as a credible witness to the final years of Jesse; however, to understand and interpret 
the image of Jesse, viewers of the film are asked to compare what we hear in the voice-
over to what we see onscreen.    
The novel and the film begin with the same words: “He was growing into middle 
age and was living then in a bungalow on Woodland Avenue.” Whereas the novel 
introduces the reader to Jesse with a five-page description, the film compresses this 
opening into a montage of about three minutes. Both narratives present multiple 
versions of Jesse, some of which we may already know. He is a devoted father and 
husband, yet he is also the most famous American outlaw living under an alias. He 
could pass through a busy city unnoticed because those who “knew” Thomas Howard 
believed the stories he told them about his wealth, his occupation, and his injuries. The 
last turn in the narrative begins with a description directly from one of the early dime 
novels, but then adds another image of Jesse possessing preternatural powers. It begins 
with, “He had a condition called granulated eye-lids, and it caused him to blink more 
 
35 “About the book” p. 11. 
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than usual.36 As if he found creation slightly more than he could accept.” This line from 
Hansen’s novel goes further in the mythologizing of Jesse by implying that he 
understands more about the world than the rest of us.  
In this brief ten- to fifteen-second shot, our image of Jesse James goes awry as we 
try to reconcile what we hear with what we see. We hear the description of Jesse’s 
condition, which “caused him to blink more than usual,” juxtaposed against the 
contradictory visual image of Jesse staring unblinking for ten seconds. The look on 
Jesse’s face is, as John Trafton argues, the look of a war vet with PTSD: the “thousand-
yard stare” is a “hollow address to the spectator [in] what Hermann Kappelhoff 
describes as tragedy transmitted through the face in an ‘endlessly condensed micro-
episode occurring as affect.’”37 We might connect his “granulated eye condition” to 
PTSD, or consider the narrative paradox in blinking/staring to ascribe characteristics to 
Jesse that make sense from our current perspective. But the ‘truth’ about the image of 
traumatized war veteran is negated by the voice-over’s credible description. The visual 
image negates the audial image, and as we begin to unpack the layers of ghost-images 
we may hold for Jesse, a new form of him is conceived. Jesse is removed from the 
 
36 This description is nearly identical to J.W. Buel’s The Border Outlaws. “In his youth, Jesse was 
troubled with granulated eye-lids from which he had never fully recovered, which is seen in the 
constant batting of his eyes and a slight irritation of the lids; besides this marked peculiarity, the 
first joint of the forefinger on his left hand is missing ,” 118. 
37 Kappelhoff qtd. in John Trafton’s “The American Outlaw and Civil War Shock: The 
Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford” Film International. 
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ordinary as the voice-over continues: “Rooms seemed hotter when he was in them. 
Rains fell straighter. Clocks slowed. Sounds were amplified.” A short montage follows 
these descriptions, visually mediating each narrated image: the shadow of a chair 
shimmering in the heat; rain across the field, falling hard straight down; the shadow of 
a chair moving with the setting sun; the sound of buzzing insects amplified in an open 
field. The final image in this montage is of Jesse James, who, we’re told, doesn’t regret 
the seventeen murders he “laid claim to” and was a Southern loyalist till he died. 
Although the narrative describes James in supernatural terms, the scene ends with the 
image of a mortal man—back to the audience, staring intently at an encroaching fire.  
If we believe this narrative description of Jesse, then we can understand how Bob 
Ford believed that Jesse James was not merely a man, but a force of nature. This three-
minute opening montage presents Jesse James as a set of contradictory selfs, each visual 
version negated by the descriptions we hear. He is a father to children who don’t know 
his name; he is a local businessman with whom no one has done business; he is an 
unstoppable, even supernatural, force who is also only human. Hansen’s version is 
based on contemporaneous newspaper accounts, and when we read the novel we 
complete the image of James as described. However, the filmic adaptation may generate 
uncanny sensations when the visual image contradicts or negates the textual 
description, or when the camera stylizes our perspective with sepia tones, fish-eyed 
lenses, and reflections in glass. I would argue that readers/viewers are constantly re-
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assessing characters on film, ascribing a variety of subjectivities depending on where 
the character is and what we think we may remember.  
2.2.2 How the characters in the film see ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ 
We may also bring to The Assassination the ghost(s) of Jesse James from any of the 
fifty-nine films and documentaries that dramatize the robberies and murders of the 
James Brothers. Each version differs from the last and, in its own way, replaces the 
historical Jesse James with the ghost of another imagined man: in one film a terrorist, in 
another a psychotic murderer, and in others a hero in his time. In the grand 
hermeneutic of Jesse James, the name functions as a historical referent for multiple 
characters playing multiple roles. But, there is a dual dynamic at work in the 
hermeneutic—the living and dead are both present. The Jesse each of us knows may be 
complex, contradictory, heroic, or antisocial, but each new version adds to the 
assemblage of ghosts we hold. For a character like Jesse James, whose image was 
mythologized in his time, enlarged after his death, and then manipulated and expanded 
by Hollywood, we may never be able to disentangle the real man and events from those 
distorted and imagined ghosts we believe we know. 
Paraphrasing Alistair MacIntyre from his work, After Virtue, Zahavi describes 
how the hermeneutic narrative works to create subjectivity:  
Who we are depends on the stories told about us, both by ourselves and by 
others. Our narrative self is multiple-authored and under constant revision. The 
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story of any individual life is not only interwoven with the stories of others 
(parents, siblings, friends, etc.), it is also embedded in a larger historical and 
communal meaning-giving structure.38  
We could insert anyone into this description: “Who [Jesse is] depends on the stories told 
about [him], by [himself] and by others. [His] narrative self…” The film constantly refers 
to these ‘communal meaning-giving’ structural stories about Jesse that account for his 
celebrity and fame. And though we may know that the two men’s stories will 
eventually become completely interwoven, in a couple of the earlier scenes where Bob 
describes Jesse’s escapades and adventures back to him, we see the tension inherent in 
the hermeneutic circle when the public newspaper version of Jesse collides with the 
private, real man.  
The night after the Blue Cut Train Robbery, Bob sits on the porch smoking a cigar 
with Jesse.  He tells Jesse that he brought a clipping to ensure he could tell Jesse apart 
from Frank. He reads from the clipping: 
Here: [Bob reads] “Jesse James, the youngest, has a face as smooth and innocent 
as a schoolgirl. The blue eyes, very clear and penetrating, are never at rest. His 
form is tall and graceful and capable of great endurance and great effort. Jesse is 
lighthearted, reckless, and devil-may-care. There’s always a smile on his lips…” 
 
38 MacIntyre, 1985, 221. qtd in Zahavi, 109. 
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Jesse stops him, and the conversation dies. So, Bob nervously returns to his fan 
material—“You know what I got right next to my bed? It’s The Train Robbers, or, A Story 
of the James Boys by R.W. Stevens.”  Jesse tells him the stories are all lies. However, Bob 
is not yet willing to let go of the ghost of ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ born from those 
stories and textual images. In The Assassination, Bob’s inability to reconcile the ghost 
image with the real man seems to haunt him the rest of his life. I would argue further, 
that it is in his attempts to make sense of the stories others tell about Jesse, he is 
compelled to revise Jesse’s story so that is inevitably interwoven with his own.  
As the story of the film moves inevitably towards the assassination, Bob’s re-
telling of Jesse’s stories begin to head in a fatalistic direction, as we see their two 
separate stories merge into one. At first, Bob sees himself as the participating 
observer—just outside of Jesse’s story, but close enough to accurately re-tell it. Early on, 
while staying with Jesse and Zee (Mary-Louise Parker), Bob would accompany Jesse 
into town, where “If Jesse palavered with another person, Bob [would secretary] their 
dialogue, getting each inflection, reading every gesture and tic, as if he wanted to 
compose a biography of the outlaw, or as if he were preparing an impersonation.” 
However, from his first appearance on film, we see Bob’s idolization and mimicry of the 
dime-novel version of Jesse James as the momentum pushing him to become a part of 
Jesse James’s story. When he first meets the James brothers, Bob tells them repeatedly 
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that he’s the man for the job,39 because this is how Jesse has been described in dime 
novels. Although it is a slippery slope to say his early, overly ambitious attempts to 
ingratiate himself into the story of the James Brothers might have led him to ultimately 
murder his hero, these gestures do hint at what we already know he is destined to 
become: the assassin of Jesse James. 
The scene after the assassination ends with a visual image that could be 
described as the written end, figuratively and literally, of Jesse’s life-story. Immediately 
following the shooting, Bob and Charley run from the murder scene to the nearest 
telegraph office to write to the Governor of Missouri. Then, in a close-up shot from 
above, we watch Bob write out the telegram: “Have killed Jesse James. Bob Ford.” 
However, instead of Jesse’s story ending here, the narrator tells how Jesse’s celebrity 
grew even greater after his death. These details of Jesse’s growing celebrity after his 
death are grounded in the historical evidence from several sources. For example, there 
was such a large demand for Jesse’s death photograph that they put his body on a bed 
of ice, took more photos, and sold thousands more of the copies. In most every saloon in 
the United States, “The Ballad of Jesse James” was sung. Even Bob and Charley Ford 
keep the ghost of Jesse James alive—bringing him back and then murdering him 
 
39 Later, during the interview with Governor Crittenden (James Carville), Dick Liddil (Paul 
Schnieder) confirms Bob’s reliability, telling the Governor that when push comes to shove, Bob 
would step up with a steady hand. Dick doesn’t mention that as witness to Wood Hite’s 
murder, he trusts that Bob could “get the job done,” even if that meant killing Jesse James.  
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repeatedly in almost 900 stage shows during their theatrical re-enactment tour. The 
photographic images, the songs, and the stage show created another image of Jesse that 
‘lived on’ even after his death. Even after his death, Jesse is ghosted by the media again.  
It’s hard to separate the ghost from the story. Ghosts may appear unexpectedly, 
and then we shape our story to explain the uncanny event, thereby mediating the ghost 
into existence. Seeing a ghost would compel most of us to tell the story of what we 
believe we have seen; and when we tell ghost stories, they re-affirm our belief in ghosts. 
In other words, I think a ghost only pre-exists until the witnesses (the believers in 
ghosts) tells us their ghost story. And ghost stories are circular, constantly revised out of 
our fading memories as we try to remember the ghost, its duration, and its non-
permanence. Like the hermeneutic, we are always trying to complete the story by filling 
in the blanks. When it comes to filmic characters, as we fill in the blanks, we are not 
simply complicit in the mediation of their stories, but, moreover, we become the 
progenitors bearing the ghosts who remain alive within us afterwards.   
2.3 The experiential performance in three parts  
The image is an instance of becoming where body and brain become indistinguishable, 
where virtual forces are constantly becoming actual forms that decompose back into the virtual 
only to become actual again.—Elena del Río40 
 
40 Deleuze and the Cinema of Performances, 72. 
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We may carry the image of Jesse James as a ghost created by the hermeneutic 
narrative that Hansen’s novel and Dominik’s film bring to fore. Likewise, Bob’s story is 
as detailed as Jesse’s—we see the events before and after the murder, and how his own 
celebrity is dulled by the accusations of cowardice and greed. However, whereas most 
of the other films generally show Bob Ford as a jealous sycophant, The Assassination 
creates a more sympathetic image of a star-struck teenager who, once he becomes 
friends with his idol, recognizes the danger Jesse poses to his safety. Although the 
narration completes the story of Bob Ford, it is most often Casey Affleck’s embodiment, 
his experiential performance of Robert Ford, that gives selfhood to the filmic character. 
One way the viewer may come to believe the character has the potential for becoming a 
self is through the actor’s performance. 
But first, before I can reach my concept of Casey Affleck’s gestural embodiment 
of Robert Ford, I need to start with Gilles Deleuze’s concept of subjectivity in film. The 
difficulty in reading Deleuze comes from his terms, because the definitions shift and 
transform depending on how he decides to use them. Deleuze is a philosopher of 
becoming.41 In a series of interviews with former student Claire Parnet,42 he describes 
how when living in a constant state of change, the process of thinking requires a 
 
41 “For Deleuze, the function of thinking is to constantly reinvent the act of living. Given 
Deleuze’s understanding of thinking as a never-ending process that forges connections among 
concepts without striving for a unifying systematicity, a fully coherent or finished theory of 
performance could hardly have been his aim” (del Río, 7). 
42 Gilles Deleuze from A to Z with Claire Parnet for French television.  
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willingness to adjust our beliefs in reaction to changes in the assemblage of preceptions 
and concepts that each of us accumulates as we perceive the world.  Whereas most of 
Deleuze’s contemporaneous Continental philosophers trace their intellectual lineage 
through Kant, who sees subjectivity as either intuition or understanding, Deleuze’s first 
book was on David Hume, for whom subjectivity is contingent upon perception and 
experience.  
We might describe subjectivity in the Deleuzean sense as the crystallization of 
the ego in the field of intensities. This field—arising out of the habitual associations that 
the subject has structured as raw intensities (color, sound, aroma) and low intensities 
(replicants of the raw; in other words, the idea of color, the idea of sound, and so on)—
becomes the space wherein one’s potentialities become possibilities. Instead of 
perceiving the world as a field of objects holding a priori meaning, active subjectivity 
tests the limits established by our habitual associations. So, it is through the repeated 
actions of an embodied subject (habituation) that a person comes to shape and 
understand what their limitations are. One may hold a variety of subjective 
potentialities, like the potential to see from the perspective of poet, priest, or politician, 
for example. Active subjectivity is the perceiving and acting on these potentials. It is 
making possible the subjective position by acting. On the other hand, some potential 
subjective positions, such as that of a pet or wild animal, can never be fulfilled. They are 
impossible, and are, therefore, contemplated subjective positions. Because both active 
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subjectivity and contemplated subjectivity are responses to habituated associations, the 
subject is crystallized.  
In addition to active subjectivity, the performance confirms a set of potentialities 
and possibilities for how we suspect the character should act. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze 
and Felix Guatteri famously explain how potentialities and possibilities resemble a 
body without organs: 
The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, 
with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking 
the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject developing 
along these particular vectors. Nothing here is representative; rather it is all life 
and lived experience […] Nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds 
and gradients.43 
In Affleck’s performance, we see the potentialities and possibilities as revealed in 
Affleck’s gestures. Bob acts as he imagines a member of the James gang should act, 
constantly looking for ways to prove himself, as if attempting to fulfill his potential. 
Afterwards, he also acts out the assassination event on stage. Elena del Río considers 
how the “body without organs” makes possible a dimension of expression that is 
beyond linguistic, making connections between bodies through the affective 
performance. Although she doesn’t describe this affect as haunting, she does use terms 
 
43 Anti-Oedipus, 19. 
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similar to those used to describe the concept of the unheimlich, concluding that, “Affect 
is precisely such an impingement of the outside upon the inside, of the new and 
unpredictable upon the familiar.”44   
Del Río differentiates how we may give meaning to the filmic characters, noting 
the difference between the narrative (the hermeneutic structure shaping our perception 
of the character) and the gestural (an experiential performance embodied through 
habituation). While both are effective means for creating subjectivity, “in the 
performative context…the molar plane may be identified with narrative action, while 
the molecular plane unfolds through a more or less abstract series of affective-
performative events.”45 I will argue that Casey Affleck’s embodiment of Robert Ford46 
occurs in three performative gestures, and because these gestures are expressions of a 
character possessing a subjective position, the viewer remembers these gestures as those 
of a ghost.   
2.3.1 Bob imitates ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ 
Affleck’s performance brings an active subjectivity to Bob as the character 
changes from a naïve idolizer of an imagined ‘hero’ to a terrified target, and then from 
 
44 Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, 11. 
45 Ibid., 27. 
46 To distinguish between the various images and embodiments, I will refer to the historical man 
as ‘Robert Ford’ or ‘Ford,’ the generic filmic character as ‘Bob Ford,’ The Assassination’s filmic 
character (i.e., Casey Affleck’s embodiment and portrayal) as ‘Bob.’ Similarly, I may employ the 
same pattern for ‘Jesse James’ to Pitt’s ‘Jesse.’  
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victim to steady-eyed assassin. There are three gestures in his performance that I want 
to consider: First, Bob’s imitation of Jesse the outlaw; next, Bob’s performances as an 
actor re-creating the assassination; and third, Bob’s repeated eye-gestures and nervous 
tics. The first two gestures include an element of speculation about the way Bob acts as 
shaped by the actor’s and the filmmakers’ embodiment of the historical Robert Ford. 
The novel and the script give narrative structure to the events, but it is the combined 
efforts of the filmmakers that convince us that Bob’s actions are appropriate to the 
emotional state of the filmic character. The third set of physical gestures are specific to 
Casey Affleck’s performance. Together these performative gestures produce an 
experiential dimension of the character Robert Ford that one might perceive as 
subjectivity and selfhood. 
The first gesture of Affleck’s affective performance results from the combined 
efforts of the filmmakers47 and their attempts to present characters whose motivations 
seem authentic. Although actor Casey Affleck portrays Bob in The Assassination, viewers 
realize that this character’s words and actions are tightly controlled by the filmmakers. 
Like the hermeneutic circle where we fill in the gaps in the story, when it comes to 
Affleck’s portrayal we can only speculate as to Bob’s motivations based on what he says 
 
47 I will use the term filmmakers as the collective cast and crew who are responsible for the 
creating characters and scenes on-screen. This includes the writers, directors, producers, actors, 
editors, etc., who have collaboratively worked to make the characters and images believable in 
the context of the film.  
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in the context of what we see him do in a scene. Hansen and Dominik both present Bob 
Ford as a young man obsessed with the James brothers, and the filmic character Bob 
acts as if they are outlaw heroes worth emulating. In several scenes Bob demonstrates 
his adoration for the James brothers not only in his extensive knowledge of their 
exploits, but also in his eagerness to prove his ‘grit and muster.’ He says he can be 
counted on to “get the job done,” a character trait that the dime novels and newspaper 
accounts have ascribed to Jesse. Playing the role of the dependable outlaw for other 
gang members, Bob believes, will prove him worthy of being a part the gang.  Although 
viewers understand that Casey Affleck is portraying a filmic character who may 
resemble the historical figure of Robert Ford, from our perspective it appears that the 
filmic Bob is performing for the filmic Jesse. His motivation seems to arise out of his 
desire to be like ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ as mediated by the dime novels he loves. In 
other words, by acting in ways that Bob thinks Jesse would act, he is performing for the 
ghost of ‘the outlaw Jesse,’ whom he has only read about.  
However, by the end of the second act, Bob has become disenchanted with Jesse, 
especially as Jesse’s paranoia becomes more intense. At dinner one night, Charley 
presses Bob into telling the group the ways in which he and Jesse are alike. Bob starts by 
describing their physical similarities, such as shoe size, height and weight, and eye 
color. When Bob starts listing their shared personality traits (ambition, dependability, 
etc.), Jesse seems disturbed by the comparison. Though we may see aspects of the 
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Lacanian mirror, or a mise en abyme of interchangeable Jesses and Bobs, I prefer to think 
of the scene as the filmmakers creating an intense, uncanny mood.  
At this point in the film, viewers know about Bob’s agreement with the 
Governor, we know of his steadiness with a gun, and we know of his idolization of the 
man whom, we also know, has the ability to spot liars and is willing to kill a friend. 
Knowing that both men hold an unspoken threat against the other, we may imagine 
that each man hides their true intentions behind a performative ghost of his previously 
perceived self. Although Bob sounds nostalgic for the ‘outlaw Jesse James’ of his 
boyhood, for the viewer the feeling evoked is more uncanny than nostalgic because we 
can also empathize with Bob’s fear of being found out. Jesse becomes inquisitive, and 
his questions and observations are uncanny in their precision. Although Affleck and 
Pitt create a performative tension between the two characters that is visually noticeable, 
the cumulative mirroring and reflecting effects between these two characters intensifies 
the scene’s uncanniness. As Bob ambles through his list and then is questioned by Jesse, 
his voice becomes defiant. Although Bob has not yet performed the ultimate defining 
gesture by assassinating his friend, he has already become a reflection of Jesse—not the 
outlaw hero of his boyhood, but a reflection of the Jesse for whom ‘getting the job done’ 
means eliminating a threat.  
The filmmakers shape the tone and mood throughout the film with their stylistic 
use of reflected images and shadows on glass. Bob and Jesse are often shown on one 
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side of a window or the other, the viewer looking in or out, the faces of the men 
reflecting back and usually slightly distorted. Esther Pereen explains the Lacanian 
concept of mirror stage thusly: 
For Lacan, the mirror connects the self to its image. One the hand, this image is 
spectral—‘the correspondences that unit the I to the image are projected as 
ghosts, in a completely ambiguous relationship of the subject with the world of 
its fabrication’ [(Mbembe, “Life” 40]—but on the other hand it multiplies 
presence by creating a likeness, a double. 48 
As we hear Bob recite his list of shared attributes—“Jesse has green eyes, I have green 
eyes”—we understand that Jesse’s double is as capable of killing him as he is of killing 
Bob. Later, in the assassination scene, we see Bob from Jesse’s perspective—as a 
reflection in the glass picture frame, raising his gun with a steady hand and gaze, just 
before he shoots Jesse in the back of the head. The assassin’s gesture becomes realized 
in the reflected image of Bob as he pulls the trigger (Figure 1). 
 
48 The Spectral Metaphor, 59. 
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Figure 1 Bob reflected as assassin 
 
 
Figure 2 Bob imitates the ‘outlaw Jesse James’ 
 
Another scene that exemplifies Bob’s imitation of his hero is the one preceding 
the assassination. Bob is alone in ‘Howard’ bungalow. The family has gone to Easter 
service, with their ‘cousin’ Charley. The performative gesture now is imitation. Bob 
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wears Jesse’s hat, drinks from his water glass, lays on his bed. He even imagines the 
physical impairments that Jesse keeps hidden from strangers.  Bob’s mimetic 
performance of missing the top two-thirds of his left middle finger allows the viewer to 
participate in the “giveness” of his experience (Figure 2). Despite knowing what Bob 
will soon become, as the title of the film tells us, this moment of peace before the 
assassination allows us to see Bob as the self he once imagined he would become. The 
scene is an intimate, personal moment for Bob, and though I will discuss later in more 
detail how we may feel present in the filmic world by ghosting a spatial image, it is in 
this moment that we witness Bob’s inner life. As Zahavi points out, “the self it claimed 
to possess experiential reality, is taken to be closely linked to the first-person 
perspective, and is, in fact, identified with the very first-personal giveness of the 
experiential phenomena.”49   At this point in The Assassination, we’ve been repeatedly 
shown how Bob’s admiration for Jesse is intimately and causally tied to Bob’s projection 
of self. Although Bob (and the audience) know that his performance of Jesse at home is 
“play-acting,” by putting on the giveness of Jesse, we see Bob’s transformation—though 
we don’t yet know what this transformation will yield.  
Killing Jesse is a traumatizing event that remains static in Bob’s memory because 
it is the definitive moment when he embodies the gesture of “killer.” Growing up, he 
had idolized the bank-robbers, the train-robbers, the Bushwackers, and that ilk, but now 
 
49 Subjectivity and Selfhood, 106. 
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having lived with the most infamous of all, he must act like Jesse and kill the man who 
threatens him. This gesture makes him into that which he thought he wanted to be. 
Bob’s imitations of Jesse are in part an attempt to find the meaning of who he is “in its 
radical ontological/ ontogenetic sense.”50 It is his performance in the “ever-changing 
material event that registers the impact of social and cultural pressures on the body in 
an active and creative way.”51  When we see the reflection of Bob from Jesse’s 
perspective in the glass picture-frame, we see Bob as we surmise he wanted Jesse to see 
him—as a man fit to get the job done. This fulfillment of his destiny, so to speak, is the 
‘experiential reality’ that Dan Zahavi describes in this way: “The self is claimed to 
possess experiential reality, is taken to be closely linked to the first-person perspective, 
and is, in fact, identified with the very first-personal giveness of the experiential 
phenomena.”52 When Bob haunts Jesse’s room the morning of the murder, he imagines 
what it’s like to be Jesse James. Killing Jesse is the ultimate form of mimicry. 
2.3.2 Bob as an actor on-stage 
Another performative aspect of Bob’s character lies in his multiple on-stage 
performances of the assassination event. Hansen admits that he knew the play “and the 
general contents of it but could not find a script so I invented the dialogue.”53 The 
 
50 Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, 35. 
51 Ibid., 36 
52 Subjectivity and Selfhood, 106. 
53 From a personal email between myself and Mr. Hansen. January 26, 2018. 
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dialogue confirms what we’ve already seen, but the film’s narrator completes our 
understanding of the affect the play had on the Ford brothers. The scenes where Bob 
and Charley re-enact the assassination are interesting because we can see in the later 
performances how quickly their fame has degraded. Although the public performances 
helped establish Robert Ford’s celebrity, they also eventually soured the public’s 
opinion of him. The viewer cannot forget that the assassination is a traumatic event, and 
trauma theory may provide some insight into the temperamental and emotional states 
of the Fords as they replay the event. The narration, and especially Charley’s behavior, 
would imply that the ghost of Jesse James haunts their performance of the parlor-
murder scene. These scenes also demonstrate how viewers can experience another type 
of ghosting affect for Bob—an actor who, in portraying himself, has shaped his onstage 
persona into the ghost of the ‘real’ man. 
The number of performances of the stage play is important. Viewers of the film 
have witnessed the ‘real’ assassination ‘as it happened,’ so we compare the staged event 
to the ‘actual’ event in a way the audience of the staged production cannot. Viewers 
also witness an early performance, before Charley’s onstage presence was fully haunted 
by the ghost of his friend Jesse. In this scene, Bob tells his story, addressing the audience 
directly, and we witness the re-enactment with the final gun-slinging flourish that 
confirms Bob as the man who killed ‘the outlaw Jesse James.’ It seems clear that Bob is 
traumatized by the actual event, but he cannot lay the ghost to rest.  Dominick 
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LaCapra’s Writing History, Writing Trauma prescribes a process by which historical and 
literary works affectualize trauma in readers, and how this process may bring 
resolution, forgiveness, or hope: 
Traumatic Dasein haunts or possesses the self, is acted out or compulsively 
repeated, and may not be adequately symbolized or accessible in language, at 
least in any critically mediated, controlled and self-reflexive manner. Words may 
be uttered but seem to repeat what was said then and function as speech acts 
wherein speech itself is possessed or haunted by the past and acts as a 
reenactment or an acting out…. These processes [of working over and through 
the trauma towards an ethical responsible agency] are crucial for laying ghosts to 
rest, distancing oneself from haunting revenants, renewing an interest in life, and 
being able to engage memory in more critically tested senses.54  
The acting out of a trauma can have therapeutic benefits. For Bob, however, this re-
enactment seems to cause more intense haunting. We can easily assume that 
performing the assassination scene almost 900 times would have had an uncanny affect 
on Bob, haunted by the ghost of Jesse, the space, and the event. The repetition of the 
scene confirms that Jesse, the space, and the event no longer exist. As Thomas Elsaesser 
posits, “if trauma is experienced through its forgetting, its repeated forgetting, then, 
paradoxically, one of the signs of the presence of trauma is the absence of all signs of 
 
54 Writing History, Writing Trauma, 90. 
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it.”55 The negating and “suspension” of the original performative traumatic event is 
mediated through its representation on stage, and as Elsaesser continues, “the traumatic 
event [is given] the status of a (suspended) origin in the production of a representation, 
a discourse or a text, bracketed or suspended because marked by the absence of 
traces.”56 Ghosts are born from the mediated representations of the event, and I would 
argue that this repeated stage performance demonstrates how that can happen.   
The staged performances also definitively establish the public image of Robert 
Ford. For him, the staged performances fulfill his desire for celebrity, but the act quickly 
becomes another place where he must defend himself against accusations of cowardice. 
In the re-enactment, Bob plays himself as he wants to be remembered—fearful for his 
life, confident, and brave. But audiences at these performances, and public opinion in 
general, became more enamored by the ghost of Jesse the “outlaw hero” than by Bob’s 
story, which ends with him shooting his friend from behind.  But this is not the end of 
Bob’s story. The film shows his story after celebrity—confused by how others saw him, 
wanting recognition from Jesse’s victims for what he has done, and increasingly 
depressed, as if suffering from PTSD. The final shot of Bob freezes on a close-up of 
Affleck turning to answer the call of his murderer, his eyes in a steady ‘thousand-yard 
stare.’  
 
55 “Postmodernism as Mourning Work,” Screen, 199. 
56 Ibid., 199. 
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2.3.3 The ‘Affleck Affect’ 
In these first two examples of the experiential dimension of subjectivity, I’ve 
primarily focused on how the character Bob appears to experience the world. Again, we 
may ascribe the filmic character subjectivity in our co-creation of the image of Bob. 
Viewers may believe that the filmic character of Bob exists because he acts as he 
imagines an outlaw should act, and then onstage he acts out the public image he wants 
to be remember as. Despite his attempts to embody the idealized version of his 
imagined self, his story ends as his fame turns violent and revengeful. Although The 
Assassination focuses more Bob’s story than Jesse’s, it is the image of Robert Ford 
derived from Affleck’s performance57 than from the events of the story that the viewer 
is likely to remember.  
We can trace the importance of certain events by the variation of eye-gestures 
that Affleck uses throughout the film. From the nervous and obsequious kid to the 
steady-eyed assassin, Bob’s physical, gestural responses to events shape our impression 
of him, and, thereby, reveal more about his subjective self than any story could, even if 
the story is told by a trustworthy narrator. Some events in The Assassination must be 
created out of portions of testimonies, such as his interview with Governor Crittenden, 
which is prefaced with the narrator noting how Bob was “never consistent in his 
 
57 Affleck’s performance earned him multiple nominations as best supporting actor, including 
the Critic’s Choice, Golden Globe and Oscar nominations.  
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recollections” when later cross-examined about this meeting.  In this interview scene, 
Bob doesn’t say much, but Affleck’s downward look followed by a nervous smile—the 
Affleck Affect58—creates the image of a young man troubled by the job he realizes that 
only he can do. In the novel and the film, Robert Ford is reconstructed from historical 
documents; however, the filmic character image of Bob, remembered by viewers as the 
ghost of Affleck’s performance, allows viewers access to his feelings through his 
awkward and unsettling gestures and tics. We assume his tics reveal an emotional 
intensity inexpressible in words, and in so doing, we imagine what a character for 
whom celebrity so quickly soured may feel. As we put meaning to his gestures, we 
haunt his image with our perceived emotional responses.  
This specific aspect of performance, where his gestures reveal our emotions, 
allows us to ascribe a subjective self onto Bob because we can empathize with a 
character who becomes empathetic. In a response to Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi describes 
empathy as only made possible when: “Subjectivity is not hermetically sealed up within 
itself, remote from the world and inaccessible to the other. It is, above all, a relation to 
the world, and Merleau-Ponty wrote that access to others is secured the moment I 
define both others and myself as co-existing relations to the world.”59 We empathize 
with Bob, particularly in his later years, which the narrator describes as being haunted 
 
58 It’s a silly term, I admit, but I can’t think of any better way to term the affect created through 
Affleck’s performance.  
59 Subjectivity and Selfhood, 159.  
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by Jesse. He imagines visiting the families of Jesse’s murdered victims, and he tries to 
make a new life in Colorado (though even there they still know who he is). Everyone 
who meets Bob defines him in relation to what they know he has done, and not by who 
he has become. We see the fullness of Affleck’s performance in these later reflections—
the eyes closing more slowly, more deliberately. As the affect becomes a more 
empathetic gesture, we assume he has, too.  
The Affleck Affect—a subtle slow-blink, downward look, then up to catch your 
(the viewer’s as he looks into camera) gaze indirectly, and a smile, just slightly, then 
quick down again. The gesture reminds one of a child trying to pull off a lie or a joke. 
He’s an awkward teenager full of ambition and celebrity worship. Dominik’s choice of 
Brad Pitt as Jesse, arguably the most famous man of his time, and Affleck as Bob visually 
reinforces ideas about celebrity. However, fame does not lead to good endings, 
especially for men who are celebrated for their violence.  
The most prominent image in The Assassination is the Affleck Affect, because it 
allows us to see Bob as an active subjectivity. As del Río says, “cinematic gestures and 
movement are more likely to speak the truth of the character when they are not blocked 
by the censoring mechanisms of a rational language—whether this may occur in a silent 
image or in one that preserves its own difference from the spoken words.”60 We could 
 
60 Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, 77. 
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characterize Affleck’s eye movements as noticeable enough to stick with us, subtle 
enough to require multiple viewings.  
We first see the Affleck Affect in Bob’s meeting with Frank (Sam Shepard). 
Instead of assuring Frank that he was a capable accomplice, his nervous tics resulted in 
Frank pulling his gun and telling Bob to move on. He had given Frank “the willies.” 
Later in the film, he again must convince a powerful man, Governor Crittendon, that he 
is capable of completing a job, though this time it is bringing in ‘the outlaw Jesse James’ 
dead or alive.  Though still awkward, Bob is more settled. By this time, Bob has been 
with Jesse enough to understand the threat he poses. Bob’s eyes move more slowly, and 
when he gazes up at the governor, after Dick Liddil has praised his reliability, Bob is 
cool and confident. The shyness from earlier is replaced with anxiety at what he must 
do. 
Other scenes which employ this gesture include when Sheriff Timberlake (Ted 
Levine) comes to warn Bob not to turn his back to Jesse. Even this veteran Sheriff 
admits a bit of amazement at James’s ability to see through a person to their true intent. 
By taking on the capture of Jesse James, the Sheriff warns him, Bob has also taken on the 
knowledge that Jesse will kill him over the slightest suspicion. Shortly after this meeting 
with the sheriff, Charley and Jesse show up at the grocery store where Bob works to 
bring him in on a three-person bank robbery. Bob is on the ladder, in silhouette, with 
his back to the front door. Jesse walks in without making a sound, quietly leans on the 
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counter. Jesse says, “You have been elected,” surprising Bob to be so quickly caught 
with his back to Jesse. As he descends the ladder, he jokes to Jesse about seeing him in 
his dreams. Now, however, the eye movements are reversed. Instead of looking to his 
addressee, then down, and to the side, Bob looks quickly down, then straight into the 
eyes of Jesse. The adoration is still there, but his gestures reveal what we know—the lie, 
and the fear of being caught out in the lie. 
The Affleck Affect is replaced with a steady-eye, steady-hand stare. Dominik 
emphasizes Affleck’s transformation through a series scenes starting with the first 
trauma in Jesse’s parlor. This series of scenes come after Jesse has warned Charley and 
Bob from speaking to each other without his permission, and after Bob agrees to bring 
Jesse James in to Governor Crittenden by any means necessary. Bob and Jesse sit in the 
parlor, lit only by the fire in the hearth. Jesse is reclined on the sofa, and Bob is sitting 
on the floor near the opposite end of the sofa. Their conversation is marked with an air 
of discontent from Bob. As the two begin to argue in earnest, Charley walks in with 
arms-full of firewood. He asks if they two were “having a spat.” Jesse reaches for the 
boy, pulls him over and begins to rub his shoulders, loosening Bob up, as a father or 
brother might comfort an aggravated loved one. Then, Jesse pulls a knife from behind 
his back with his right hand, grabs Bob by the hair with his left, and holds the blade 
against Bob’s neck. Jesse’s threats are intense and direct. Bob’s eyes are wide open 
(Figure 3) and reflecting the murderous rage in Jesse’s (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 Jesse traumatizes Bob (brightness adjusted) 
 
 
Figure 4 Jesse in murderous rage (brightness adjusted) 
 
From this point in the film, Bob remains visually aware. Whether or not the 
reality of Jesse’s threat motivates Bob to act, this is the filmic traumatic event, revealed in 
the gesture of Jesse (not Bob), whereby Bob’s options are made clear. Bob wanted to be 
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the outlaw, the gunslinger, the man others could count on, the equal of Jesse James. This 
first scene in the sequence that culminates in Jesse’s death could be summarized in a 
way similar to del Rìo’s description of melodrama in Sirk’s films.  She writes: 
Poised between classical narrative and affective-performative intensity, Sirk’s 
films thus oscillate between moments of repression and moments of 
overexpenditure—between images that contain the characters’ libidinal energies 
to a degree of unbearable bodily regimentation and images that liberate energies 
in ways that exceed any goal except the vital expression of their own affective 
force.61 
The effect of Jesse’s psychotic break on Bob are clearly noticed in Affleck’s performance, 
as Bob now seems to be constantly and attentively on watch. Jesse’s knife-wielding 
event confirms not only what Bob has been told—that Jesse will kill him—but it also 
“liberates energies” in him, which he has always known existed but had not yet had the 
opportunity on which to act. 
I’m fairly confident that most people who saw The Assassination of Jesse James by 
the Coward Robert Ford knew something of Jesse James, if not also Robert Ford. Whatever 
the source of that foreknowledge, it’s likely a mediated image that viewers remember. 
For me, there were the ghosts of previous Jesses—James Keach and Robert Duvall—and 
ghosts of previous Bobs—Nicholas Guest and John Carradine. I also knew of Jesse 
 
61 Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, 29. 
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James the way most Americans probably know something of Al Capone, Bonny and 
Clyde, or Ted Kaczynski. Whether having read about him, or having seen one of the 
forty or more film versions, or had only passing knowledge, we carry a ghost of the 
mediated image of Jesse James with us. Although we may remember textual images 
and filmic images differently, The Assassination lets viewers consider two ways of 
creating ghosts. We trust the narrator to give an accurate account of the events leading 
up to and the aftermath of the assassination. We may even trust that the narrator knows 
the thoughts and motivations of the two characters, and we can fill in the gaps when the 
narrator’s words are insufficient or contradictory. Similarly, we ascribe emotion and 
mood to a character through the filmmakers’ and actors’ efforts. In other words, we 
assume filmic characters have subjectivity based on the stories they and others tell 
about them, and we ascribe subjectivity to characters based on their performative 
experiences. Once we see characters as having subjectivity, as having resemblance to 
living people, we make those characters ghosts—alive but not living. If we hope to find 
clear meaning in these ghosts, we’ll be disappointed. The ghosts allow us to imagine 
what the meaning might be. If we have an uncanny connection to characters in a film, 
we may find meaning in the ghosts that resonate after the film has ended, but that 
meaning has an ontological base in our perceptions. So, it’s unlikely we can find a clear 
definitive ‘meaning’ in the ghosts of Jesse James and Robert Ford. But if we are haunted, 
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we may at least be allowed some comfort knowing the ghosts are mostly of our own 
making. 
 
3 CHAPTER TWO: ANGELS OF THE EVENT: PALIMPSESTS OF GRIEF AND 
DESIRE  
In this chapter I will consider ghosting the event-image. I argue that one possible 
way for a reader/viewer to ghost the event-image is through adaptations, specifically 
when adaptations are products of the palimpsestic process. As the process by which the 
subjective reader/viewer co-creates the image, the palimpsestic process is an event. This 
event may occur in the space/non-space that 20th Century German writers collectively 
conceive as “the Open,” and this event may evoke auratic or uncanny sensations in the 
viewer.   
 An event-image can be an image from an historical Event, like one that 
fundamentally changes political and global structures; or, an event-image may be an 
image borne from an event in a person’s (or a character’s) life. Ghosting event-images is 
how I describe the process by which we co-create, remember, revise, and revive those 
images we may associate with the ‘seismically large’ historical Events in relation to the 
events of our everyday lives. In order to more fully explain my concept of ghosting an 
event-image, I will consider the intertextual relationships between the works of three 
20th Century German “artists”—the poet Rainer Marie Rilke’s Duineser Elegien (Duino 
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Elegies), the philosopher Walter Benjamin’s Über den Begriffe der Geschichte (Theses on the 
Philosophy of History) and filmmaker Wim Wenders’ Der Himmel über Berlin62 (Wings of 
Desire). My close reading of these three works will include some relevant biographical 
information about Rilke, Benjamin, and Wenders, as well as a discussion of how the 
historical milieu and the influence of other artistic images contextualize the imagery at 
the center of each work. Because the event-images of these three works may resonate 
more fully with a viewer when considered together, my analysis will attempt to 
respond to the images as a collection of ghosts, a palimpsest that negates and creates 
simultaneously. 
3.1 The palimpsest 
In her highly influential work, A Theory of Adaptation, Linda Hutcheon proposes 
we see the adaptation as a palimpsest—an erasure of the old work followed by the 
creative layering of another. Although I agree that the palimpsest is a relevant way of 
engaging adaptation theory, I would argue that palimpsests tend to be limiting, not 
expansive, unless we're haunted by ghosts. As a process for understanding a viewer’s 
subjective experience of an image, ghosting images differs from the palimpsest in that the 
 
62 Although Peter Handke is credited as co-screenplay writer with Wenders, Handke’s 
contributions to the creation and shaping of angels is minimal. Handke downplays his 
contributions to the film in many interviews, despite Wenders insistence that he share credit.  As 
director, producer and screenwriter, Wenders is the driving force in the creation of the myth 
told in Wings of Desire. Therefore, I’m not ignoring Handke, but using “Wenders” to represent 
their collaboration. 
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ghosts of images negated and then re-created are stronger, the uncanny feeling 
produced in the adaptation more palpable, when our experience with the source images 
is intense.63  
The artist Robert Rauschenberg tells of wanting to do an “erasure” of a Willem 
de Kooning sketch.64 As he tells it, he went to de Kooning’s studio with an idea and a 
bottle of bourbon. He told de Kooning his idea, and de Kooning agreed. But de Kooning 
insisted that it be a sketch he would miss, and one that would be hard to erase. We 
could argue that the erasure Rauschenberg made of the de Kooning sketch is ‘beautiful,’ 
and the aura in the Rauschenberg is our affective response; we don’t need to know the 
story to appreciate the adaptation. However, we may feel haunted by the erasure 
knowing that under the Rauschenberg there was once a de Kooning; we may feel an 
uncanny sensation knowing that something beautiful once existed, a work beloved by 
its maker, a sketch known only to two great artists—one present at its creation, the 
other at its elimination. I have been moved and amazed by both artists’ work, and for 
me the tension in Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing (1953) (Figure 5) is 
tightened when I consider the ghost of impossible images no longer there. Every line, 
shade, or blank space becomes its own image in flux, impossible to identify as 
separately generated by either artist. A palimpsest is both negated in the erasure—an 
 
63 I think of intensity as the difference between a ghost in my house who lived here before 
versus the ghost of my grandfather who first visited me the night before he died. 
64 He retells the story in several interviews posted on YouTube. 
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image always already imagined, and confirmed in the re-creation, an image immediately 
imagined. The palimpsest in an image that is here/now and nowhere/always. When we 
view an image, our response is likely shaped by ghosts of past images we bring with us.  
 
Figure 5 Erased de Kooning Drawing Robert Rauschenberg 1953 
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For Hutcheon, “adaptations are never simply reproductions that lose their 
Benjaminian aura. Rather they carry that aura with them.”65 . This implies that the aura 
is an essential quality inherent in the image. If the palimpsest erases the image, if the 
image no longer ‘exists’, but its auratic qualities persist, then how do we account for the 
differences in our subjective experience? Would we all not be similarly moved by a 
piece of music? Any work of art? I believe a more plausible explanation is that the aura 
resides within me, the subjective viewer. Moreover, I am more likely to recognize the 
aura present in the palimpsestic image if I have already experienced an auratic affect 
from the source image. 
Similarly, when I experience an image that evokes uncanny sensations, it is the 
ghosts of images previously experienced and still present in my memory that are 
producing the uncanny sensation. It might be easy to confuse an auratic response with 
an uncanny sensation, but I believe both of these feelings can be evidence that the ghost 
exists. Because I have subjectively experienced images, ideas, emotional states, physical 
threat and fear, all that a work of art may evoke,  as well as the aftermath of these 
reading/viewing experiences—the trace of an image left behind, the mis-remembrances, 
the conflation of time—my memory is like a an open field where my ghosts of the 
image wait. When I view a work of art like Rauschenberg’s, my collection of memories 
of previous images, of events and people, of false memories and mis-remembrances, the 
 
65 A Theory of Adapatation, 4. 
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ghosts of de Kooning’s image, are all called forth, into the open field. If I must rely on 
my feelings about an adapted image as the only proof that ghosts exist, then I am willing 
to admit I believe in ghosts. Ghosting the image is the event in which we allow our 
ghosted images to mix with the present image; the aftermath of my ghosting is the 
physical, emotional, psychological, etc., responses to the image borne from my 
assemblage of subjective experiences with other works. 
3.2 From palimpsest to ghosting 
My point about the palimpsest is this—the process of simultaneously erasing and 
creating requires the subjective reader/viewer to participate in the production of the 
new image. I would disagree with Hutcheon’s view of the palimpsestic process as 
originating in each author’s work, and where, if the process is done well, the auratic 
qualities of the source image persists. I read this to mean the aura is an essential quality 
in the image, and it is the skill of the adapter that determines whether or not the aura 
from the source image hiding within the new image will be revealed. The problem in 
this process for me is that the aura of an image is always outside of our experience. I 
believe, rather, that aura is an interior feeling, a product of my experience with an 
image begun within me, the reader/viewer. When I watch Wings of Desire, I may 
recognize trace fragments from the negated images of the ‘schreckliche Engel,’ the 
Novus Angelus, and the angel of history in the image of Damiel (Bruno Ganz). The 
angels of Rilke and Benjamin are ghost images haunting me as a reader/viewer, and the 
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aura of the source images are not essential to Damiel unless I assign my ghosted 
images, and the auratic responses they evoked, onto him. When the images of a source 
work are negated in the adaptation, it must be I, the reader/viewer, who chooses which 
of the ghosted source images, and to what extent, I will juxtapose, compare, or comingle 
with the new image I am immediately experiencing. Ultimately, I decide how much of 
an image’s aura, if any, is revealed.  
The palimpsestic process of constant erasure/creation of images, this 
simultaneous presence/non-presence of images, can be seen as a way of ghosting the 
image. Whereas I argued in Chapter One that a viewer may employ the process of 
ghosting a character image by first believing that a character has selfhood or 
subjectivity, in this chapter I will widen the conceptual metaphor of ghosting to include 
event as an image. In considering how the palimpsest helps to explain ghosting the 
event-image, I will use Wings of Desire as an example in which the fragmented images 
from a “source text” can shape a reader/viewer’s experiences of and responses to an 
image. It is not that these trace fragments contain essential auratic qualities that anyone 
will recognize; but, the fullest affect may only occur when we readers/viewers also 
recognize the underlying, erased image.  
For example, we can more fully recognize the reference to Klee’s Novus Angelus 
in the film if we know that this watercolor painting, as Benjamin would say, provided 
him an open field in which to meditate on the Angel of History. A reference to an image 
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does not necessarily evoke its aura; but, when readers/viewers know the source image 
before its negation in the adaptation, we may experience again the auratic affect of that 
source image layered onto and joined together with the aura of those images we are 
immediately experiencing. On the other hand, when we experience an image for the 
first time, not knowing that the image is an adaptation from an earlier work, the auratic 
affect that the image evokes is most likely not the same one evoked by the source. The 
aura of a new image without referents is unique to the viewer when we consider aura as 
our affective response to that image alone. In Wings of Desire, viewers may see the image 
of Damiel as an angel who willingly leaves eternity to be on this earth with the woman 
he desires; however, in the Duino Elegies and in the “Ninth Thesis on History,” the 
images of angels are bound to the Openness66 of grief and eternal isolation. I believe that 
for those who have read Rilke’s poems, Benjamin’s thesis, and seen the film, the overall 
auratic affect that each image evokes becomes more intense, compounded by the 
seemingly simultaneous occurrence of past and present. To go back to the example: 
after reading Benjamin, we may see Wenders’ Damiel differently. Instead of his 
choosing to join this earth as a human capable of being moved by carnivals, rock music, 
coffee and cigarettes, we may now see his choice to leave his life in the Open as a 
 
66 Openness and the Open are literary tropes common to mid-20th Century writers and thinkers. A 
fuller discussion of the Open will follow. 
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response to the grief revealed in the eternally recurring event where the full history of 
human suffering is always constantly witnessed and never changed.   
Whether we recognize the connections or not, I would assert that the three works 
examined herein form a network of interrelated images, ideas, and events. Chasing 
down all source images is a rabbit-hole to which I won’t subject my readers, but each of 
the three artists, Rainer Marie Rilke, Walter Benjamin, and Wim Wenders credit the 
creation of their works as having found inspiration in the images of other artistic works. 
Rilke acknowledges the acrobats and clowns in the Elegies as images remembered from 
the 1905 Picasso painting, La famille de Saltimbanques; Benjamin’s articulates an extended 
meditation on his friend Paul Klee’s Novus Angelus (1920) in the “Ninth Thesis”; and 
Wenders says the idea for the film came to him after reading the Elegies and noticing the 
images of angels everywhere he went in Berlin. Likewise, the influence of one’s work on 
the other is evident in several examples. In his letters to his friend Gershom Scholem, 
Benjamin expresses his admiration and professional respect for Rilke’s works; in 
another letter addressed to Rilke he states that he has included copies of his own work 
to the poet. For Wenders, the influences of these two previous works are so 
pronounced, some of the source images appear without erasure in the palimpsest he 
creates. He openly claims both writers (as well as Klee’s painting) as a direct influence 
on his film.  
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As I work through the metaphor of ghosting the image, I see its usefulness as a 
concept for understanding how we might remember filmic images because it is flexible. 
I can apply it to my readings/viewings, and I can apply it to the artist/adapter, the 
palimpsester (if you will). However, before I directly consider the palimpsestic process as 
a method for ghosting the event-image in the three works that these artists produced, I 
discuss the event as an image and explain some common themes (especially in Rilke 
and Benjamin) concerning the Open and the ‘creaturely.’67 Then, I will describe how the 
filmic event might be haunted not only by the ghosts of history—held in common by a 
city, or a community, or a family—but also by the ghosts we personally hold for a 
historical event (i.e., images of the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime).  But first, 
a more considered description of events. 
3.3 Angles witnessing Events 
Over the past three decades, the event has been a philosophical topos of 
discussions in linguistics and cognitive sciences; other fields of inquiry, including 
existentialism, Marxism, literary criticism, and phenomenology have also made 
definitional claims to this elusive term. Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek68 
have written extensively on events, which can be read in light of and extending from 
their writings on film. Yet, despite the multiple overly flexible definitions these and 
 
67 ‘Creaturely’ as used by Weigel.  
68 Three certifiable cinephilosophers. 
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other contemporary scholars of film-philosophy have put forth, little scholarship has 
explored how we as viewers interact as witness to the historical Event and/or the 
personal event as imaged onscreen.  
Of the three philosophers above, I am most drawn to Badiou’s four events of 
philosophical inquiry—love, science, politics (history), and art. For my own 
convenience, I designate these as Events;69 they are communally experienced and their 
social, cultural, technological, or political impacts are measured in seismic terms. On the 
other hand, events70 are personal, subjectively experienced moments. To borrow a 
Rilkean image, we walk a rope tightened between two poles: the universal, the 
ahistorical, the potentially traumatic Event and the individualized, localized, potentially 
transcendent event. In my reading of Wings of Desire, the viewer may at times be witness 
to the personal events in Berlin, hearing the inner thoughts of individuals as they 
navigate daily life in the city. At other times viewers may experience Berlin as the angel 
of history might—moving through a city haunted by the Event World War II.  
 It is difficult to talk about events, especially images of a filmic event, without also 
talking about space, because these two images are so tightly braided. For example, even 
if we see an Event mediated through television or film, we clearly understand and 
generally associate it as having occurred in a specific place—the Olympic Village in ’72, 
 
69 Events with capital E. 
70 events with lower case e. 
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the US Iranian Embassy in ’79, or Omaha Beach in Saving Private Ryan (1998). However, 
as I propose in the next chapter, when an image of space is mediated, we may become 
ghosts haunting that filmic space. We may ghost the spatial image—remembering the 
filmic image of the wall, for example, while walking through Berlin; or we may ghost the 
spatial image by appearing as a presence/non-presence in the filmic world.71 In Wings of 
Desire, Berlin is haunted by its past—the ghosts arising from our knowledge of its 
history, from our family stories, from our remembered images from other texts, from 
our combined memories and perceptions of Berlin’s past. Following the characters from 
one event to the next, we project these ghosted images of Berlin, World War II, and its 
aftermath onto the city walled off from itself. The people and the angels in Berlin may 
be living their events now, but they are surrounded by the ghosts of Events past.  
Wings of Desire was released just two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 
Wenders returned to Berlin after the fall to film the second chapter, Far Away, So Close. 
Standing for over twenty-eight years, the Berlin Wall could be the image of the Event 
we describe as ‘a divided Berlin.’ But as an image type for this particular film, the Wall 
is more accurately an image of space than event. The Wall occupies space; it encircles 
space; it keeps one from entering a space and it keeps one from leaving a space. The 
Wall as an image of space has a very specific intent—it is a constant physical reminder 
 
71 The film, coincidentally, that I will analyze in Chapter Three is another German film—Die 
Wand/The Wall.  
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of a separation resulting from political Events. Since I will examine more closely how 
filmic images of space may call into question the viewers’ relational position to 
onscreen objects in Chapter Three, let me turn instead to ghosting the event-image of 
World War II. When we are ghosting the filmic event, viewers may find more in the 
film than the facts of the war confirm. Viewers may find the event-image more 
personal, more significant, more meaningful, more mysterious. Basically, I am arguing 
that ghosting the event-image is a way for viewers to expand their participatory emotional 
experience of an event (fictional or historical) beyond the facticity of its occurrence.   
As we think about how we remember the event-images in Wings of Desire, we 
might consider two things: first, facts72—what we know about the historical placement 
of the Event, as well as the resulting social, cultural and political effects the Event had 
on the city of Berlin;  and second, feelings73—our emotional response to the resulting 
affects the Event has had on the individuals who lived through it. To further 
oversimplify, facts may ground us with verifiable knowledge of the Events, but feelings 
allow us to subjectively empathize with those who have lived through these Events. 
Like the angels who move through Berlin from one person to the next, stopping to 
extend a moment of comfort, clarity, or insight, we may witness the event-images as a 
collection of factual occurrences; but, when we hear the most intimate, interior 
 
72 Perhaps the most highly charged and potentially undefinable term in the whole dissertation.  
73 Perhaps the most highly charged and potentially undefinable term in the whole dissertation. 
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conversations one has with one’s self, we may then find reason to assign the event-
image significance in the context of our subjective experiences.  
In this way, ghosting the filmic event-image may allow viewers to reconcile fact and 
feelings. In Wings of Desire, World War II is re-imaged in the action of the actors, in the 
costumes designed to look like uniforms, and in the sets constructed like bombed-out 
buildings, etc. When intentionally composed, as in Wenders’ mise en scéne, the viewer 
may experience these images as elemental palimpsests of factual events. For example, 
the image of a swastika lacks historical significance until a viewer loads it with his or 
her remembered collection of facts and feelings. In this case, the palimpsest erases the 
trauma of Event and replaces it with the viewer’s physical and emotional responses. 
Ghosting an event-image can revive auratic- or uncanny-like sensations in us.  
Again, I see the distinction between Event and event as a function of its intensity 
and reach. Filmic events are images that viewers accept as moments in a character’s life, 
chunks of time shaped by the character’s actions, eternally returning as the film plays 
out each time, in as nearly as exact way, again and again. Although we may recognize 
the transformative potential an Event can have on a character, for most films we are 
more likely to be moved by the set of personal events the characters face than the 
background Event. Sometimes, we bring our ghosts of the Event with us to the film, and 
then we leave with the ghosts of the events that transformed the characters who “lived” 
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through them. In my system, the event-image may be the most complex image type 
because it cannot appear in isolation. 
3.3.1 A brief digression on ordinary language, the open and the ‘creaturely’, the 
palimpsest as an event, and ghosting the event-image 
As I mentioned earlier, events and space seem inextricably bound together. In 
choosing a conceptual metaphor to try and explain how one might remember filmic 
images, I am intentionally forcing my self to consider multiple ‘compossibilities’ that 
ordinary language may preclude. Rilke, Benjamin, and Wenders have all created images 
that opens for us a space where we might, if only slightly better, understand those 
things which cannot be stated or understood in ordinary language. To find meaning in 
an image may require us to enter a space where we co-create the new image. Again, 
here I’m using space because, in the world we recognize and understand, event cannot 
happen outside of space. The process of the palimpsest, the ghosting of an image, is an 
event happening in the space where our ghosts of the image reside.74 But, when we try 
to describe this ghosted image to someone else, the process itself becomes like a re-
occurring loop, holding us in place as we cobble together words that are ultimately 
insufficient. For example, when a reader/viewer attempts to understand the written 
works or visual images constructed by the poet, philosopher, filmmaker, we are not 
 
74 In my system, this is open field of ghosts is probably most like Deleuze’s plane of immanence.  
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only limited by a system of signs—an endless set of ‘signifieds’ and ‘signifiers’—but, we 
are also trapped in this system that we have built. Ordinary language constructs 
meaning for its users, as Swedish linguist Per Linell explains it, through dialogism—
specifically in our interactions, contextualizations, and communicative construction. In 
other words, the meanings of our words exist in the event of being heard by another, in 
relation to “co-texts (also with non-verbal aspects), situations, activity types, 
interlocutors’ interactional biographies and cultural knowledge,” and through the 
process of attempting to understand.75 In this, there are clear echoes of Mikhail Bakhtin 
and Julia Kristeva, which may further encourage us to see the Duino Elegies, Thesis on the 
Philosophy of History, and Wings of Desire as three texts in dialogue. However, Linell’s 
focus on the ordinary language of human conversation is relevant because any 
language, at its base, regardless of intention, relates meaning only in the process from 
transmission to reception, from thought to word, from being spoken to being heard, 
from projection to reception.  
If we posit that ordinary language is a liminal system dependent upon an 
already agreed upon set of denotative and connotative associations to establish 
meaning, then users of language must share in the assumption that there are inherent 
gaps and ambiguities (a lacuna) where meaning always remains afterwards. Everyday 
conversation is only possible when both speaker and hearer actively engage in the 
 
75 “What is Dialogism,” 2-3. 
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lacuna, like in the palimpsestic process, negating the other’s imagined sense of meaning 
and completing it with our own. This may account for misunderstanding in ordinary 
language; but, once we begin to use language to convey more complex abstract thought, 
the co-mingling of historical, psychological, experiential forces may widen these gaps 
further. When facing an image that evokes uncanny expressions, for example, we may 
turn to metaphor to explain that sign without discernible meaning. For me, the power 
of a painting, a poem, or film lies in its challenge to our imaginative abilities to find 
meaning in the narrative event. Jacques Maritain describes art as the “mutual 
entanglement of the World and Self.”76  But, I believe it’s not enough to enter the space, 
to enter the Open, or an immanent field, we also must enter the event of a poem, a film, 
or a historical account. When reader/viewers ghost the event-image, they enter a space 
where uncanny expressions are allowed to move us, and, thereby, have meaning 
despite any verifiable evidence.  
Whereas we can make meaning in ordinary language because the meaning is 
conceivable, when we try to find meaning in auratic affects, an uncanny expression, or 
the ‘language of the Open’, we are challenged to use our imaginative powers to 
conceive of something previously inconceivable. In his essay, “On Language as Such 
 
76 Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 9. 
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and the Language of Man,”77 Benjamin considers the limitation of expression and our 
attempts to go beyond them: 
Mediation, which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the 
fundamental problem of linguistic theory, and if one choses to call this 
immediacy magic, then the primary problem of language is its magic. At the 
same time, the notion of magic of language point to something else: its 
infiniteness. This is conditional on its immediacy. For just because nothing is 
communicated through language, what is communicated in language cannot be 
externally limited or measured, and therefore all language contains its own 
incommensurable, uniquely constituted infinity. 
Further, in the introduction to Benjamin’s translations of Charles Baudelaire’s Tableux 
parisiens, he addresses the difficulty of translating ‘that which is beyond’ from one 
‘ordinary language’ to another. He again expresses frustration in that which cannot be 
communicated and posits that, depending on the context, "It is [something that 
symbolizes] only in the finite products of language, and [something symbolized] in the 
evolving languages themselves.”78  Imagine holding an image in your mind of an 
event—you are standing in an open field and the ‘infiniteness’ of choices for finding 
meaning in the image is ‘conditional on its immediacy.’ Just as language can open a 
 
77 From Illuminations, 317. 
78 Ibid, 79. 
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space where we may find meaning, so, too, can image open the event of finding 
meaning.  
When we enter the space of the open, we are also entering the process for finding 
meaning already in progress. For Benjamin, a painting could open a space where he 
could contemplate the thought-image of a philosophical concept. The Novus Angelus, for 
example, opens the space wherein he can find confirmation of his beliefs in Messianism, 
where the destructive realities of history are evident, and where his prophetic fears of a 
fascistic future come true. Even in the infiniteness, where space is opened so 
expansively it appears erased, when something happens in that open, it confirms our 
creaturely-ness. A viewer’s subjective experience of the event-image finds among the 
ghosts his history, her life-story, their remembrances of events past. We can imagine 
meaning in this space in all of its conceivable and inconceivable forms. 
In her book, Walter Benjamin Images, the Creaturely, and the Holy, Sigrid Weigel 
examines Benjamin’s critical approaches to the function and ontology of works of art, 
specifically the tension in his work between the secular and the sacred. In her analysis 
of Benjamin’s essay, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities”, she points out how Benjamin sees 
symbolism as holding domain over both the meaning that “extends beyond poetry” and 
the unexpressed event of the narrator.79 Furthermore, Weigel states: 
 
79 Walter Benjamin Images, 86. 
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The theory of artwork formulated here implies that, on the one hand, the poet 
must limit himself to his (human) faculty; yet, on the other hand, he is to mark 
and rupture the limit of his own language in representation and the narrative 
stance by using it as symbol of a different realm that lies beyond.80 
It is in the “rupturing the limit of his own language” that we can return to the ghosting 
of the event-image. Although in “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” Benjamin describes the 
role of the critic as uncovering beauty’s divine secret, it is clear that he sees artistic 
expression as reaching beyond the limits of comprehensible, human language.81 In the 
rupture, the image’s ‘meaning’ becomes veiled, mysterious, and therefore, divine. If we 
can now replace ‘rupture’ with ‘palimpsest,’ the negation and creation of images are 
then like ghosts, who are the “symbol of a different realm that lies beyond.”   
3.4 A chorus of angels: Duino Elegies, Theses on the Philosophy of History, and 
Wings of Desire 
Each of the three works portray human experience as a reflection of the historical 
context in which the work was written, specifically the isolating effects on individuals 
during and in the aftermath of world wars. The three works are by twentieth century 
German artist: Rainer Marie Rilke’s Duino Elegies, Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the 
 
80 Ibid., 86. 
81 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 1, 101.  
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Philosophy of History and Wim Wenders’82 Wings of Desire. Instead of comparing how 
each artist uses the image of angel caught in the world subjugated to human historical 
Events, my reading will look at how the palimpsestic process transforms the image of 
an angel who desires to transcend the liminal threshold of human experience into one 
who finds hopes and comfort in that which is beyond language. Here again I argue that 
as each author initiates another layer in the palimpsestic process, adding new image on 
top of old, it is we who transform the old image into the new, in this case haunted by 
the ghosts of angels, acrobats, and crossing over.  
Much has already been written about film’s ability to create simultaneous affects 
by engaging multiple sensory experiences creating a work that requires affective 
participation and reaction. Robert Stam assures us that what the viewer experiences 
corresponds perfectly with Benjamin’s idea of aura expressed in “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” because a work of art in film reveals its auratic 
essence through the “enriched field of human perception.”83 Although Benjamin 
warned against movies whose production are ultimately controlled by an industry that 
places audience reception and profitability over artistic quality, and though it is 
 
82 Although Peter Handke is credited as co-screenplay writer with Wenders, Handke’s 
contributions to the creation and shaping of angels is minimal. Handke downplays his 
contributions to the film in many interviews, despite Wenders insistence that he share credit, 
especially for the poetic language of the interior voices. As director, producer and screenwriter, 
Wenders is the driving force in the creation of the myth, told in Wings of Desire. Therefore, I’m 
not ignoring Handke, but using “Wenders” to represent their collaboration.  
83 Film Theory: An Introduction, 65. 
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impossible to say whether or not he would find a film like Wings of Desire to be auratic, 
there are scenes in Wenders’ film that Benjamin would likely find resonate with his and 
Rilke’s works.  
In scenes such as when Damiel describes his recollections of the creation and 
evolution of humankind, or when Peter describes to Damiel the pleasure of physical 
sensations of drinking coffee or rubbing your hands together, or when the black-and-
white world changes to color for Damiel after he chooses to cross over, my sense of aura 
in these events varies depending on how I remember feeling when reading the “Ninth 
Thesis” or the “Seventh Elegy,” for example. Film mediates event-images differently 
from the way written texts mediate images, and when we allow our experience with 
one event-image to co-mingle with the experiences of the others, the events strike us 
with a simultaneity of a harmonic chord. Adding another layer of metaphor, I think of 
my ghosted event-images as a chorus, where each ghost image is a voice with its own 
distinct timbre and tone. And, when sounded together, this chorus may produce a new 
image, a new harmonic tone that is fuller, more complex, perhaps more meaningful or 
mysterious.  
When I return to the Duino Elegies or the “Ninth Thesis,” I think of Cassiel and 
Homer, the strong man and the musicians, and Berlin. The aura in Wings of Desire is 
produced in our witness to Events. When I visited Berlin in 2017, the aura of the film 
was also evident in Potsdamer Platz, and in the Berlin State Library, in a remnant of the 
107 
wall with Thierry Noir face, and in the view from Marlene Dietrich Strasse where the U-
Bahn still runs. Can an artist create an object which has an aura, and is the aura only 
accessible through the object she has made? Or does she create an object which may 
hold the potential for evoking auratic reception in me? Am I the one who ascribes 
meaning beyond language? When I remember a scene from Wings of Desire, the images 
may evoke an uncanny feeling or an auratic sensation within me. Whereas the 
palimpsest may wipe away these feelings, in the ghosting of an image I am always adding 
more. 
At the risk of being repetitive, ghosting an image may be a more effective way to 
conceptualize adaptations than the palimpsest because it can be applied to a variety of 
perspectives, projections, receptions, subjectivities, and events. For me, the palimpsestic 
process implies a movement that is one-direction, and a process by which the viewer is 
ultimately only able to clearly make out one image at a time.  Even when I return to the 
source image after viewing the palimpsested image, the process of negating and re-
creating is now applied anew, and the palimpsest becomes the source image erased and 
re-created through my new reading of the older source image, which is now the new 
palimpsest. Like a short loop of film, or a gif, the effect on our co-creation is limited to 
that which is on the loop. No matter how densely layered the palimpsests images are, 
the only image which can evoke affects, sensations, and responses for the viewer is the 
image on the top of the palimpsested layers; all the images below are being filtered in the 
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layering. Instead of experiencing the full intensity and context that each ghost image 
holds, we see the image as though through an opaque glass, or through a scrim of 
palimpsested images; we hear the voices of the ghosts as a crowd’s murmur under the 
loudest voice in the room. So, I propose that each ghost of the event-image has a 
singularly unique voice,84 and that the voices of the ghost images can all speak (or sing) 
in different vocal parts, creating harmonies and dissonance out of intervals in the story 
of the event. If these ghosts have voice and can sing together in the open, then when I 
am ghosting the image, I interact with the image like a choirmaster interacts with a choir. 
I choose which voices to bring forward and amplify and which to push back or soften. I 
shape how well the voices harmonize together. Because ghosting allows the 
reader/viewer a richer mixture of possible meanings, ghosting an image is a better 
analogy for how or why we remember an event-image than the palimpsest. 
3.5 Three event-images in Wings of Desire  
I will identify three event-images in Wings of Desire that resonate, echo, or 
palimpsest an event-image from one or both source texts. Although I will provide some 
context of the historical milieu in which the source texts were written—the aftermath of 
World War I in the Duino Elegies, and the encroaching drive of fascism in Thesis on the 
 
84 Voice—in the sense that the ghosted image communicates to the viewer; it tries to tell us 
something specific about the event. The voice of a ghosted image may provide meaning to the 
image, or it may just further confuse meaning. Taken together, the voices are like a chorus in 
which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.   
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Philosophy of History—my main interest is in how the event-images in Wings of Desire 
seem to be haunted by the ghosts of the events from the source text. The three filmic 
event-images are: war and its aftermath as witnessed by the angel of history; the circus 
performers and the inverted world; and crossing over. Because Wenders’ film can 
produce a multi-sensorial experience unavailable to the reader of the source images, my 
analysis will be centered around the event-images on screen. In my readings, the filmic 
event-image may be a palimpsest of the source event-images, but the filmic event-image 
is co-created in my ghosting and the merging with the ghosts of the events from the 
sources.  Furthermore, because I believe that these ghosts are wholly our own, the filmic 
image-events may also be haunted by the realities of our experience at the time of our 
viewing. From Rilke, writing a hundred years ago, we understand how technology has 
become more efficiently weaponized and alienating; for Benjamin, we see Russian 
interference through social media bots as the perfection of the form he warns against in 
“Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction”; and since the release of Wings of Desire 
in 1987, we can better understand the significance of the Berlin Wall especially now that 
it’s gone. 
3.5.1 The aftermath of war and the Angel of History 
For Rainer Marie Rilke loneliness and isolation are chronic temperaments that 
appear throughout his work and trouble his personal life. Although he is a German 
Modernist poet whose influence on that movement cannot be understated, and whose 
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continued influence makes him one of the best-selling poets of the past hundred years, 
the events in his life tell a story of an archetypical Romantic poet of the imagination. His 
earnings were never enough to provide adequate financial support for him, his wife 
and child (whom he abandoned), and he often lived off the generosity of several 
patrons.  
Rilke started the Duino Elegies in 1912 while staying at the Duino Castle as a 
guest of Princess Marie von Thurn und Taxis-Hohenlohe, and he worked on the Elegies 
sporadically until 1922. Like Benjamin’s Arcades Project, the elegies were not simply put 
away during breaks in Rilke’s writing; he meditates on them constantly, revising and 
restructuring them without writing them down. Then, in energetic bursts of inspiration 
that lasts for days at a time, he would write one or two new elegies. He is interrupted 
from writing several times, such as in 1916 when he is conscripted into a year’s military 
service, and afterwards when his bouts of depression became debilitating.  
A theme evident in the Duino Elegies common to the writers and thinkers who 
fought (or otherwise served) in the first World War is that the human condition lacks 
meaning. The loss of meaning became a common trope because the events of war, the 
accumulation of violent actions of soldier against soldier, demonstrated how humans 
lack humanity. In other words, we are more creaturely than we care to admit. If you 
were to look at an Event as way to find meaning for your existence, and what you saw 
there were acts of brutality and horror, then you, too, might begin to feel life has no 
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meaning. In the Elegies, the speaker suffers because he lives in a world where events are 
devoid of ontological meaning and where sustained relevance cannot be produced. 
However, though the speaker may not find meaning to these events, he may find relief 
in the search for meaning. As a poetic form, the elegy is traditionally a form of lament 
for something lost through death or war. Rilke’s Duino Elegies break with the traditional 
form in that the speaker is not mourning death, but mourning life—the whole of human 
condition because it is always lacking, always searching for meaning, always reaching 
out to unreachable Open. Here, we could draw parallels between the speaker in the 
Elegies, who finds moments of relief in the search for an ontological meaning, and Rilke, 
who attempts to find meaning by breaking away from the traditional elegiac form. 
Perhaps for Rilke, the event is the creation of a new elegy, a process in which he may 
find relief. 
Walter Benjamin did not witness the aftermaths of World War II, the defeat of 
fascism and rise of totalitarian communism, a divided Berlin, etc., but he imagined the 
horrors produced by the “chain of events, [which is] one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of [the angel of history’s] feet.”85 In 
the “Ninth Thesis,” Benjamin asserts that the aftermath of war will always be with us 
and will always haunt us, because the aftermath of all war is cumulative.  
 
85 “Ninth Thesis,” 258. 
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Wenders makes both direct and indirect references to Walter Benjamin’s Angel 
of History, as well as other concepts from Thesis on the Philosophy of History. In the 
director’s commentary, Wenders explains how he decided to film in Berlin before 
knowing what the story would be. At first, he thought the subject would revolve 
around children, but as he walked throughout the city daily looking for ideas, he began 
to think of the images of angels as if they are guardians inhabiting Berlin and 
comforting its citizens. Furthermore, every day after his walks, he would return to 
explore his notes at his desk, over which hung “a painting of an angel by Paul Klee.”86 
Though in the commentary Wenders doesn’t name this painting, it was a print of Klee’s 
Angelus Novus (Figure 6). The well-known image comes from the “Ninth Thesis” of 
Theses on the Philosophy of History: 
A Klee painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as though he 
is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are 
staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken 
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from 
Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no 
 
86 “Audio commentary” 
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longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is 
what we call progress.87 
For Benjamin, the painting could open an imaginary space where he can erase and re-
create the Klee image; Benjamin’s angel is the palimpsest translating into written 
language an interpretative commentary on what Klee’s angel is witnessing, feeling, and 
experiencing.   
The Klee painting is simple; Benjamin’s thesis complex. The angel witnesses the 
pile of a single catastrophe—the non-stop human destruction brought on by wars. 
Though he cannot turn his head to see the future, he doesn’t need to—the future pushes 
forward in one single catastrophe. The angel feels compelled to help relieve the 
suffering, but is stopped by the storm of Progress. Benjamin says the storm blows from 
Paradise, which in German—Paradeise, connotes the Garden of Eden, and the prideful 
fall of humankind. This angel has witnessed destructive accumulation since the 
beginning of time, and he is horrified by how unaware humans are that the series of 
linked Events is not a causal chain, but is, instead, one continuous movement. Wenders 
and Benjamin share this water-color image, and from it Benjamin makes a ghost of the 
Angelus, Wenders makes a ghost of Benjamin’s ghost. 
 
 
87 Illuminations, 258. 
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Figure 6 Novus Angelus Paul Klee 1920 
 
Wenders slips in a reference to Klee’s painting as Damiel and Cassiel (Otto 
Sander), the two “lead” angels of the film, walk past various students reading to 
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themselves in the Berlin State Library.  As students pour over texts, copying musical 
scores, literary texts and philosophical treatises, thinking aloud for only the angels (and 
audience) to hear, a cacophonous chorus of inner voices reciting multiple textual 
references buzzing through the implied silence of the library. The second clearly 
audible voice that we hear says: 
Walter Benjamin kaufte 1921 Paul Klees Aquarell Angelus Novus. Bis zu seiner 
Flucht aus Paris im Juni 1940 hing es in seinen wechselnden Arbeitszimmern. In 
seiner letzen Schrift, Über den Begriff der Geschichte (1940), interpretierte er das 
Bild als Allegorie des Rücklblicks auf die Gesichte. (qtd. in Cook)88  
This reference is brief, and it would be easy to dismiss or ignore it as one in a series of 
literary allusions in the library scene. Many of the allusions are to works that reference 
angels or the end of the world; however, the Benjamin reference is important 
considering the thematic focus the next minutes of the film takes after this.  
Many of the Berliner angels gather everyday in the Berlin State Library, where 
history is held and recalled—a form of the collective Jetztzeit89 that humans can 
understand. As students and patrons read texts to themselves—their inner voices 
 
88 “Walter Benjamin purchased Paul Klee’s watercolor Angelus Novus in 1921. It hung in his 
office until his escape from Paris in June 1940. In his last essay, Theses on the Philosophy of History, 
he interprets the picture as an allegory for the looking-backwards at history” [my translation]. 
When I first heard this, I could only make out the first sentence and a half, and it’s not included 
in the English captions; the rest of this quote is swallowed up by the other voices in the library. 
Roger Cook quotes this whole passage directly from the screenplay for Der Himmel über Berlin.  
89 Another Benjaminian term that I will unpack in the event-image of crossing over. 
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whispering as if sharing secrets with their deepest and most personal selves—the angels 
stand close to or put hands on their shoulders to help them concentrate more clearly. At 
this point in the film, a new character enters who is the human equivalent of the Angel 
of History—the old man, Homer. 
In the character of Homer, Wenders fuses two textual constructs—the epic poet 
and chronicler of ancient wars, and the Novus Humanus, the Human of History who has 
been witness to the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century and who now evokes the 
muse of peace to help him tell the story of humankind. As he climbs the stairs Homer 
stops on the landing to face Damiel who is descending, and as if addressing the unseen 
angel, he says: 
Tell me, muse of the storyteller, who has been thrust to the edge of the world, 
both an infant and an ancient and through him reveal everyman. With time those 
who listened to me became my readers. […] I’m an old man with a broken voice, 
but the tale still rises from the depths, and the mouth slightly opened repeats it 
as clearly as powerfully. A liturgy for which no one needs to be initiated to the 
meaning of words and sentences.  
Homer has witnessed the destructive forces of Nazism first-hand. As he walks the ruins 
of Potsdamer Platz, his memories are intercut with documentary footage of the Platz 
before and after the Allied bombing. Viewers see the past and present simultaneously, 
as if the events of the old Platz were happening again, the images layered onto the 
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buildings and space. And as Homer guides the viewer through the ruins of the city 
destroyed and divided, a living witness to the city’s trauma, he speaks his poem of 
peace in his human language. He acknowledges that he is inadequate to describe the 
terror of these human-caused events. Potsdamer Platz is filled with ineffable 
remnants—the unspeakable ruins—fragments of buildings testifying to lives no longer 
there. The Event and the space are imaged together tightly in this scene. Berlin is 
haunted by Berlin. 
Damiel and Cassiel, too, are not only present in the now, but also aware and able 
to recall the historical fragments of time past; however, because their past is eternal, 
they more fully image the Angel of History. Damiel is painfully aware of the historical 
events that led Berlin to its current state, and, like the Angel of History, he is frustrated 
by his inability to do nothing more than witness human activities and praise the absent 
Creator. He reports to other angels, not to God, about the small human miracles and 
large atrocities. In Wenders’s filmic world, the creator God is removed from human 
activities, though possibly evident in the moments when the angels provide slight relief 
to humans’ suffering. In Wings of Desire, angels are not schreckliche; these angels are 
separated from humans and aware of the suffering the historical Events creates, but 
they are also able to provide slight comfort from the personal events of daily lives. 
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3.5.2 The circus performance/the acrobatic feat 
The second event-image from Wings of Desire palimpsested from the Duino 
Elegies is the circus performers’ acrobatic feats. Whereas, the angels exist both as liminal 
creatures in the ‘beyond’—in the heavenly realms of eternal time—and as spirit-
comforters with limited access to earthly experience, they, too are search for meaning, 
like humans, in a world outside of their experience. In both texts, the circus imagery 
and characters invert (in the Bakhtinian sense) the relationship between the earthly and 
the heavenly.90 And in the event-images of the circus performance, humanity finds a 
grace that eludes historical Events. Instead of humans who are more like creatures 
debased by war, in the circus performance humans seem capable of transcending their 
humanity. Bakhtin uses the carnival to explore the idea of the world turned upside 
down, and though this may not have been Rilke’s intention in evoking images of the 
circus performers, particularly in the “Fifth,” “Seventh,” and “Tenth Elegies,” he has 
transformed the saltimbanques from Picasso’s painting (Figure 7) into characters who 
make the familiar strange.  
Rilke was surrounded by artists most of his adult life. For several years in Paris, 
he worked as Auguste Rodin’s personal secretary; he was married to the sculptor Clara 
Westhoff; and he counted among his friends many well-known artists, such as Paul 
 
90 For more on the carnivalesque, see M.M. Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World, translated by 
Helene Iswolksy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. 
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Cezanne. However, this painting in particular haunted him in a way similar to how 
Benjamin was haunted by Klee’s Novus Angelus. In a letter to Lou Salomé, Rilke tells her 
how Pablo Picasso’s 1905 painting of a family of circus performers, La famille de 
Saltimbanques, was the inspiration for the “Fifth Elegy.” This poem is dedicated to Frau 
Hertha Koenig, who owned the painting, and who, for several months in 1915, allowed 
him to live in her house in Widenmayer Strasse where the painting hung.91 
 
 
Figure 7 La famille de Saltimbanques Pablo Picasso 1905 
 
 
91 Leishman, “Commentary” Duino Elegies, Norton, 102. 
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Like Benjamin’s Novus Angelus, Rilke meditates on this painting for long periods 
while living at Frau Koenig’s winter home, and it is from this meditation that he 
conceives the poetic event-image of the circus performance. From the opening lines of 
the “Fifth Elegy,” the circus performers are shown as the human counterpoint to his 
terrifying angels. The elegy opens with an inquiry:  
Wer aber sind sie, sag mir, die Fahrenden, diese ein wenig 
Flüchtigern noch als wir selbst, die dringend von früh an 
Wringt ein wem, wem zuliebe 
Niemals zufriedener Wille? Sondern er wringt sie, 
Biegt sie, schlingt sie unde schwingt sie,  
Wirft sie und fägt sie zurück; wie aus geölter,  
Glatterer Luft kommen sie nieder  
auf dem verzehrten, von irhem ewigen 
Aufsprung dünneren Teppich, diesem verlorenen 
Teppich in Weltall. (Spender, 46)92 
 
92 The following translation is taken from both Spender’s and Mitchell’s. I combined my 
preferred imagery and language from one poem with the images and language of the other, 
then mixed it together with a few translated images of my own. This palimpsest of the “Fifth 
Elegy” is my ghosting of poetic images in translation. All other “translations” in this chapter are 
like this, unless otherwise cited.  
 But tell me, who are they, these exiles, even more  
fleeting than we ourselves, these—who since their youngest days—urgently  
wrestle with whom, for whose sake: 
the Will which will never be appeased.  
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In the earlier elegies, the angels look down on the earthly creatures, almost mockingly, 
as we try to find meaning in human terms and through human means. But in this elegy, 
Rilke presents the family of travelling acrobats and circus performers as the 
embodiments of our attempts to leap into the Open.  
Acrobatics and feats of strength demand intense concentration and 
determination; to flip and twist and land on your feet takes not only prolonged physical 
conditioning, but also the will to continue despite hundreds of failed attempts. Like the 
threadbare carpet on which they land, the saltimbanques portrayed in Rilke’s poem are 
worn down by their very existence. As this elegy continues, we see the old strongman 
decrepit—now, half the man he used to be, made impotent by the long years of 
superhuman feats; and we see the young acrobat, “like the son of a neck / and a nun: so 
taught and powerfully filled / with muscle and innocence.” In these two character-
images, we see human creatures desiring to transcend beyond the limits that their 
earthly bodies constrain. The young acrobat, naïve to his physical limitations, believes 
he may find access to that which is beyond by constantly training, through his 
persistent attempts to ‘land the trick’—a process of creating perfect physical control of 
 
It keeps wringing them  
bending, slinging, swinging them,  
hurling them and snatching them back again; and as if out of  
the slick well-oiled sky, they fall  
onto that carpet made threadbare by their constant leaping— 
that eternally lost, infinite carpet.    
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one’s self over a single moment in time and space. And we see the wrinkled 
strongman— 
shriveled up in a mighty skin, which looks as if it had once  
contained two men, and now one   
lies already in the churchyard, while the other lives on without him,   
deaf and sometimes a little  
strange in his withered skin.  
While the young acrobat searches for the perfection of a physical feat, the old 
strongman is half-dead from his years of trying. Here again, grace and transcendence 
into the Open are symbolized in the event-image of the attempt. Because the acrobat 
and strongman attempt feats that are beyond the “normal” capabilities of most of us, 
their attempts give the event significance and meaning, even if their attempts never 
succeed.  
In the final strophe of the “Fifth Elegy,” Rilke returns to the figure of Angel, to 
whom the speaker poses a question:  
Angel: what if there’s a place that we cannot know of, and there  
on a carpet we cannot speak of, lovers show us 
that which they could never master here, the audacious 
exploits of their high-flying hearts,  
the towers of sensual desire, their 
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ladders, upright in place where there is no ground, 
leaning against each other, trembling—and there they have mastered it, 
showing off for the surrounding crowds, the countless silent dead.   
Although the speaker is addressing the angel, the images allude to the acrobats 
practicing on the carpet, with their “high-flying hearts” and “ladders, upright in place 
where there is no ground.” As he has done throughout the Elegies, Rilke imagines that 
sexual union provides fleeting access to the Open. But here the inversion is in the 
supposition. Rilke admits that this is a place we cannot enter. The carpet that once was 
threadbare through our excessive attempts to leap beyond is now the bed on which 
lovers perform for the dead. The performance may promise a transcendence beyond 
earthly existence, but at what cost? The lovers are showered with coins of happiness—
an odd image that reiterates the strange and mysterious power of a circus performance 
to invert physical human desire into a metaphysical resolution of that desire.    
If Wenders has made a palimpsest of this Rilkean image in the filmic images of 
Marion (Solveig Dommartin) on the trapeze, and the viewer doesn’t know the Elegies, 
then the viewer may think of her performance only as an expression of hope. But, when 
the viewer ghosts the filmic event-image with the saltimbanques, the hopefulness of 
Marion may seem to draw deeper contrast against the grief that human desire instills in 
the Elegies. For Wenders, an angel becoming human is a means to escape the Open. 
Human suffering is preferable to the eternal chorus of hallelujahs, because the grief that 
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humans suffer in desire dissolves in human love.93 Damiel falls in love with Marion, 
and his desire for her gives him the courage to fall to earth. Damiel is not the only 
character who crosses over; other have crossed before him, and others will cross after 
him. But, only as a human can Damiel touch, taste, see colors, and most importantly 
love. Crossing over in Wings of Desire is an event that begins in the Open and ends in 
the circus, but it is in the moments when Damiel is present for Marion’s trapeze 
rehearsals, and in the scene just after, that initiates Damiel’s desire.  
Whereas the angel Damiel must cross-over into human form to fulfill his desire 
to be here in the earthly world, Marion transcends her humanity, like the young acrobat 
in the Elegies, flying on a trapeze wearing angel wings. As a trapeze artist, she embodies 
the Bakhtinian circus-inversion. We hear her interior monologue, which inverts the 
usual trope of ‘fulfilled desire’ in two ways: first, as the one who is desired, it is she—
not the hero who has journeyed to find her—who declares her love for the one who 
desires her; second, she defines their union as being perfected in their separateness. 
Marion proposes that their story will be the greatest ever told, the story of a man and a 
woman. Badiou describes the Event of love as beginning in the encounter and “sealed 
by the declaration: I love you.”94 He continues, “Once the encounter is determined in 
the declaration, whatever form this may take, the amorous experience in the strict sense 
 
93 One of the four philosophical Events in Badiou’s system. 
94 Badiou, Philosophy and the Event, 43 
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begins: that of a world ‘existed’ by two.”95  Declaring her love before the encounter 
inverts the usual sequence of events; defining union by it separateness is what Badiou 
describes as the creative act of love—the construction a singular experience out of 
difference.96  
We first see Marion on the trapeze rehearsing for the evening performance. As 
Damiel watches her, circling her from below, moving around the circus ring as if could 
be here to catch her if she fell. She finishes her practice when the circus owner 
announces their last performance will be tonight. She leaves the tent and walks to her 
trailer, where, as she begins to undress, she describes (in French) her loneliness to the 
silent and unseen Damiel. Her final thoughts in the long voice-over describe the feelings 
of desire they both share: 
[…]How should I think? I know so little. Maybe because I’m too curious. I often 
think so wrongly, because I think as if I was talking to someone else. Inside 
closed eyes, close your eyes again. Then even the stones come alive. Be close to 
the colors! The colors. Neon lights in the evening sky, red and yellow S-Bahn. 
Longing. Longing for a wave of love that would stir in me. That’s what makes 
me clumsy, the absence of pleasure. Desire for love. Desire to love. 
 
95 Ibid, 43 
96 Ibid, 44 
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This is an important scene for Damiel because it is the encounter which begins the event 
of love. The scene is shot in black-and-white, so we see her as if through Damiel’s eyes, 
and as she continues her thoughts, Damiel reacts as if they are his thoughts and 
feelings, too. Like her, he is a foreigner who always ends up at the Wall, but for him the 
wall is the separation dividing earth from the Open, angel from human. She says she 
talks to herself like she’s talking to someone else while Damiel stares directly into her 
eyes. She says the stones come alive, and he picks up the shadow of a stone from her 
desk. And then speaking as if to the one who desires her, she tells him to stay close to 
the colors. Again, the scene is shot in black-and-white because Wenders is allowing us 
to see as Damiel, the “absent presence” who lacks color, sees.97 The separation between 
the two is made even further evident as he reaches out to touch her bare shoulders. She 
admits an absence of pleasure—an absence that he shares, and then the space changes, 
from black-and-white to color, as we seem to cross from the angelic to the human 
world.  
Wenders and Rilke use the circus performance as the event in which desire is not 
only revealed, but also resolved. The next to last event-image is of the two lovers, who 
have by now consummated their love—Damiel standing on the ground firmly holding 
the rope on which Marion performs an acrobatic dance above. This final carnivalesque 
 
97 Here the viewer is ghosting the image in that we are both present in the event-image, but 
absent from the earthly world in color. More on the viewer as the ghost present/not-present in 
the filmic world in the following two chapters.  
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inversion—angel on earth, human in flight—conveys their full consummation of 
separateness and connectedness.  
The scene begins with the viewer looking upwards at Marion, her body fully in-
frame, backlit by the skylights, and slowly spinning on the acrobat’s rope. Damiel’s 
voice-over tells us something happened, an event we did not see, but the aftermath of 
which is symbolized in their shared participation in her dance above. Then, in a 
medium shot of Damiel, sleeves rolled up, holding the rope tightly, providing the 
needed resistance to balance Marion’s weight above. He watches her while the voice-
over continues, narrating their story that he says is still happening. Wenders cuts to 
medium shot of Marion, camera elevated at the same height, her body centered in the 
frame. Marion moves, separated visually from Damiel. A brief full shot shows the space 
in which this performance is happening—a large ballroom with both lovers center-
frame. Damiel stands below, firmly planting himself in place, holding the rope on 
which Marion seemingly effortlessly floating above—the brevity of this shot alluding to 
the ephemeral nature of physical consummation. The remainder of the scene cuts 
between shots of the two, again visually separating them.  
Damiel says he has found home with her, and while her graceful shadow spins 
around the shadow of the rope—this shadow image layered over the painting of a 
couple dancing on the ballroom wall, he continues, “It happened once, only once, 
therefore forever.” We cut from the shadow on the wall to Marion spinning more and 
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more quickly. Damiel says: “The picture that we have created will be with me when I 
die. I will have lived within it. First the amazement about the two of us. Amazement 
about man and woman has made a human being of me.” The sequence and length of 
the shots in this scene echo the moment of climax that Rilke imagines: first, each of two 
clearly distinguishable performers/lovers are shown separately in 7-10 second shots; 
each performer must use the acrobat’s equipment, the rope, to counter-balance one’s 
self against the other98; the fully imaged man and woman in shared acrobatic feat is an 
ephemeral expression, a brief 2-3 second shot that resolves back into the longer 7-15 
second shots of the two lovers who are again separated afterwards. 
Then we return to an extreme close-up of the poet’s hand, presumably Damiels’ 
as he records in his journal, echoing the image that opened the film. In the journal, the 
circus performance is an event-image on which the poet reflects—a palimpsest for the 
angel, for the poet, for the viewer.  If we remember the opening image, a poet’s hand 
writing in black ink on white paper, filmed from the perspective of the angel in black-
and-white, the words appearing as they are spoken, “Als das Kind Kind war,” [when 
the child was a child], then we may see this later image as the completion of the love 
story of Damiel and Marion. The image of Marion and Damiel performing an acrobatic 
feat is evidence of the words written in Damiel’s hand, now filmed in color, again 
 
98 the rope which makes the performance possible, it is the instrument which exists only in the 
efforts of the simultaneous two. 
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spoken as he writes them, “Ich weiss jetzt, / Was kein Engel weiss.” [I now know/ what 
no angel knows.]  Remembering Rilke’s circus images, and the auratic affect that those 
palimpsests once had on me, while watching Wings of Desire, the image I create and 
hold has meaning in the context of my viewing. I prefer the hopefulness of these 
images, which, as Badiou says, the creative event of love makes possible. Whereas in the 
Elegies, the circus performers can never fully enter the space where the angels reside, in 
the filmic event-images of the circus performance and of crossing over, we may 
understand that humans are no more bound to their creaturely-ness than angels are to 
their “angel-ness.” The acrobatic feat is an event-image in which love creates the 
possibility for crossing over. 
3.5.3 Crossing over and Jetztzeit 
Although the film is not what one would call a ‘faithful’ adaptation of Rilke’s 
poems, in the short documentary, Angels Among Us,99 Wenders tells the interviewer how 
he loves the Duino Elegies and how they had a direct thematic influence on the film. The 
idea of Wings of Desire came to him when he returned to Berlin after an eight-year 
absence. He describes how he would read the Elegies nightly, and how while walking in 
Berlin, he was struck by the images, painting, and statues of angels everywhere. After 
reading Rilke and re-witnessing the city where some of the worst evils put upon the 
 
99 From the MGM Special Edition DVD of Wings of Desire (2003). 
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world in the twentieth century were conceived, Wenders decided that he wanted his 
film to show how, despite the isolation of individuals and the piles of destruction left 
behind by human history, fulfillment of desire is possible. In Wings of Desire, Wenders 
re-imagines Rilke’s schreckliche Engel as Damiel, a Beliner Engel whose desire for human 
love is the impetus for crossing over. 
For my reading of crossing over as an event-image, I will need to describe the 
space where the character starts and the space where he crosses to. Crossing over 
requires a movement of simultaneously entering one space while exiting another; 
furthermore, in order to exist in the different spaces, to cross over may require a 
transformation from one state of being to another. Because crossing over implies radical 
transition, the event may be seen in political as well as personal terms; therefore, I will 
also discuss Benjamin’s concept of Jetzzeit as the contingent event wherein love becomes 
revolutionary. By ghosting the event-image of crossing over, allowing the ghosts of 
Rilke’s and Benjamin’s images to haunt the event-image of Damiel’s crossing over, I may 
experience that filmic image as a mixture of the ‘schreckliche Engel’ incapable of 
leaving the Open with the images of the Angel of History rupturing history through the 
revolutionary event of love. In other words, because I choose which ghosts are present 
in the image, the meaning I might hold for the filmic event-image is the product of my 
choosing.  
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I define ‘crossing over’ as simply an event-image in which a character moves 
from one liminal space to another. Because these spaces are separate and 
distinguishable, crossing over implies that the character experiences a transformational 
existence when crossing from one space into another. Furthermore, crossing over is an 
event-image that can appear as transition out of and into other spaces to which we can 
assign liminality—human/angel might be one set of spaces; here/now might be another. 
To define more specifically what crossing over might mean, I must first consider the 
space from whence the character comes.  
The Elegies and the film share a mythological construct that angels and humans 
exist in separate spaces clearly delineated by a “wall” of perceivable existence. Die Engel 
perceive their existence as an eternity in the Open; the circus performers perceive their 
lives as earthly creatures in the human world. For viewers, our experience in the filmic 
Open are auditory—a multitude of subjective existences expressed through their 
interior monologues, the space reverberates with a chorus-like effect as we are 
witnesses listening to the thoughts of ordinary humans, poets, carnival performers, 
actors, citizens of a city ruined and ravaged by war. Berliners are surrounded by the 
history marked off in the passing seasons of nature, the remains of city, and their 
language seems incapable of voicing the incomplete. Viewers also experience the Open 
as a space visually differentiated by lack of color—we know we are seeing Berlin and its 
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people from the point of view of the angel when the images onscreen are in black-and-
white. The angels are timeless, outside of history yet troubled by its terrifying effects.  
For the speaker of the Dunio Elegies, angels exist in the Open—the metaphysical 
space beyond human comprehension, where human-creatures can find, if albeit only 
temporary, solace against loneliness. This Open is “that we didn’t know of, and there/ 
on some unsayable carpet, lovers displayed/ what they never could bring to mastery 
here—the bold/ exploits of their high-flying hearts.”100 Earthly creatures may enter that 
angelic space, and for the briefest of moments gain mastery over things which eluded 
us in the creaturely space. It is in the Open where our desires are fulfilled; but having 
existed in the Open forever, the angels are too much fulfilled. They appear at times to 
us as frightening, terrible, and always more than we can comprehend.  
The tension between the search for fulfillment and the terror in finding it is seen 
in the first strophe of the first elegy. Rilke begins the “First Elegy” with the poet’s cry to 
be heard and understood: 
Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the angels’ 
hierarchies? and even if one of them pressed me  
suddenly against his heart: I would be consumed 
into that overwhelming existence. For beauty is nothing 
but the beginning of terror, which we still are just able to endure, 
 
100 Duino Elegies, Mitchell translation, 181. 
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and we are so awed because it serenely disdains 
to annihilate us. Every angel is terrifying.101  
If we take the speaker to be a ghost of Rilke, the modernist bound up by his own 
romantic ideals of love, we hear him crying out for a transcendent union with another, 
even though he knows that this union will also be his demise. To be one with another 
fully means you are no longer you. In the “Second Elegy,” Rilke addresses you—which 
can be the lovers, the angels, himself, and/or his readers—who has approached the 
limits of your body: 
So you promise eternity, almost, 
from the embrace. And yet, when you have survived  
the terror of the first glances, the longing at the window,  
the first walk together, once only, through the garden: 
lovers, are you the same? When you lift yourselves up 
to each other’s mouth and your lips join, drink against drink: 
oh how strangely each drinker seeps away from his action.102 
The crossing over, from individual to you, may be brief, but it is never fully complete. 
The lovers’ passionate embrace glances the boundary’s outer limit before they must 
 
101 DE, Mitchell translation, 151. 
102 DE, Mitchell, 159. 
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return to their creaturely-ness. However, whereas sexual encounters are ephemeral, for 
Rilke’s speaker loneliness persists. 
In the poetic world of the Elegies, the wall that separates humans from the Open 
is our “creaturely-ness.” As Eric L. Santner describes it, this idea of the human 
condition is shared by Benjamin, Gershom Scholem, Franz Kafka, Franz Rosenzweig, 
and Paul Celan. It is a “tradition” that Santner characterizes as “German-Jewish,” as 
these contemporaneous writers place “the creaturely at the center of their literary and 
philosophical elaborations of human life under conditions of modernity.”103  Although 
Rilke was a non-practicing Catholic, in the “Eighth Elegy” we can see his affinity for 
this “tradition” in his description of the human condition: 
Mit allen Augen sieht die Kreature 
das Offene. Nur unsre Augen sind 
wie umgekehrt und ganz um sie gestellt 
als Fallen, rings um ihren freien Ausgang.104 
Even if the Open is accessible to the creature, our human condition gets in our way. We 
forget that we can see into the Open because our sight is constantly pulled back in a 
solipsistic gaze that precludes us from seeing beyond ourselves. We are spectators, 
staring frozen and incapable of participating in the event. Santner sees a similar gesture 
 
103 On Creaturely Life, 12. 
104 All creatures look with eyes turned out/ to the Open. But our eyes are/turned back, inward, 
as if our gaze has surrounded and trapped our escape [my translation]. DE, Mitchell, 151. 
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in Benjamin’s “Origin of German Tragic Drama,” positing that Benjamin “argues that 
the melancholy affect ‘emerges from the depths of the creaturely realm’ and ‘is the most 
genuinely creaturely of the contemplative impulses.’”105 Whether melancholy or ennui, 
grief or desire, it is suffering that distinguishes human experience from angels. In this 
20th Century German literary tradition, humans can access the Open, but only briefly; 
and those who have crossed and returned may become so entranced by the memory of 
the image of crossing over, they become stuck. Instead of moving us to attempt again a 
transcendence of our human creaturely-ness, the image locks us in place, and we 
become like static observers—paralyzed by those haunting images of our previous 
moments of transcendence; or frozen by our desire to re-enact the remembered event-
image when the acrobat performed his feat perfectly and crossed from earth to the 
Open.  
The Elegies are inhabited by creatures of the Open and creatures of the earth. In 
the Open, there are angels and orders of angels. On earth, there are plants, animals, and 
human creatures; and though neither space subjugates its inhabitants to traditional 
hierarchies, like the “great chain of being” or ranks of archangel, cherubim, seraphim, 
etc., on earth human creatures fall between puppets, unable to see the master pulling 
their strings, and circus performers, upsetting authority with amazing feats of magic, 
 
105 On Creaturely Life, 16. 
136 
strength, or acrobatics. The angels, on the other hand, are schrecklich106—terrible, 
awesome, inciting fear or dread. They are the ones whom the speaker cries out to, not 
God, for comfort. But they are absurd figures, beyond understanding, beyond language, 
beyond the earthly boundaries that limit human creatures. They are horrifying because 
they exist in the Open, they are incapable of relieving human suffering, and they are 
stuck in the Jetztzeit that is always now and always past. Rilke’s angels occupy the Open 
space inaccessible to humans, where they are reflections of the creature world.107 The 
angels of the Duino Elegies are like Benjamin’s Angel of History in that they are 
witnesses to human suffering, but paralyzed and unable to help. 
However, in the mythology of Wings of Desire, crossing over permanently is 
possible for angels—they can leave the space and time beyond human comprehension, 
where one exists eternally without the physical or emotional suffering of human 
existence, and enter human space, where they can have agency which may incite, shape, 
or give meaning to events. Like the Rilkean Open, Damiel, the angel who desires union 
with another, exists in an atemporal space beyond human comprehension. He can hear 
the most deeply held personal thoughts of humans, and can even enter the dream of the 
woman he loves. Yet, what he lacks are those bodily sensations (touch, taste, smell, and 
 
106 “Jeder Engel ist schrecklich” –Every angel is terrible [emphasis mine]. 
107 This is reminiscent of a line from Czeslaw Miłosz’s 1954 prose poem Esse,107 “I was left behind 
with the immensity of existing things. A sponge, suffering because it cannot saturate itself; a 
river, suffering because reflections of clouds and trees are not clouds and trees” (Notebooks, 7). 
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color) that both connects and separates one human from another. Without a human 
body, Damiel recognizes his desire for complete spiritual union with another will 
always be unfulfilled. In the Open where Wenders’ angels reside, human separateness 
is preferable to an existence that has no effect on history. Whereas the inward turning of 
one’s gaze is a mark of the creaturely for Rilke’s speaker, for Damiel the mark of his 
creaturely-ness has meaning in the act of joining in and reveling with earthly humans.   
One image of crossing over can be seen in the story of Peter Falk, who arrives in 
Berlin to star in a movie set in Nazi Germany, and who is a former angel. Falk plays the 
character Peter Falk, whom everyone recognizes as the fictional, iconic Detective 
Columbo character. His identity as Peter Falk, the American actor, is further 
complicated when he reveals that he crossed over thirty years previously. So, Falk plays 
two roles: he is himself, an iconic American character actor, as well as the fallen angel 
Peter Falk, who has successfully navigated life as a human. The key to Falk’s success as 
a human comes from his unquenchable joi de vivre. Not only is he fully human, but he 
has memory of his angel existence, and he can sense when angels are around. Peter tells 
Damiel what life among earthly creatures is like: 
I can’t see you, but I know you are here. I feel it. You’ve been hanging around 
since I got here. I wish I could see your face. Just look into your eyes and tell you 
how good it is to be here. Just to touch something. See that’s cold. That feels 
good. Here. To smoke, to have coffee. And if you do it together, it’s fantastic. Or 
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to draw…Or when you’re cold you rub your hands together. That feels good. 
There’s so many good things. But you’re not here. I’m here. I wish you were 
here. I wish you could talk to me because I’m a friend. Compañiero.  
In an earlier conversation with Cassiel that covers the whole of earthly history, Damiel 
explains to Cassiel his frustration with his angelic life and wonders about crossing over: 
“Yes!” Damiel exclaims, “To conquer a history for myself.…I’ve been on the outside long 
enough. Absent long enough. Long enough out of the world. Let me enter the history of the 
world. If only to hold an apple in my hand… Look.”108  
The contrast between the life of these angels and the life of humans, between 
Damiel and Falk, is exaggerated in Falk’s constant use of here. Angel time is all 
inclusive, the whole of history is one Event; but Damiel’s event is here. This is where 
Wenders’ film creates an event significantly different from Benjamin’s (or Rilke’s)—
angels (and humans) can find relief for their desires. Here is the space in which events 
happen, not in the Open, and it is here where the angel crosses to. Here is where the 
angel becomes an agent of change. This ‘Wendersian here’ is not about Event in time or 
even place; it is the personal event (lowercase e) that follows the Jetztzeit for one angel. 
We may think of Jetztzeit in the Benjaminian way wherein the here/now is so 
politically, culturally, socio-economically situated that revolution must follow. 
Although here/now might have us assume we are placed in space/time, this Jetztzeit is 
 
108 From the English captions to WoD. Anniversary Issue (italics in original). 
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more like a Geist (though not a Zeitgeist) that appears just before an event, be it an 
artistic, scientific, or historical Event. Jetztzeit can precede even the most personal of all 
events, love. For Damiel, most of the film occurs in the Jetztzeit before he elects to fall to 
humanity. He listens to Peter explain the physical sensations of material historicity, and 
he watches Marion, who is acutely aware of herself as alive in her desire.  
When they meet after his crossing, it is Marion who understands what is 
happening. She tells him (and the viewer directly) how great the significance this event 
they are about to experience is. Without speaking Damiel hands Marion a glass of wine, 
as if partaking of communion, and before they kiss she stops him and says, “it must 
finally become serious”. She continues in a long monologue:  
I was never lonely, neither when I was alone, nor with others. But I would have 
liked to be alone at last. Loneliness means I’m finally whole. Now I can say it as 
tonight, I’m at last alone… I don’t know if there’s destiny, but there’s a decision. 
[You] Decide! We are now the times…the whole world is taking part in our 
decision. We two are now more than us two. We incarnate something…I am 
ready. Now, it’s your turn. You hold the game in your hand. Now or never [Jetzt 
oder nie!]. You need me. You will need me…Last night I dreamt of a stranger, of 
my man. Only with him could I be alone, open to him, wholly open, wholly for 
him. Welcome him wholly into me, surround him with the labyrinth of shared 
happiness. I know it’s you. 
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“Jetzt oder nie!” She understands the importance of the here/now and its import to the 
impending event. Whereas Damiel has crossed over because of his desire for her, she is 
giving up all that she has—her individuality—out of her desire to be more. Together, 
what they have given up makes possible their shared desire—to write a history, unlike 
any two that’s come before or after, of two who are one and still two. Crossing over to 
here/now is an event-image with personal greater affect on the viewer, even in the 
context of a city haunted by its historical Event. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Although the two earlier written texts, Rilke’s Duino Elegies and Benjamin’s 
Angel of History, have a clear and direct influence on the later filmic text Wings of 
Desire, it would be misleading to imply that this film is a traditional adaptation of either 
the poems or the thesis. Each text has not only created its own separate mythological 
space populated by angels and circus performers, but as palimpsests, they are also 
connected by themes of the destructive power of history moving beyond human control 
or comprehension, earthly creaturely-ness and the “heavenly realms,” and the 
fulfillment of human desire for connection with another. These works are extraordinary 
expressions that reveal secrets about the hidden and unknowable. They are wholly 
separate works haunting each other, as well as haunted by the participating observer. 
Just as one author regenerates the myth of the other, we, too, are creatures of the earth 
searching for and creating meaning out of the voices of angels. 
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4 CHAPTER THREE: GHOSTING SPATIAL-IMAGES: ENTERING THE 
FILMIC SPACE OF THE WALL  
4.1 Entering imagined and filmic spaces 
In the first two chapters, I presented ghosting the character-image and ghosting the 
event-image as processes by which we transform filmic images into ghosts that inhabit 
our memory. In this chapter I will apply ghosting images to the viewers’ experience with 
filmic space. I think of filmic space as existing in multiple possible dimensions, both real 
and imagined. Whereas a spatial-image is projected on to a materially liminal screen, 
filmic space transcends the screen, opened up or amplified by the viewers’ imagination 
and recall. Filmic space is the illusioned space, made apparent by the spatial-image 
onscreen, expanded outward by our beliefs. Viewers understand that we cannot exist in 
same dimensional plane as the spatial-image, yet, the camera, the shots, the moving 
images through planes of space, all of the filmic images, together and more, produce 
such a strong, physically evocative illusion, we believe that we are there. Filmic space is 
illusional, and it exists in the dimension of our co-creative imaginations. We move 
inward when we imagine ourselves moving through the onscreen world, at times 
intimately close to others; or, when we witness intimate events in a filmic-character’s 
story. It is as if our presence/absence reveals another spatial dimension, like the Rilkean 
Open, where, after having been allowed the briefest glimpse of a sublime image, we are 
always returning from with our faulty memories of the other space.   
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 Another imagined dimension of filmic space may exist for reader-viewers who 
enter the fictional world of an adapted text. For example, we can imagine the space 
created by an adaptation is like a large open plane, or a valley. On one side of the valley 
is the novel; on the other, the film. When I read the novel, I enter the valley from that 
side carrying the ghost-images, which I co-created, and then I leave them there to 
mature on their own. Later, remembering what I read, I enter the valley again, and visit 
with these ghosts. I may or may not recognize how they’ve changed, but they always 
do. Then, when I watch the film adaptation, I enter the valley from the other side, again 
carrying new ghost-images. If an older ghost image appears when I return, I can 
squeeze the old and the new together into one, or let them remain as separate ghostly 
images, each with its own influence and purpose. Sometimes a ghost from the novel 
appears with no correlating image from the film, or vice versa, and I must decide how 
to integrate or ignore them. When I am an active reader or viewer, I am a co-creator of 
the images mediated on page or on screen. Mediation opens a creative space where my 
subjectively-present consciousness has the power to re-shape and re-forge the collection 
of the ghosted images which I have gathered together. This space is an imagined space, 
and it is different for every reader-viewer.  
Spatial-images differ from event-images in another way: whereas event-images 
can be inherently public (historical/ political) or private, spatial-images are images of 
intimacy. For this chapter, ghosting the spatial-image describes how viewers may feel 
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themselves moving through intimate spaces in the onscreen world, and thereby we may 
believe we are sharing the same subjective positions and experiences as the Woman in 
the film. On the other hand, because the film makes visible the invisible wall 
surrounding the Woman, we are reminded that the space we occupy in The Wall has 
limits that cannot be crossed. Filmic space is a dimension that we can never wholly 
breach. So, like a ghost haunting the Woman we may be present in a space separated 
from hers by an invisible plane, and yet we may also feel we have presence in hers 
because of the illusion of shared space. In my reading of the film The Wall, adapted by 
Julian Roman Pölsler from Marlen Haufhofer’s 1968 novel, Die Wand,109 I argue that the 
film encloses space more prominently than the novel, primarily through Pölsler’s use of 
special effects, shifting subjective positions, and mise en scéne; and, it is in relation to 
this enclosed filmic space that the reader-viewers’ ghostly presence is more assuredly 
affirmed.  
Because there are compossible dimensions that can employ filmic space, ghosting 
the spatial-image differs in function from the ghosting of characters or events. Instead of 
considering why or how a filmic image can haunt the viewer, ghosting the spatial-image 
considers why and how a viewer can haunt filmic space. To consider how a viewer’s 
presence in filmic space is affirmed by their absence, I will analyze scenes from the 2012 
 
109 I differentiate between the novel and film by using the German title, Die Wand, for the novel, 
and The Wall for the film.  
144 
adaptation, The Wall. This film is especially well suited for a discussion of filmic space 
because it offers viewers an uncanny subjective experience that is both intimate and 
distant. As viewers, our place within the filmic space is measured by our movements 
away from or towards the Woman, or marked by our separation from her and the 
events onscreen. Ghosting the spatial-image, imagining we are a ghost inhabiting filmic 
space, requires us to consider our experience in-between representation and materiality.  
4.2 Ghosting intimate traumatic space  
I would argue that the most intimate space one can experience is the space 
wherein a trauma occurs. Although both the novel’s and the film’s narratives are 
framed by two traumas, the film more successfully encloses the traumas within a space 
that visually delineates a safe-distance from the trauma for viewer beyond the wall. 
Furthermore, the narrative function of the report for embodying the Woman in the 
novel, added to the actor-embodied Woman in the film, challenges the conventions that 
Alan Gibbs calls the tropes of “trauma genre” that emerged in the late 20th and 21st 
centuries the “formal devices that [became] established methods of depicting trauma, 
including fragmentation, dislocation, and repetition.”110 The novel and film use these 
tropes extensively, and yet, both break from this trauma tradition with the Woman’s 
‘honest’ detailed recounting. The Woman is not the victim caught in cycles of 
 
110 Contemporary American Trauma Narratives, 47.  
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involuntary flashbacks “without access to memories of the originating cause;” she 
knows the trauma is the originating cause of writing things down. Her report, the 
account we trust as ‘true,’ is her response to the two traumatic events she survives. 
Readers of the novel know that the Woman can only exist as the character we imagine 
her to be. And, although her report may not be accurate, we may think of the report as 
the imagined space where the meaning of the events that have shaped her since the wall 
appeared is revealed, and where we might witness the ‘truth’ of a traumatic event.  
Viewers of the film, however, are allowed to see the Woman as multiple 
subjective embodiments—her body sometimes younger and sometimes older, and the 
physical changes evincing her responses to the events chronicled in the report. The 
Woman‘s story is bracketed by two traumas: an originating trauma—the appearance of 
the wall and her subsequent existence in an afterlife; and then a second trauma—the 
loss of her dog Lynx, which is the impetus for writing her report. Because her story is 
enclosed between the bracketing traumas, we experience her story as witnessing 
presence in the most intimate space imaginable. Examining her existence in this space, 
as well as our access to and presence in the space enclosed by the film are two of the 
purposes that I hope ghosting spatial-images will support.  
4.2.1 Spatial-images and filmic space 
In the novel, the reader can only exist outside of the Woman’s world. Our 
appearance in her world occurs after her report is complete, and, as she says, our 
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reading confirms her belief that no one will be able to read her report until she is dead. 
However, in the film viewers can be present in the space of her world, and we can move 
into and out of that space where she lives with her own ghosts. As Pölsler positions and 
repositions us inside and outside of the world enclosed by the wall, we often feel caught 
in-between—as if we are ghosting her ghost. In discussing how our movements are 
oriented by the world onscreen, I will apply what Scott Richmond calls a proprioceptive 
aesthetics111 to our experience with the images Pölsler creates. In other words, I want to 
demonstrate that by limiting the viewers’ spatial access to certain places in the 
Woman’s world, the filmic version further isolates the Woman from the living. 
Watching the film we are always already among the living (literally and figuratively), 
and because the Woman is only alive in the space of an afterlife, our perceived ghostly 
existence in her world is visually confirmed by our spatial presence/absence.  
When I claim that ghosting the spatial-image is how viewers move inwards into the 
spatial world onscreen, I’m using ghosts here to mean a conscious presence that 
exists/doesn’t exist within a space. I agree with Richmond’s assertion that the illusion of 
movement in filmic space is made possible by the proprioception of the viewer, and 
inherent in proprioception is the viewers’ self-awareness that their position is always 
only made possible through the technics112 of cinema. As he explains:  
 
111 Cinema’s Bodily Illusions, 6.  
112 Richmond uses this term not in the theoretical sense of “apparatus,” but as Bernard Steigler 
defines it—the pursuit of life by means other than life. Ibid, 17. 
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Cinematic modulation of perception is, at a profound level, also the modulation 
of proprioceptive self-perception. The cinema modulates my relations with the 
world unfolding before me onscreen, and in so doing it inexorably modulates my 
relation with my self—as well as the perceptual processes by which I arrive at a 
sense of myself as a self in the first place.113 
Richmond’s proprioceptive aesthetics requires a departure from the idea that cinema is 
fundamentally representational, relying instead on the cinema’s technics as the third 
operational component114 through which our aesthetic experience responds. His concept 
of ecological phenomenology of the image is the process, derived as from the union of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy of perception and James 
Gibson’s ecological approach to perception,115 by which we might understand and 
explain our relation to the world onscreen. This process works on viewers as cinema’s 
ability “to manifest a sense of the world unfolding before [a viewer] onscreen in which 
objects might appear by virtue of its proprioceptive modulation of viewers.”116 Although 
proprioception creates the illusion that we can appear in onscreen space and participate 
in the filmic world, this process depends on a cinematically induced multi-sensorial 
experience that is ultimately limited by a camera’s point of view. Despite a camera’s 
 
113 Ibid, 8.  
114 Body and world being the other two. Ibid, 16.  
115 Ibid, 13. 
116 Ibid, 16 (emphasis mine). 
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ability to draw us into onscreen space, we can never fully exist there because 
technology intrudes in our perception insisting that what we are experiencing is an 
illusion.  
The screen is a liminal plane separating the viewer from the spatial-image. 
Although the spatial-image is a projection on flat plane, the illusion of movement and 
presence within the spatial-image can open viewers’ up to a new imagined space 
generated from their affective responses—the filmic space. In other words, we believe 
that filmic space exists because we have viscerally experience it. Further, the screen is a 
liminal plane on to which we may project our imagined presence. Just as the illusion of 
movement within a filmic spatial-image affirms our imagined presence, filmic space is 
the space we seem to occupy when we remember the ghosts of filmic images.  
In Chapter One, I described how viewers may ascribe subjectivity to a character 
based on the stories we hear about them or based on their performative and defining 
gestures (i.e., an assassin assassinates). In this chapter, I will consider how a character’s 
movement within filmic space creates the illusion of agency for both character and 
viewer. In the eternal loop that is the story repeatedly composed in onscreen time, a 
character’s agency is always already determined and, therefore, her moving with 
intention is an illusion of agency. Reader-viewers can shape the force and context of 
images and of a character’s thoughts about those images, and we can alter our 
responses to the same events clicking off in the same chain of causal links. But for a 
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filmic character, intentionality is always beyond the scope of our influence. Although 
the agency that empowers a character to move may appear as the product of the 
combined technics of actors, editors, sound technicians, and other members of crew, as 
well as the elements of script, mise en scéne, lighting, soundtrack, etc., the real 
animating force that brings life to characters and images in the diegetic world of 
onscreen space is the eternal return. Because we experience images in relation to our 
position in space and time, the world onscreen is always an illusioned space enclosed in 
a precisely measured time-loop of exposition and running time.  
Moving in the spatial-image requires that we cede some of our agency to the 
film. However, would we be willing to consider completely submitting our agency to a 
film’s technics if it produced a sublime or even uncanny aesthetic experience? Is to be 
there/not there a question that can be answered in such an aesthetic experience? In his 
“The Dialectics of Outside and Inside,”117 Gaston Bachelard examines the Henri 
Michaux poem,118 “Shade-Haunted Space,” and concludes: 
Being is alternately condensation that disperses with a burst, and dispersion that 
flows back to a center. Outside and inside are intimate—they are always ready to 
be reversed, to exchange their hostility. If there exists a border-line surface 
between such an inside and outside, this surface is painful on both sides. When 
 
117 Bachelard, “The Dialectics of Outside and Inside.” From The Continental Aesthetics Reader, 155. 
118 [translated into English as] 
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we experience this [poem by Michaux], we absorb a mixture of being and 
nothingness.  
If this border-line is the screen, and the experience of moving from outside to inside (or 
vice-versa) is painful, then my earlier analogy of ‘birthing ghosts’ is apt. For the Woman 
in onscreen space to move outward, a viewer must pull her out of that space, outside of 
the screen. She is no longer ‘alive’ in the filmic world, but a ghost haunting the viewer’s 
memory. Once removed from the filmic world, the Woman remains in a state between 
life and death, the spatial dimension of in-between; again, I think of this space of co-
creative imagination like an open field where she exists with the others, and from where 
she can be brought back to the viewer—a ghost birthed and alive within us—or brought 
back onscreen when the film starts again. For the viewer, the pain of moving inward 
may not be felt physically, but we may experience that pain as the loss of agency in the 
filmic world. I follow a character inward, for example, over her shoulder walking 
through a city, and I forfeit my agency to turn left or right, to speak or to be heard. Or, 
when I am stopped by an invisible wall, I am reminded that I am not in any space but of 
my own imagining. If watching a film requires that I believe I am there/not there in order 
to have an aesthetic experience, I’m willing to act on faith and trade my agency for the 
heightened experience.  
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4.2.2 The Woman inside the wall 
 One of the most striking elements in The Wall is the director’s foregrounding of 
liminal space, by which viewers can make a clear distinction between internal and 
external, between our movements behind and our movements beyond the wall. 
However, before I discuss examples of how the viewer’s position within filmic space 
allows us to experience a reversal of subjective experiences—from the viewer haunted 
by the ghosts of remembered textual images to the viewer’s active ghosting of filmic 
characters and space—I should briefly summarize the story of the Woman in Die Wand. 
Then, I will consider how the Woman is embodied not only by the two versions that 
German actress Martina Gedeck portrays, but also in the noticeable changes to Gedeck’s 
body over the course of shooting. Furthermore, because her report creates a space for 
the images to appear, her embodiment within that space is possible by our ghosting of 
the spatial-image. The Wall is an excellent film for discussing ghosting images of space 
because it provides several examples where viewers may clearly see our presence 
haunting the Woman; moreover, by enclosing her world and her life behind a wall, 
space and time appear to be compressed forcing the ghosts from her report to reveal 
themselves in her labor, her hunts, and her dreams. She relives days of the years 
marked off on a calendar filling in the details as she remembers them in her report, and 
her ghosts appear in the changes of seasons. She can survive in this afterlife space, but 
only by keeping her ghosts with her. She is a ghost living among ghosts, and her 
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embodiment gives purpose to the filmic space. And finally, for viewers, ghosting the 
spatial-image is a movement we initiate as we move inward, into the space imaged on 
screen, where our presence among the filmic images is visually noted as an absence. 
The Wall is the story of a woman surviving alone behind an unexplained invisible 
wall surrounding several miles of forest in the high elevation of the Austrian Alps. The 
novel and film are narrated by a series of entries from her report in which the Woman 
explains how she learns to survive in a world alone with only her animal companions—
the only other living creatures. Her life before the wall appeared is barely mentioned, as 
if the memories would somehow hinder her survival. Although she questions whether 
life continues as she once knew it on the other side of the wall, from her perspective the 
others outside the wall appear frozen in place and time. She writes that she has started 
the report after two years inside the wall, and we can assume our “reading” of the 
report is only possible, as she says, after she is dead. Time does not move in a straight 
line in her report, so we see her at times younger and soft from city life, then roughed 
by the years of hard work, and then young again. Her dog Lynx is her constant 
companion, and his fate becomes the trauma which prompts the report of her last two 
years behind the wall.  
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Marlen Haushofer was a young rising literary star in Germany—a strong 
feminist voice who died of cancer shortly after the novel was published.119 Even though 
we may read the novel as a haunting allegory with serious philosophical and political 
overtones, the main thematic questions about how one lives and dies reportedly echo 
Haushofer’s personal beliefs.120 Pölsler says he was haunted by the novel for over 
twenty-five years,121 and several scenes are haunted materially by Haushofer’s words.  
In the novel, scenes are described by the Woman with comments and contexts, 
with images that connect her calendar to her creatures and their shared afterlife space; 
however, the film also shows us images without comment. This difference requires the 
images to assume a materiality for the embodied character moving through the filmic 
space. The questions about our place and our subjective being within that place as 
reader-viewers are asked in each text: Are we inside the wall and alive/dead? Or, outside the 
 
119 Mein.Österreich.com. Die Wand: Die Romanauterin. Die Wand was written in longhand 
reportedly over three years. Haushofer received the Arthur Schnitzler Prize for literature the 
same year she completed the novel in 1963; however, despite her reputation as a writer, Die 
Wand was not published until 1968, two years before her death by cancer at age forty-nine. 
Pölsler’s adaptation resurrected attention for the novel and revived international academic 
interest in Haushofer’s work. [my translated paraphrase] http://www.mein-
oesterreich.info/literatur-medien/wand.htm.  
120 Ibid.  
121 In the Afterword by Julian Roman Pölsler, included in the accompanying text to the 2013 
Music Box Films DVD, he writes, “The Wall has been on my mind for over twenty-five years. 
The first time I read it was in 1986, and after I put it down, I immediately began thinking about 
how to turn it into a film.” He goes on to describe his reverence for Haushofer and her novel. 
Although he suggests that the fiction of both novel and film “gets at something of the human 
condition that no other work of fiction does—the truth of yourself when you are the last 
remaining member of the human race,” I would go further and claim that together the novel 
and film expand and more intensely illuminate the subjective experience yourself.  
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wall and alive/dead? However, I believe that the filmic adaptation may be technically 
better able to provide satisfactory answers. Although Pölsler’s special effects are not 
innovative, the onscreen space that he envisions produces uncanny affects; furthermore, 
the philosophical implications provoked in the images ask us to consider how we haunt 
this space. Since we are determinedly physically incapable of completely moving inward 
into this filmic space, ghosting the space inside the wall more accurately describes our 
illusioned experience of it.  
Because this film was conceived in the mind of the writer/producer/ director 
Julian Roman Pölsler as the adaptation of the images that the novel birthed for him,122 
The Wall is particularly useful in considering our spectral relationships with adaptations 
and adapted images. I will refine these questions below, but for now I wonder: can we 
become a presence moving inward in adapted-space? Or, are we carriers of ghosted 
images from the source text, sent to haunt the space, characters, and events of the 
onscreen world? And, how does space define the intimacy of our responses; do we 
shutter and shake in response to moving inward, or when pulling an image out? 
 
122 Another palimpsest, perhaps. 
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4.3 Gedeck123 embodies the Woman  
I find a resonance in the writings of two 20th Century French philosophers, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze, that I can’t always reasonably explain. In 
this section, I want to unpack some key aspects of their complex concepts of 
subjectivity, as well as respond to recent investigations of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, 
especially in the works of Vivian Sobchack and Hunter Vaughn. As I discuss how 
scenes from The Wall may exemplify these concepts of subjectivity especially well by 
creating space in which we have ghostly presence, I hope to show how this presence 
confirms our subjective experience in the onscreen space. I did not choose this film 
because it always illustrates concepts of subjectivity neatly, but because it raises 
questions about the connection between the viewer and viewed subject that are 
sometimes complimentary, sometimes contrary to Deleuze and/or Merleau-Ponty. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze are often linked by their mutual 
admiration for and the similarity of their reflections on Henri Bergson’s concept of 
time.124 Where they certainly differ, however, is Merleau-Ponty’s view of subjectivity 
tempered by Gestalt psychology. While we might reduce Deleuze to the philosopher of 
becoming, we might likewise see Merleau-Ponty’s subject as a feeling-being.125 Merleau-
 
123 To distinguish between the Woman as we imagine her in the source text and Martina 
Gedeck’s performance and portrayal in the 2012 film, I will refer to the film’s embodied subject 
as Gedeck (italicized) and the actress as Gedeck (un-italicized). 
124 See Judith Wambacq, Dorothea Olkowski, and Corry Shores 
125 I take full responsibility for this gross over-simplification. 
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Ponty’s lived-body removes any barrier that separates the subject from the object—a 
Cartesian/Kantian dualism that dominates most Continental philosophy, including 
existentialists like Martin Heidegger. For these philosophers, perception is 
indistinguishable from expression. The lived-body is responsible because it is 
reflexive—turning away from the object “toward the act of viewing and its existential 
implications of a body-subject.”126 The gestalt of the subjective viewer is inseparable, 
invariant, and aware. Whereas Heidegger’s phenomenological-existential perspective 
allows for a separation of the subject from the historical or ethical by favoring the now, 
Merleau-Ponty’s seeing-in-the-world necessitates that an embodied subjectivity is 
responsible because it is able to recognize; therefore, subjectivity is a mediated conscious 
experience.  Intentionality makes us responsible because meaning is created by the 
reflexive subjectivity when it transcends self through contact with otherness.127 Because 
sensation is always in relation to and dependent on background, perception is a fallacy.  
For Sobchack, the embodied subject is the viewer-viewed. In the Address of the 
Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, she questions Deleuze’s dismissal of the 
phenomenological perception in film, writing:  
It is not time [as Deleuze suggests], but space—the significant space lived as and 
through the objective body-subject, the historical space of the situation—that 
 
126 Sobchak, 55. 
127 Hass, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, 33. 
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grounds the response to those questions and the question of cinematic 
signification in this present study.128 
Movement through time is not crystalized in the moment; it is the space moved through 
which we perceive as having meaning. Our relative position in space, more so than our 
position in time, provides the necessary grounding for the viewing subject in 
determining value and meaning. Sobchack goes further, explaining that the photograph 
offers us “the possibility of meaning,” thereby creating a “’hole’ in temporality”; 
however, moving images fill up that vacancy with motion because “the images in the 
film exist in the world as a temporal flow, with finitude and situation.”129 The invisible 
wall surrounding Gedeck limits her movements within a defined space, and as a film, 
The Wall has temporality and finality. To clarify how her movements within the defined 
space behind the wall enlivens our image of the Woman, it will be helpful to begin with 
Martina Gedeck’s embodiment, because the physical transformation we see the filmic 
embodiment Gedeck undergo during the year-long filming works as narrative device 
giving voice and body to the ghosts who haunt her report. 
For most of the film, we are inside the wall with her, and it is her subjective 
experience of that space that we follow closely. The report provides the most obvious 
access to Gedeck’s inner life, but by chronicling and reporting on daily chores, on 
 
128 Address of the Eye, 31. 
129 Ibid, 60-61 (emphasis in original). 
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seasonal shifts in the weather, details of daily life, the report also acts to substantiate her 
time in this space. Martina Gedeck130 reads entries from the report in a voice-over 
narration throughout the film, even though we rarely hear Gedeck speak onscreen. The 
report is an important device for organizing her actions and events within the wall, but, 
I would argue, the report has another effect because when it is read, it creates and 
encloses an imagined space where the events of the report can occur. When we watch 
the film and hear Gedeck reading her report, which she admits is grounded in faulty 
memory, the events she describes become images we believe happen as they appear 
onscreen in the filmic space. Reading, or hearing the report read, makes possible the 
space where our co-creation of images can occur, where we believe what we see even 
when we know better, and where a story repeats endlessly, changed only by our 
perceived presence/non-presence in it.  
The image of the Woman in both the novel and the film is made subjectively 
embodied by her report. Both texts start from the same literal marker, “The fifth of 
November,” and in both, reader-viewers understand that the narrator is the older 
Woman looking back. Her report is a first-person journaling of an extended event—her 
life inside the wall. She tells us she will write until there is no more paper left, and that 
she knows it is more likely that mice will eat her report than for another human to read 
 
130 Gedeck provides the voice-over narration of the film in both the German and English 
versions.  
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it. Her report weaves in and out of chronologically ordered-time, and though we may 
not know the full affect of the events she will survive, because she has already lived 
through and been changed by the events described, the Woman’s reflective subjectivity 
is always present. For this character in this film, by writing the report she is creating an 
imagined space where the ghosts of past events can haunt.  
Likewise, when we read or hear the report, we are entering an imagined space 
where we become ghosts haunting the events, characters, and space that the journal 
describes. By accepting the premise that no one will read her report, when we do read 
or hear it, we exist in a space where one can only be non-existent. The filmic space is 
enclosed and filled with ghosts—the images remembered by the report’s author and the 
reader/viewer who must always be present/not-present. In other words, reading Die 
Wand requires us to create an enclosed, paradoxical space where we (as living readers) 
and the report (which can only be read by non-existent reader) can simultaneously 
exist.  
Pölsler acknowledges the significance of the report for embodying the Woman 
onscreen by retaining a sense of textuality in the film through the visual representations 
of report writing. Before the story begins, images of handwritten notes—words later 
spoken aloud by the voice-over narrator—appear behind the opening credits. A 
disembodied voice-over reads the first lines from the report, and we understand that 
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she is reading the first-person account of, most likely, the last human woman dying 
alone. The report begins with a distinct singular perspective: 
Today, the fifth of November, I shall begin my report. I shall set everything 
down as precisely as I can. But I don’t even know if today really is the fifth of 
November…. But I don’t think that’s very important. All I have to rely on is a 
few meager jottings; meager, because I never expected to write this report, and 
I’m afraid that much that I remember will be different from my real 
experiences.131  
Reader-viewers are expressly told that our experience with the events recorded here 
will be shaped by a voice limited by its misperceptions of time and events yet made 
‘real’ in the writing. The film opens with Gedeck’s disembodied voice, and within the 
first two minutes, the subjective position of the viewer is moved from the voice, to a 
hand writing in a report, to the face, the eyes, and then implicitly into the mind of 
Gedeck. As the camera moves from the hand in the act of writing to the silent face of the 
older Gedeck, the voice-over continues, linking her written words to her thoughts, the 
voice-over is now embodied for the viewer in the image of Gedeck writing her journal.  
Moving even more inward, in close-up and lingering on the subject’s eyes, her 
expressions reflecting an inner struggle with the ‘ghosts’ haunting her memories that 
 
131 The opening lines of both film and novel are verbatim. I cite the novel for these quotes as that 
is an easier text to accurately copy. The Wall, 1.  
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the report evokes. We are present in the intimate spatial-image—a woman alone in a 
candlelit cabin visited by the ghosts of her life behind the wall.   
In Pölsler’s film, space is a visual illusion where we perceive our position in 
relation to the space inside of or outside of (beyond) the wall. Although her report 
allows us access to the Woman’s remembered experiences, the film makes possible 
what the text may not be able to do—taking the subjective position of multiple Gedecks, 
and at times her dog Lynx, through a visual juxtapositioning of the world we see inside 
the wall with the events we hear described in the report. We see her world and the 
events she remembers in a space, which, depending on the changes in our perspective, 
we share with or are separated from her. Furthermore, Polsler’s camera moves the 
viewer through this filmic space intimately close to Gedeck, as might only a lover or a 
ghost be privileged to enjoy. We look directly in her eyes, and feel as if we are entering 
into her most intimate interior space—her memory, where the images of hunting, her 
dog Lynx, and her younger self reside. In ecological terms, she can only exist by 
becoming a symbiotic part of the system around which her space is constructed. As an 
image of the Woman whose thoughts we can hear and whose memories come alive 
onscreen for us in the retelling, Gedeck is the embodied subject alive in the spatial-image 
and haunted by our intimate proximity.  
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4.3.1 younger Gedeck and older Gedeck 
To further complicate our relationship with Gedeck, we see at least two versions 
of her, sometimes within the same scene. Pölsler shot the film over a fourteen-month 
period, using nine credited cinematographers,132  and though we are given visual clues 
to the passage of time, the most prominent one is in the physical transformation of the 
actress Martina Gedeck. While Haushofer uses the Woman’s report as a narrative 
device capable of transcending time and space, the filmic adaptation relies on the 
changes to the actress’s body to indicate her relation to space and her movement within 
that space. 
Gedeck embodies the Woman as younger Gedeck and as older Gedeck. We 
recognize younger Gedeck by her longer hair, the roundness of her face, her tentative 
stride and gaze, and other physical attributes. We can see changes marking the younger 
Gedeck as ‘in winter,’ or ‘in spring,’ or ‘working in the meadow,’ or ‘sleeping in the sun.’ 
Younger Gedeck grows stronger from the physical labor necessary for survival. 
Although younger Gedeck may occupy the same space as older Gedeck, we must 
sometimes rely on the background details in the mise en scéne to determined which 
Gedeck is present. We may also recognize her as younger or older in the hunting lodge, 
the hut, in the meadow, on the trail, or at the table depending on the mise en scéne. For 
example, the well-stocked lodge with stores of potatoes, herbs hung to dry, jars filled 
 
132 Romney, “A World Apart,” Sight & Sound 23.8 (2013): 36-38.  
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with blueberries, and stacks of split firewood indicate her later experiences as farmer 
and hunter.  The world in which she is contained has required her to change physically, 
and her face reflects a matured and aged consciousness generated from the experienced 
events in this world. The older Gedeck knows what is to come, and her face reflects 
having already lived through it.  
An example of the shifting perspectives occupying the same space that the 
younger and older Gedecks make visually possible, linked by her voice-over description 
of how she felt that day, occurs early in the film. After her first night behind the wall, 
the younger Gedeck awakes from the dream (which is not in the novel) wherein the wall 
has moved inward on her world, enclosing her in the hunting lodge and further 
tightening her constraints. She leaves her bed and opens the door for Lynx. As the older 
Gedeck’s voice-over describes the scene, she makes the only direct reference to her life 
before the wall in the film: “Suddenly it seemed quite impossible, that I would survive 
that bright spring day. This wasn’t the first time in my life I had to survive like this.” 
Although the novel provides some details about that life which are not included in the 
film, the viewer understands that she is not only referring to a former life, but access to 
a formerly inhabited space. For Gedeck surviving in this space is never assured, and 
returning to that former space is not possible.  
As the scene continues, the younger Gedeck moves in a haunted, dream-like state 
toward the front door, opens it slowly, and with hands reaching out before her, she 
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walks out of lodge and off the porch. The hesitancy in her actions confirms what the 
voice-over narration implies. Cut to exterior of the hunting lodge—we are looking in a 
window as Gedeck says, “I no longer remember what I did that morning,” just as the 
older Gedeck appears in the window, her hair cut short, as she appeared in the opening 
scene. This shift in time and perspective reminds viewers that we are witnessing the 
scenes sketched out in her report. To further reinforce the shifting subjective position 
connected by this singular voice, Pölsler makes several eye-line cuts from the 
perspective of the older Gedeck. We see the older Gedeck framed as if in a prison-cell by 
the shadows of the window grilles; she turns towards the window and looks out. Her 
voice-over continues, “Maybe the hours that followed were so awful I’ve had to forget 
them, but perhaps I only spent them in a kind of numbness.” The eye-line cuts connect 
the two ghosts and in this spatial-image we can see the younger and the older at the 
same time. She describes this space as a numbness that comes from trying to forget; and 
the space is intimate in its awfulness. As viewers, we may not yet know the full 
awfulness of this intimate space, but from our position we can begin to ascribe meaning 
to her isolation, her traumas, and the ghosts that haunt her, as we witness the changes 
this space has effected on her body. 
The younger Gedeck walks away from the lodge into the green mountain forest 
with Lynx. She is still wearing her light-colored bed clothes, moving as if floating 
through the tall grass, her image reinforcing her appearance as ghost. Because we see 
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this from the position as older Gedeck, our subjective position is altered in an almost 
uncanny realization that what we see is her memory as embodied object—the ghost of 
younger Gedeck the morning after her first night alone. As we’re watching older Gedeck 
watching her memory of younger Gedeck move through this space, her voice-over 
questions what we see. She says, “I can’t remember.” But, we are there with the ghost of 
her; we are witness to this embodiment of her memory onscreen. Here we have visual 
confirmation that the report is ultimately untrustworthy because it must always rely on 
the inherent uncertainties of memories.  
The scene continues, cutting between the perspectives of the younger and older 
Gedeck. The shot then widens as if moving move away from the lodge, where the older 
Gedeck remains—a vague figure in the window from this distance. As we move away 
from the space where her memories are recreated and ghosts brought back to life, our 
experience as an observing presence/non-presence for the images in the film is affirmed.  
Where we are and what we can affect in the filmic space of The Wall are the questions to 
which ghosting the spatial-image wants to reply. 
The younger Gedeck is a woman who has not just survived the isolation of her 
walled-off world, but who has thrived and achieved a relative peaceful contentment in 
her strong and independent life. The older Gedeck is a new version of herself, hardened 
and further isolated by the event that prompted her report. The difference between the 
two Gedecks may be understood in relation to Alan Gibbs’s explanation on the 
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difference between PTSD and trauma. Whereas the latter may include forms of 
collective trauma, validated trauma, or cultural trauma, the former was derived as 
“constructed” diagnosis from clinical observation of Vietnam vets, many of whom were 
also suffering from perpetrator trauma.133 The older Gedeck is visually troubled by the 
life she has borne, the deaths she has witnessed, and the deaths that she caused over the 
past two years. Because her struggle is constrained and internalized—haunted by the 
ghost of her beloved dog, but not the ghost of the man she murders protecting Lynx—
we see in the older Gedeck a more complicated aspect of our own human condition. In 
other words, rather than the question Who are we when in conflict with another?, the more 
difficult question for viewers/readers of The Wall/Die Wand is Who are we when there is no 
one else?134 
In explaining how film is a form [best] “equipped to do” philosophy, Hunter 
Vaughn asserts, “Cinema helps to remind us that looking is itself an interaction with the 
world, and the medium can shift perspectives to alter our very notion of subjectivity.”135 
Our positional movement from space occupied by younger Gedeck to space occupied by 
older Gedeck, and our positioning within that space—interior and exterior to the lodge, 
looking in or out—makes our perspective indeterminate.136 In the section on the Chiasm 
 
133 Gibbs, 24-26. 
134 See footnote 121. 
135 Where Film Meets Philosophy, 45. 
136 We might think of this indeterminacy as a symptom of our ghosting.  
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from The Visible and the Invisble, Merleau-Ponty describes the event where “we see other 
seers,” as the moment when:  
we no longer have before us the look without a pupil, the plate glass of the 
things with the feeble reflection, that phantom of ourselves they evoke by 
designating a place among themselves whence we see them: henceforth, we are 
for ourselves fully visible: […] The body is lost outside the world and its goals, 
fascinated by the unique occupation of floating in Being with another life, of 
making itself the outside of the inside and the inside of the outside.137  
We haunt the images because even though we are not seen, we can see, and seeing gives 
us presence in the space where ghosts reside. When we are moved away from both 
Gedecks, we are returned to the subjective position of one beyond the wall. I will return 
to Pölsler’s use of the wall to visually delineate the space between us and her below, but 
for now I will say our movement between filmic space as established in The Wall does 
not promise to eliminate the separation between subjects and objects, but it is through 
our multiple positions that we may see how wide the separation ultimately must be.  
4.4 Moving into filmic space  
The space in which the Woman lives is a paradox—the Alps enclosed by an 
invisible wall. We are moved within this space in Pölsler’s camera, specifically two 
 
137 Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings, 259-260. 
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aspects of the shot—mise en scéne and reverse cuts; and through these our spatial 
relation to the embodied Gedeck are seen. Whereas Robert Ray describes these “two 
formal paradigms [mise en scéne and reverse cuts] at work [of Classical Hollywood 
Cinema]” as a way to “disguise an ‘intensely decision-based’ medium as an apparently 
natural one,”138 in this adaptation these shots emphasize Gedeck’s containment. Instead 
of the classical Hollywood western hero standing in relief (metaphorically) to the wide-
open spaces, all of Gedeck’s actions are contained—resonating and reverberating in her 
voiced memories, her dreams, her report entries, her continuous cycle of changing of 
seasons. In many ways, Pölsler relies on classic cinematic ‘paradigms’ for embodying 
the Woman and establishing the world through which she and the viewer move, but he 
also creates space in such a way that the subjectivities of the character, the viewer, and 
the filmic space work as one system.  
Having first enclosed the expansive world that Gedeck occupies, Pölsler’s mise en 
scéne visually emphasizes her isolation in this afterlife. We see Gedeck almost consumed 
by the expansive space of the surrounding Alps. Whether in daytime exteriors scenes in 
different seasons—hiking through snow, trailing the hunt, or lying in the summer 
sun—or in night scenes—Gedeck silhouetted against the deep starry sky, like a small 
shadow outlined against a background of deep space--Pölsler’s exterior space contained 
within the wall is so vast, Gedeck appears insignificant in comparison. Set against the 
 
138 A Certain Tendency of Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980, 54. 
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open filmic space, we hear her most personal interior thoughts, as she describes her 
desire to be integrated wholly into this space.  
Midway through the film, we see her laying in the sun, next to a napping Lynx, 
and watching a bird of prey circle high overhead. Her voice-over explains how she is 
not hesitant to be in and of this ‘community’ of animals, plants, mountain, weather, 
home; but, as a human capable of choice, she can never be completely integrated into 
that life. Despite her desire to be of this space, she is isolated by her odd existence in a 
world that seems incapable of existing. Enclosed through the technics of film, this space 
is filled with ghosts; they are always co-present and always unrestrained by time. 
Unlike the Woman, who is haunted by the loss of her “motherness” and by the memory 
of her husband and lover, Gedeck is haunted by two things: the ghost of Lynx, her 
closest companion, and by the traumatic event that led to and resulted from his death. 
In many of the exterior scenes, we see her move through the space accompanied by the 
ghosts of those two things.  
Having choice implies agency and intention. Because she is capable of choice, 
Gedeck understands that it is her non-animal/human potential that places her at the 
center of her community. Together they share the responsibility for each other’s 
survival, but unlike Lynx (the dog), or Bella (the cow), or Pearl (the white kitten), as a 
human she is aware it is her choices that will ultimately determine their survival. While 
spending her summer in the pasture Gedeck describes what it would take to be reunited 
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with her past “community,” and she describes this as an empty gesture. The 
community she has left behind is without meaning, and in order to be reunited with 
that human community, she would have to betray the love she holds for this one, 
though she can never fully be a part of it. The only other human alive within the wall is 
The Man, whose brutal attack on Bull and Lynx is emblematic of mankind’s (not 
humankind’s) instinctual tendency to kill indiscriminately. Because he is a man, the Man 
is an evil and indiscriminate killer, and Gedeck has no desire to return to his community. 
The exterior shots image her as part of this space she has created, where meaning for 
her, for her life in this space, is necessitated and determined by her refusal to leave it.  
On the other hand, the interior scenes, lit by either the mountain’s morning 
sunlight or meager candlelight at night, reinforce the interiority of her story. In these 
interior shots, Pölsler’s camera tracks the Woman, or remains static and wide, or draws 
us in to close-ups of an unspeaking face; again, the illusion of moving into intimate 
space is facilitated through the voice-over narrating an associated memory. Even when 
the voice-over is quiet, we have access to her interior thoughts as witness to the events 
on which she silently reflects. I’ll get to our experience with those scenes in the reverse 
shots, but for now, we may associate the interior shots with the act of writing. These 
interior shots, especially the close-ups of Gedeck in-between dreams, are moments when 
the ghosts of the reported events are their most haunting.  
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In the novel, the Woman tells us how easily the wall could be forgotten, but as 
soon as it was, it would suddenly re-appear. In the film, however, we see her subtle 
reaction to the remembered wall, and because we see this from outside of the wall, the 
filmic affect is more subtle. During the summer after she has marked out the wall’s 
perimeter, carrying hay down the steep slope from the meadow to the lodge, Gedeck 
lightly brushes against the wall; she stops, turns, reaches out and lays her open palm 
flat against it. The narrator doesn’t comment, and Gedeck looks as one might when 
touched by a familiar ghost. Without the voice-over narration to tell us, she has been 
reminded of her place inside the wall, the silence requires viewers to complete the 
thought for her. Because Pölsler has composed this scene so subtly, we may not realize 
that we are again seeing Gedeck move through her world from outside the wall—from 
the position of the dead. Again, we are haunting her story—evidence of our presence in 
her world, yet outside of her space.  
Although the movement from space inside the wall to the space beyond 
establishes that the two spaces are different and that we have ghostly presence for the 
filmic space, most of the time we witness the events in her life as a ghost inside the wall. 
Our haunting of the space is controlled by Pölsler’s use of reverse shots to move us into 
her subjective position—cutting between the events and images that haunt her dreams 
and close-ups of her facial reactions to those memories. He also uses reverse shots to 
move us inside and outside of the wall, thereby making visible the barrier between 
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Gedeck and us. While the first set of reverse shots move us from interior space, the 
intimate space inches from Gedeck’s face, to exterior space, where the action of the event 
unfolds, the second set of reverse shots establishes the wall as visual spatial presence 
that ultimately reminds us that we are not there.  
The reverse shot can reveal the images haunting her inner thoughts, memories, 
and dreams. For example, the night after her first kill, by cutting from Gedeck, in close-
up, lying face-up and awake in bed, to the death of the deer in real-time, our movement 
is into the creative space where her memories exist as she imagines them. Although the 
theme of mankind’s capacity to kill is considered more extensively in the novel, in this 
series of reverse shots our subjective experience of the event is witnessed in the space 
Gedeck creates through her imagining.  
One of the film’s most powerful scenes, her ‘first kill’ starts with Gedeck and Lynx 
walking through the forest, the voice-over reflecting on the necessity and 
responsibilities inherent in human choice. Her final words are, “A human becoming the 
only creature that doesn’t belong [in the forest], troubled by chaotic thoughts, cracking 
branches with clumsy boots, engaged in in the bloody business of hunting.” She aims, 
but we do not see her fire the rifle. Instead we hear the shot echoing through the woods 
as we watch the deer jump, stiffen in resistance, roll lifeless downhill, and finally die. 
The scene is short, with very little narration between long moments of complete silence.  
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Pölsler starts with a close-up of younger Gedeck in a bluish tint. She is laying face-
up, looking directly at us and we hear older Gedeck’s voice-over narrating the scene 
from her report. With each cut between the image of the deer dying in real-time in 
silence and Gedeck’s silent face, the close-ups tighten and the viewer moves inwardly 
into a shared intimate space, into the space where the event she remembers exists, 
though she refuses to record this scene in her report. Because the filmic spatial image 
shows us a scene absent from the report, our ghostly presence is affirmed by our eye-
witness. The scene ends as we follow younger Gedeck through the forest, carrying the 
deer on her shoulders, before cutting back to older Gedeck’s face in extreme close-up. 
The voice-over says, “one must be born with the capacity to enjoy killing.” She has not 
forgotten the image of the dying deer, and her refusal to record the killing emphasizes 
her disdain for it.  
As we move finally in tighter, in a close-up of only her eyes, the viewer may 
experience multiple simultaneous perspectives (younger face, older voice, image 
remembered but not written down, viewer/reader).139 But the scene also provokes 
multiple emotional responses from the viewer, which may differ considerably from 
those evoked in the reader. The scene is uncanny, as Gibbs would describe it, because 
 
139 In the novel we read only, “I find it striking that I never noted it in my diary. I now recall that 
the idea of writing it down simply repelled me; it was quite enough that I had to do it.” The 
moving image of the death of a deer is clearly more disturbing than the novel allows.  
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there is a “plentitude of ontological uncertainty and its elision of fact and fiction.”140 By 
layering the multiple perspectives, we get the sense of the trauma of her first (and 
subsequent) kill. The camera tightens on her face, and we move inwardly, towards her. 
Again, the voice-over opening the way into her memory, where we witness her ghosted 
image of the dying deer.  
The movement between the two spaces, the event of crossing over in The Wall, is 
one way that we may ghost the images in the filmic world. However, because the wall 
also visually substantiates that we are outside of Gedeck’s world, our position as a 
viewing subject who lacks the agency to move freely through the space imaged 
onscreen is affirmed. In an early scene, when Gedeck first becomes aware of the wall, the 
mise en scéne and reverse cuts serve to further emphasize her isolation as inwardness 
and to remind us of our inability to fully enter her world. The first time she runs into 
the wall, we are on the road just ahead of her, waiting in place on the other side of the 
wall. She smashes hard into the invisible wall, and her flattened face makes the wall 
visually appear for us in an illusion of materially. As Gedeck describes the wall as feeling 
like a pane of glass as her hands flatten and then she reflects on those first memories of 
being enclosed, Pölsler moves us in a series of reverse shots from one side of the wall to 
the other. From her side, we can hear her footsteps on the unpaved road, we hear her 
talk to Lynx, and we even hear her heart beating; but from the other side the only 
 
140 Contemporary American Trauma Narratives, 108. 
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audible sound is a deep vibrating tone. The viewer occupies a space liminally marked 
by the invisible wall: when we are outside of the wall, we are in a separate and adjacent 
space from the world created by the report; when we are inside the wall, we are with 
Gedeck, yet also always absent. In The Wall, it is the viewer who crosses over from one 
space to the other, and who becomes one of ghosts haunting Gedeck. If I am ghosting the 
spatial-image, I believe I have presence in the filmic world. Whether that experience is 
illusionary or not, the sensation substantiates and confirms my belief.  
In the next scene, the movement inside and outside the wall is repeated, but now 
we see others who are outside the wall. Walking back to the hunting lodge with Lynx, 
she sees a couple in front of their hut. At first, the viewer first sees the couple from 
Gedeck’s perspective—they are outside the wall and frozen in time (Figure 8). The old 
woman sits perfectly still on the porch of their modest mountain cabin, staring out and 
away. The thin old man’s back is permanently bent as he stands at the well-pump, 
water flowing through his unmoving hand.141 Pölsler cuts to a wide shot from behind 
her, deeper inside the wall, and the viewer sees and faintly hears Gedeck banging on the 
wall and yelling for help (Figure 9). Then as the reverse shot cuts to outside the wall, the 
viewer sees her hands flattening against an unseeable wall, and her mouth open, 
silently calling for help (Figure 10). This is a spatial image made visual in the illusion 
 
141 Later in the film, she returns to this scene and in voice-over tells us that those who are 
outside the wall are dead. Later in the novel, the wind has blown the old man over; his body 
has not decayed and he is still reaching out for water.   
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that there is a wall. Just as readers of the novel are assumed to be among the dead (or 
the not yet living), Pölsler’s mise en scéne and reverse shots establishes a filmic space in 
which viewers may occasionally cross over and look back into her world from the 
perspective of one among all the other dead. 
 
Figure 8 Inside the wall 
 
 
Figure 9 Deeper inside the wall 
 
177 
 
Figure 10 Outside the wall 
 
The wall is materialized in the film in a way that is not possible in the novel, and at 
times, viewers are precluded from sharing the Woman’s subjective experience; we are 
stuck outside of the wall looking in. The viewer’s agency is limited to the position 
chosen for him. He cannot cross the plane between Gedeck and himself at will because 
the invisible wall, as seen in the flattening the actress’s face and hands, reminds us that 
proprioceptive illusion of movement, or in this case the immediate and forceful 
stopping of motion, is ultimately just an illusion created out of the spatial-image 
onscreen. In the scenes where Gedeck runs hard face-first into the invisible wall, the 
viewer is made to feel almost painfully aware that the distance between subject and 
object is too great to be crossed. Like the reader who, accepting the premise of the novel, 
is always absent when reading the report, the viewer is reminded of his non-existence—
having inhabited the filmic spaces as an absence without agency.  
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4.5 Die Wand/The Wall 
Thomas Leitch and others have presented a methodology for studying 
adaptations that begins with Bakhtin’s dialogism. Thirty, forty, and fifty years later, as 
various iterations of Bakhtin’s concepts were refined, reshaped, and re-contextualized 
by adaptation theorist and others, we now gather many variations of this method under 
the one—intertexuality. As a catalyst for simultaneously transforming the source text 
and the adapted text into a third, new creation, I am all for it. I can appreciate the 
aesthetic pleasure that this method may provoke. However, the difficulty here is that 
subjectivity is always already determined by the order of experiences with the texts.142 
For example, Pölsler’s adapted script adds two dream sequences (not in the novel) 
which further isolate and puzzle Gedeck and the viewer. Having seen the dreams first, 
when I read the novel, I look for them among the other dream images. If I cannot find 
the dreams I remembered, my experience is of remembering something not there. This 
may be the cause for an uncanny feeling, or perhaps evidence of haunted space, but it is 
still my subjective experience confirming existence in the imagined space. On the other 
hand, when recollections in the report from the novel are omitted from the film, it is I 
who supplies the missing emotional weight (in this case—of the Woman’s past life) to 
the film. By co-inhabiting the space, I bring meaning to the images for Gecdeck.   
 
142 Viewers/readers = the way I came to this film/book, in that order. I will refer to viewer and/or 
reader as “he,” taking my own perspective as the privileged one for this analysis.  
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Some internet film databases list The Wall as science fiction, and though my 
layman’s approach to spatial dimensions lacks any grounding in physics, the adapted 
film does provide us with possibilities for conceptualizing space beyond the three we 
know. Filmic space creates opportunities to imagine ourselves in a space where we may 
only be present in our absence. It may also present a space wherein we may enter the 
fictional world of an adapted text. Reading the report in Die Wand, we imagine a plane 
of existence for the Woman and her world; hearing the report in The Wall while seeing 
the world in which Gedeck must survive, reader-viewers enter this space as co-creators, 
testing what they are told against what they see. My ‘subjectively-present 
consciousness’ brings meaning to the space in the form of my ghosts gathered there. 
Filmic space in The Wall visually confirms our presence through our absence, as well as 
visually determining the liminalities of our movements and ultimate separation from 
the characters and events onscreen. Whether or not we are aware of our movements 
through the various dimensions of space that our imaginative participation with a text 
allows, ghosting the spatial-image may require us to consider our experience as 
somewhere in-between representation and materiality. This is where film does the work 
of philosophy—in the ‘real’ world we may ask, Who are we when in conflict with another? 
But in the filmic world we enter a space where we may ask Who are we when there is no 
one else? The hard part is asking ourselves this question and living with all its 
complications and consequences when we return to the real. 
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5 CHAPTER FOUR: WITNESS TO TRAUMA, WE ARE GHOSTS IN 
CHILDREN OF MEN 
“In other words, trauma makes people feel like either some body else, or like no 
body. In order to overcome trauma, you need help to get in touch with your body, with 
your Self.” –Bessel van der Kolk143  
5.1 The trauma-image & Cuarón’s camera 
The images of trauma that haunted me after first seeing Children of Men are 
images that I’ve returned to hundreds of times since. What I have come to understand 
about how I felt that first night, about how I remember those images, and about how 
my body remembers those images is that my experience in the film was made possible 
by the mediation of the image through Cuarón’s camera.144 Film viewers expect our 
perspective, the focus of our attention, and our awareness of images to be limited to 
those chosen for us by a director, but Cuarón’s camera mediates the images of trauma 
in such a way, we feel as we have ghostly presence in his future dystopic world. The 
first time I saw the film, I did not want to leave immediately after because the 
emotional, visceral, and intellectual affects I experienced were familiar and strange, and 
 
143 The Body Keeps the Score, 249. (emphasis in original) 
144 Cuarón’s camera is comprised of the elemental camera movements, POVs, and shot-lengths, 
technical achievements, etc., essential to his directorial vision. It is an immersive experience that 
requires participation. The camera should allow audiences to “invest their experiences and 
emotions into the experiences happening onscreen” (qtd. in “How Alfonso Cuarón Makes 
Every Shot Count”). More to follow. 
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I wanted to remain in that “moment of truthfulness and being”145 that Cuarón’s camera 
created. Now after more than ten years with this film, I can see that it was likely my 
thinking about Cuarón’s camera in Children of Men that first informed my ideas about 
ghosting images.   
By looking at the image of trauma as mediated through Cuarón’s camera, I hope 
to demonstrate how we may seem to experience the traumatic events as they happen to 
the characters in the filmic world when we witness filmic images as a ghostly presence 
in that world. Cuarón’s camera carries us into a diegetic world where foreground and 
background are balanced in ‘real-time’146; where themes of disenchantment, ghostliness, 
and trauma haunt every scene. Cuarón says his camera informs the content, the context, 
and the characters; and then they (content, context, character), in turn, inform each 
other.147 I go further to say that although it may be Cuarón’s camera that carries us into 
the film, it is our inner contexts, our experiences, our ghosted images which inform and 
enliven the onscreen images.148 Cuarón’s camera makes our ghosting of trauma-images 
possible in Children of Men by carrying us into the most intimate and violent space, and 
 
145 Cuarón interview in “How Alfonso Cuarón Makes Every Shot Count.”  
146 ‘real-time’ is the illusionary effect that the long take can produce where one minute (or ten) of 
time in the diegetic, filmic world is equal to one minute (or ten) in the viewers world.   
147 Quoted in “How Alfonso Cuarón Makes Every Shot Count”  
148 Likewise, we may inform an image with an aura of our own making—the image of Kee 
carrying her baby past soldiers and refugees through the embattled wreckage of an apartment 
building is sublime. In this world, as this child moves among the traumatized inhabitants, she 
becomes a force holding them all to “cease fire.”  
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then leaving us there for minutes at a time. Because Cuarón’s camera gives existence to 
our experience, we may feel an uncanny sensation in the fluid long take, like we are in 
time-out-of-joint. And as near as Cuarón can sometimes get to breaking the liminality of 
the screen for viewers149, we are ultimately unable to fully breach the spatial-dimension 
separating us from the characters onscreen. However, in Cuarón’s fluid long takes, the 
illusion of movement is coupled with the illusion of ‘real’ time in Children of Men. 
Viewers are allowed a sense of a directly shared experience with the characters whose 
traumatic events we haunt. Because our filmic existence is made possible in the space 
opened to us in the technics of Cuarón’s camera, when we are ghosting the trauma-image, 
our physical experiences of the trauma-image may seem to be responsive in real time.  
Alfonso Cuarón creates distinctive perspectives in his films through his 
assemblage of shots, camera movements, his use of hand-helds and Steadicams, his 
fluid, ‘elastic’ and extreme long takes, his creative shooting methods and editing 
techniques. Although our experiences with the images of trauma in Children of Men are 
equally responsive to the soundtrack, the score, the dialogue, the performances, etc., the 
proprioceptive effect that Cuarón’s camera enables for viewers is as a ghostly presence 
in the diegetic world of an Alfonso Cuarón film. Cuarón’s camera moves through the 
space like a ghost, unbound by the rules of physics that the ‘real’ space of the film 
implies. In Children of Men we haunt Theo (Clive Owen) as he travels through 
 
149 Especially in the film Gravity. 
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overpopulated urban landscapes, as he finds respite in Jasper’s (Michael Caine) 
farmhouse, or as he listens to Miriam’s (Pam Ferris) story of the beginning of the end of 
life. We move with Theo freely past imprisoned refugees or we hover in the tightly 
enclosed interior of car during a violent attack. Cuarón’s camera allows us a sense of 
conscious presence moving through intimate and confined space, in which we confront 
the slow accumulative power of violence and absence. 
From the opening scene, Cuarón requires viewers to engage with the film 
through the absence of visual images. The film opens with a black screen and a 
newscaster’s voice-over describing riots, the passage of stricter immigration and martial 
state laws, and the lead story—the death of Diego Ricardo, the youngest person on the 
planet. Viewers must imagine the narrated events; this black screen is an absence that 
we must fill, like the space we enter when we listen to the news with our eyes closed. 
As the newscaster continues, we appear, hovering above, just to the left of the 
television, looking down on a group of customers in a café blankly staring up and 
seemingly frozen in place. The television holds the customers’ attention, while behind 
them another television above the door shows the same news story. They are all 
transfixed on the story of “Baby” Diego. Cutting from crowd to the televised image of 
“Baby” Diego, Cuarón’s camera positions us so close to the mediated image, we seem to 
share the same space and perspective. I would stipulate that although viewers may not 
see themselves as the ghost of Diego, or Dylan, or all the lost children, Cuarón’s camera 
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does make us feel as though we are moving through this future space with ghostly 
presence. When the black screen cuts to the crowded coffee shop, we appear as a 
hovering presence—aware of the world, yet completely unseen or unheard. Whereas 
the black screen requires us to imagine the world narrated onscreen, once we appear 
Cuarón fills the fore- and background space with mediated images. Throughout 
Children of Men, mediated (mostly political) images are seemingly projected on every 
surface, and it is our ghostly presence that gives these images meaning. 
Cuarón’s long take not only allows us to experience the filmic space in close 
proximity to Theo, but it also provides narrative details visually without explicit 
descriptions.  When we follow Theo out of the café, we lag slightly behind and are fully 
immersed in visual details. The title card, London, 16th November 2027, locates this time 
and place—a future world where nothing is new. The streets are busy and grey; trash 
bags and refuse are piled high next to buildings; uniformed policeman seem to be 
everywhere. This future world doesn’t look much different from our own, except more 
decrepit, more polluted, and obviously dying. Cuarón immerses us here in background 
images, are images inherently violent and fear-inducing. Throughout CoM, the 
background is filled with persistent and pervasive mediated images, such as news 
bulletins, photographs of lost children, a political comic, the Picasso painting Guernica. 
The constantly running ads reinforce the filmic trauma for the inhabitants of this space 
we move through. The future city we have entered is walled with images, and in 
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following Theo down the street, we move as if in ‘real-time’ through the space of a 
dystopic after-life, a space where human life has ceased to continue.  
The final image in the opening is a trauma-image. It is this image, briefly 
appearing out of the smoke of the explosion, that we may find most haunting. We turn 
back to follow Theo, who stops to add a shot of whiskey to his coffee. As he pours, we 
circle around to his left looking back down the street the way we came. Theo starts to 
put a lid on his cup, and a bomb explodes in the café we just left. Theo falls backwards 
into our position, our sight lines match briefly, then we move quickly past him towards 
the café. There is a high-pitched, piercing tone over the screams of the bombing victims. 
A woman exits the café holding her dis-attached arm: this is final image in the three-
minute long take. When the screen cuts to black, and the title card reads CHILDREN OF 
MEN in white letters, the high-pitched tone continues while, for some viewers, the 
image of the woman remains as a ghost in our imagination.  
Trauma images may act on the viewer like a traumatic memory.  Freud observes 
that trauma, “the psychical trauma—or more precisely the memory of the trauma—acts 
like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent 
that still is at work” (qtd. in van der Kolk, 248). Although there is clear evidence that 
directly experiencing a trauma is much more likely to produce severe symptoms, 
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witnessing a traumatic event can also cause PTSD.150  The difference between witnessing 
traumatic events in a fictional world onscreen and witnessing real trauma is obvious—
filmic space enables images of trauma to be mediated safely on the other side of the 
liminal screen. Even though viewers may feel that they are sharing intimate space, the 
distance is just a proprioceptive illusion. If we accept that the memory of the trauma 
“acts like a foreign agent,” is it so different for the viewers of Children of Men to envision 
the image of the woman carrying her dis-embodied arm as a ghost of the trauma-image, 
walking towards us and still at work in our memory?  
Throughout Children of Men, we experience trauma-images in two ways: as 
witness and as ghost. In the opening scene we witness a traumatic event from an 
intimately close distance, and our shock is magnified by our proximity to the explosion 
measured in ‘real-time’. Considering that traumatized patients report having 
dissociative experiences in which they describe themselves as “observers watching an 
event happen to someone else,”151 I believe that by moving through Children of Men as 
both witness and ghost, we become a foreign body in the diegetic world whose entry is 
“an agent still at work” in that world. As both witness and participant, our purpose for 
ghosting Theo may originate from multiple sources. We could be just a traveling 
companion, a witness to Theo’s journey. Or, in Cuarón’s camera we could be the 
 
150 May, Casey L. and Blair E. Wisco. “Defining Trauma: How Level of Risk and Proximity 
Affect Risk for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.”  
151 Schachter, The Seven Sins of Memory, 174.  
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embodiment of the one ghost who haunts Theo, the only ghost who can revive Theo 
from his apathy and motivate him to a holy mission—his son Dylan. Or, we could 
imagine the ghost as an assemblage of lost children: ghosts of Dylan and “Baby” Diego, 
ghosts of the children lost to influenza or other diseases, and ghosts of the children who 
remain unborn over the last nineteen years. If we can agree that a ghost’s presence may 
be nothing more than the feeling that one is not alone, or that we sense a presence 
encouraging us to fight on, then we could also agree that our ghosting in Children of 
Men re-affirms our presence and purpose as an agent still at work on Theo.  
As witness to the dystopic future, we understand from the earliest scenes that all 
of humanity has been injured by a continuing traumatic event—world-wide infertility 
without explanation or cure. England in 2027 is traumatized by the nineteen years of 
infertility, which has ultimately led to a violent nationalistic fervor targeting refugees 
and immigrants. London is a city traumatized by the acts of those who brandish official-
power over and against those whose official-existence is invalid. The former port city of 
Bexhill has been traumatized, imprisoned behind the walls of official-status as refugee 
detainment camp. Political trauma can take multiple forms, but the inherent violence of 
nationalism is especially insidious because, at its base, official-existence is always in 
crisis. Illegal immigrants are always perceived as a threat in the zero-sum, geo-political 
game of official-nationalistic ideology. Derrida describes the immigrant and refugee 
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experience as an aporia of foreignness, and current critical-thinking152 about this concept 
confirms our image of refugee as a person whose identity is always already stuck in-
between. Children of Men engages the political trauma perpetrated on the 
overdetermined and unstable other, the “fugee,” in ways prescient to our images of 
current political traumas in Europe and the United States. We witness the filmic events, 
the excessive government abuses against immigrants and the brutality of terrorist 
groups in response, and we appraise153 our position in the trauma-image in response to 
the reality of our current viewing. Like the refugee caught in-between countries, 
viewers of trauma-images are caught between states of being: one, as witness to the 
mediated image in the filmic world and two, as witness to the images from the real 
world (or perhaps as witness to real violence).   
In Children of Men we witness refugees—who have fled to England as their last 
hope only to be caged, abused, and forced to live under constant threat of violence—
from our own constantly changing current perspective. We are present-day ghosts 
haunting a future world. In this diegetic world we see the earth suffering from human-
caused injury, and from our physical bodily position as a viewer in 2020, we know that 
we are the humans most likely to have caused this injury. Images in the film echo 
images of trauma from our own time, like the image of a dark-skinned man, 
 
152 See Transnational Cinemas, 2018, VOL 9, No. 1-12.  
153 Ehlers and Clark. “A cognitive model for posttraumatic stress disorder.”  
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blindfolded, in an orange jumper, forced to stand in a stress position reminding us of 
American soldiers with prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Watching the film again, more than a 
decade after its release, and having since seen real-life images of the ever-expanding 
refugee crises engulfing most of the world, the images in Children of Men resonate in 
another powerful way. Ghosting the image from our present position as viewer, we are 
always already stuck in a temporal in-between.  
Cuarón’s camera allows viewers to become the ghosts haunting the events, the 
space, and the people in the filmic world, and as such our purpose may become to 
assign meaning and significance to the filmic images. Furthermore, when we lead, 
follow, or remained trapped in an enclosed space with characters in the long take, the 
illusion of proximity and time convince us that we somehow exist together in the same 
temporal-spatial dimension as the characters in this diegetic world; but we also know 
that we are more of our present life, safe from the violence onscreen. We may haunt the 
images in a film, moving as we do through Children of Men as a ghost from Theo’s past, 
or as the spirit leading him and Kee and the Baby to place of safety. Or, we may haunt 
the filmic images of trauma as witnesses bearing the ghosts of images (news photos or 
videos) from our own time and place. Although viewers ultimately cannot cross-over 
into the filmic world, Cuarón’s camera provides the illusionary experience of moving in 
‘close proximity to’ and within the same space as the collective traumas of London’s 
survivors, as the group trauma of a terrorist explosion, and as the intimate trauma of 
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Julian dying in Theo’s arms. His camera opens the space in which we may nearly 
directly experience the traumatic event. 
5.2 Mediated trauma-image 
When I first looked at the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-V, 2013), the diagnostic criteria for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) present 
as originating from:  
 A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence in 
one (or more) of the following ways:  
1  Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s). 
2  Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to others 
3  Learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a close family member or 
close friend. In cases of actual or threatened death of a family member 
or friend, the event(s) must have been violent or accidental.  
4  Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the 
traumatic event(s) (e.g. first responders collecting human remains; 
police officers repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). Note: 
Criterion A4 does not apply to exposure through electronic media, 
television, movies, or pictures, unless this exposure is work related.154  
 
For me, the Note: in A4 begs the question: Can a fictional film cause PTSD? More 
importantly, it seems obvious that by excluding the ‘non-work related’ viewer from the 
clinical definition, the manual ignores an originating cause that mediated images may 
potentially produce, such as the persistent injuries that mediated terrorism inflicts. 
Implicit in this exclusion are a couple of questions about proximity: first, How close to the 
 
154DSM-V https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm  
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trauma must one be to be traumatized? second, Does the mediation of traumatic images expand 
or contract the distance between a viewer and the trauma? and third, Can a mediated trauma-
image be both public and personal?155 E. Ann Kaplan sees proximity to the event as the 
most obvious complicating element in the responses to the attacks of September 11th, 
2001. Using Žižek as an example of the distant intellectual perspective, she agrees that 
the US had “already anticipated the event in many uncanny similar catastrophes—as if 
unconsciously aware of the illusion citizens were living, of the repressed knowledge 
that now emerged in film fantasies.”156 The history and methodology of modern 
terrorism from the 20th century onward is inextricably linked to the dissemination of 
images through popular media. When groups like al-Qaeda began to utilize multiple 
coordinated attacks timed to generate maximum news coverage, they were able to 
exploit our structure for reporting mediated images as ‘news worth repeating.’ They 
discovered that mediated images of trauma, especially running live in real-time, are 
powerful and effective weapons with extensive reach and great potential for causing 
massive psychological injury.  
During the hours and days after the first plane hit the World Trade Center 
Tower, these weaponized images were replayed non-stop, on every channel and 
 
155 Julia Kristeva distinguishes between two types of trauma—the military/political and the personal. But 
for my purposes, public and personal trauma expresses more aptly the measure of emotional proximity 
between the viewer and an image or between the witness and a trauma. 
156 Trauma Culture, 15. 
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medium. The event and our emotional proximity to it may change from ‘witness to an 
Event of public trauma’ to ‘victim of a personal trauma’ in our repeated viewing; as 
images of the Event become firmly engraved in our memories, they may become an 
originating source of personal trauma. Most of us can tell the story in great detail of 
where we were and what we were doing when we first saw the televised images of the 
World Trade Center. And though the research in memory generally agrees that our 
memories of events, even those we believe we remember in great detail, are mostly 
inaccurate, it is the underlying sense of proximity to the imaged event that our ghosts 
may affirm.  
I can try to recall the details of my experience with the images of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19th, 1995. Because I have several 
cousins who are politicians, law enforcement officers, and journalists in Oklahoma, and 
all of whom, I knew, went to that building regularly, the first images of the Oklahoma 
City bombing had great emotional proximity for me.157 Now, I may try to re-construct 
the time and place where I first saw the cratered building, and the details become 
insignificant compared to the affect. Whether we were at dinner in East Atlanta or 
Grant Park, with Ed and Sondra or Rex and Caroline, it is the feeling evoked by the 
 
157 One cousin, a political advisor and pollster, had been there a week or two earlier; my uncle, sheriff of 
Okfuskee County, and his son, an Oklahoma Highway Patrolmen, were both three counties south from 
where Timothy McVeigh was captured.  
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image televised above the bar that I remember. Fortunately,158 my experiences with the 
images of trauma did not produce symptoms that would warrant a diagnosis of PTSD, 
but others are not as fortunate. For many the photographs, video images, or audio 
recordings from 9/11, or Sandy Hook Elementary, or the Bataclan theatre in Paris, to 
name only three, are traumatizing.  
In considering how filmic images of trauma can haunt us, I will draw parallels 
between one effective treatment process, Eye Movement Desensitisation and 
Reprocessing (EMDR) and image ghosting. Specifically, I argue that just as EMDR 
incorporates the participating viewer (the patient/ witness/victim) in an imagined space 
where he/she/they may narrate the event as he/she/they remember it, ghosting the 
trauma-image incorporates viewers into a filmic space where the meaning of the filmic 
event is determined by the appearance of ghosts from the viewers’ past. I believe that 
mediated images can be an originating source of trauma, but how we affirm our 
presence in an image and the meaning we find in the image are, in part, functions of 
those ghosts of mediated traumas (and perhaps actual traumas) that we bring with us.    
Our bodies produce physical traces of the traumatic events through the 
seemingly unstoppable repetition of memories for those who directly experience or 
witness the event. And our bodies may respond unexpectedly, even when we are in a 
 
158 since my experience with mediated images does not meet my insurance provider’s authorized 
definition of originating trauma. 
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safe place, as the intrusive fragment of a traumatic memory acts as a catalyst for our 
stress hormones to increase production. In describing dissociation and reliving of 
trauma, Bessel van der Kolk makes two points about our bodies’ reactions to the 
affective experience:159 
[One—] The overwhelming experience is split off and fragmented, so that the 
emotions, sounds, images, thoughts, and physical sensations related to the 
trauma take on a life of their own. The sensory fragments of memory intrude into 
the present, where they are literally relived. As long as the trauma is not 
resolved, the stress hormones that the body secretes to protect itself keep 
circulating, and the defensive movements and emotional responses keep getting 
replayed. 
[Two—] Flashbacks and reliving are in some ways worse than the trauma 
itself. A traumatic event has a beginning and an end—at some point it is over. 
[…] 
If elements of the trauma are replayed again and again, the accompanying 
stress hormones engrave those memories ever more deeply in the mind. 
Ordinary, day-to-day events become less compelling…Not being fully alive in 
the present keeps them [the victims/witnesses] more firmly imprisoned in the 
past.  
 
159 The Body Keeps Score, 66-67. 
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The ghosts haunting victims and witnesses are physical traces “engraved […in] those 
memories ever more deeply,” and these ghosts ‘come alive’ in the space opened in 
victims’ or witnesses’ active memories.  Just as I proposed in Chapter Three that the 
Woman’s report created the space in which the ghosts of her former self, her dog, the 
Man, and the events ‘that required her to write everything down’ could exist, I believe 
when we imagine ourselves present through Cuarón’s camera in Children of Men we are 
participating in the creation of a space where events traumatize characters. However 
slight the distance between the space of my presence and the space of my presence on 
film appears, this distance is liminal.  Although mediated images may be traumatizing, 
I would argue that most films provide viewers an experience more like EMDR, where 
our presence in filmic trauma seems closer than we actually are. From this distance, we 
can experience (or re-experience) the trauma safely separated from the traumatizing 
effect. 
In the Prevention and Treatment Guidelines,160 published and updated by The 
International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS), Eye Movement 
Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) is recommended as an “effective” or the 
“most effective” treatment for a broad range of patients suffering from various forms of 
PTSD.  
 
160 http://www.istss.org/getattachment/Treating-Trauma/New-ISTSS-Prevention-and-
Treatment-Guidelines/ISTSS_PreventionTreatmentGuidelines_FNL.pdf.aspx. 24.  
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EMDR is a standardised, eight-phase, trauma-focused therapy, involving the use 
of bilateral physical stimulation (eye movements, taps or tones). Targeted 
traumatic memories are considered in terms of an image, the associated 
cognition, the associated affect and body sensation. These four components are 
then focused on as bilateral physical stimulation occurs. It is hypothesised that 
EMDR stimulates the individual’s own information processing in order to help 
integrate the targeted memory as an adaptive contextualised memory.161 
Although multiple studies report positive results for EMDR treatment in PTSD patients, 
van der Kolk’s 2014 EMDR study showed that even though its efficacy had 
limitations,162 it was a “powerful treatment for [releasing] stuck traumatic memories.”163 
The parallels between EMDR treatment process and image ghosting starts with a 
consideration of the four components—image, the associated cognition (inner contexts, 
what we think the image means), the associated affect (our psychological and emotional 
responses to the image), and body sensations (our visceral responses, both conscious 
and unconscious).  Whereas EMDR mitigates intrusive memories by integrating past 
events and triggers into “an adaptive contextualized memory,” we can think of ghosting 
 
161 The definition of EMDR presented on page 26 of The Guidelines included the following: 
“Processing targets involve past events, present triggers and adaptive future functioning. 
EMDR at times uses restricted questioning related to cognitive processes paired with bilateral 
stimulation to unblock processing.”  
162 EMDR was not as effective in resolving the effects physical or sexual abuse in childhood, for 
example.  
163 The Body Keeps Score, 257. 
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the trauma-image as the process by which we integrate our constantly evolving presence 
into the filmic space where the originating trauma occurs.   
5.3 Image, associated cognition, associated affect, and body sensations 
Like Bazin, who argues that the cinematic image is valued not according to 
“what it adds to reality but what it reveals of it,”164 Deleuze sees the long take as adding 
to the assemblage of responses by which viewers perceive their reactions. The long take 
moves the viewer away from the narratively restricting cuts and towards the compossible 
variations inherent in durée. In other words, the long take opens multiple possible 
points of connection for viewers with onscreen images which otherwise are unavailable 
in the controlled narrative that quick-cuts and montage sequences employs. Watching a 
long take unfold, the viewer is engaged with the creation of the story in real-time. 
However, in Children of Men, the long take not only serves as a means by which viewers 
can co-create the story, but it also enables viewers to co-create space out of the shared 
real-time. 
Cuarón has carefully populated this world with a background that requires our 
attention and participation, and as his camera brings background images forward, our 
existence within the film’s story is contextualized by the linkage of those background 
images to our own cognitive associations. Moving between foreground and background 
 
164 What is Cinema? 28. 
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space, closely following Theo through the dystopic world without comment or notice 
and then lingering behind to watch the encaged refugees, or the ‘repenters’ enthralled 
in religious fervor, or Jasper and Janice as they prepare to die, we may begin to interact 
with the background images, especially the characters, in a very specific way. In this 
world, where everyone has been traumatized by a realized existential crisis, viewers can 
imbue every character with a set of psychological and emotional effects that trauma 
implies. Just as we ascribe subjectivity to a character-image in the hermeneutic and 
experiential, we may also ascribe subjectivity as the associated cognition. Because in 
Children of Men, the traumatic Event was directly experienced by every primary, every 
secondary, and every background character, we may associate any one of their 
movements in this space as an expression of agency borne from the attempt to resolve 
the trauma, to no longer be haunted, to no longer live in-between.  
In the opening shot at Jasper and Janice’s (Philippa Urquhart) house, we 
compose their stories from a collage of mediated images—headlines, awards, comic 
strips, news and personal photographs, bumper stickers, political buttons, and other 
mementos which, when taken collectively, hold a system of associated feelings around 
these narrative points in the couple’s life. We start with Janice’s vanity on which they 
have collected these ghosted images. We move in a slow pan right, and the context of 
the personal traumas they suffered are revealed. We linger on the final image—a front 
page photo of Janice with the headline: MI5 deny involvement in torture of photojournalist. 
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Though Cuarón clearly brings these background images to the fore visually, they 
function in the shot as narrative background information. The collage tells two 
simultaneously occurring stories: the headlines, political buttons, and bumper stickers 
giving backstory to the public trauma that infertility wrought upon the world; while the 
cartoons, the feature stories, and family photos tell the personal story of Jasper and 
Janice, whose lives have been stopped in place by the event headlining the final image 
before the cut.   
In this scene, viewers may begin to hold associated affects with the characters as 
we piece together the physical and psychological damage levied against Janice now. 
When we cut to a three shot—Jasper on the right, Janice staring blankly, and Theo on 
the left, the two images of Janice are juxtaposed—the old, full-page photo of Janice 
smiling wryly against her living face in ‘real-time,’ catatonic and absent. For me, this 
scene can be what makes ghosting so appealing, because in this scene I can appear as 
the ghost haunting Janice. From the montage I co-create her story; from the headline I 
empathize with her pain. The actress Philippa Urquhart embodies both the life story 
and the physical effect of torture on Janice in her performance, but the actress’s 
embodiment is a gesture reacting and responding to the psychological affects our 
ghostly presence ascribe. In other words, we haunt her with empathy—it is our feelings 
that explain Janice’s catatonia. The camera’s movement between still photo of younger 
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Janice and the filmic character-image of Janice creates yet another imaginative space 
where we can create ghostly versions of her life that we send back to haunt her.  
The camera also moves us from filmic character-image to still photo as we move 
into close-up on Theo. As he looks up at the collection of images, his eyes are drawn to 
one photograph—of him, Julian, and their child Dylan. The photo is in the center of the 
collage: Dylan is being held between Theo and Julian. They are both looking at him, and 
we see his face fully. He is looking directly at the camera, as if at us. We move in closer 
and linger on his face.  
On first viewing, this image may not seem as haunting as other violent or 
sublime images, but after subsequent viewings I would contend it is an important 
image of the film as it the only image of who we may become, as viewers of Children of 
Men—the ghost of Dylan urging Theo on. When the photograph appears later, off-
camera, we understand its significance as the image of the ghost haunting Theo.   
This is where I return to EMDR therapy and connect it to the viewers 
proprioceptive sensations. The fourth component of the targeted traumatic memory in 
EMDR therapy is body sensations. Cuarón’s camera opens the space where the absent 
body of Dylan can appear. Near the midpoint of the film, Cuarón uses a compound 
long take, contiguous long takes that work effectively as one, to focus our attention on 
Theo alone. This scene lasts for about three minutes with only one cut near the end. 
Although Theo doesn’t speak a word, in our two and a half minutes alone with him, as 
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the others discuss the photo from earlier of Theo, Julian and Dylan, we empathize with 
his feelings of lost. We watch Theo, who appears haunted by Dylan, appearing out of 
the mediate image in Kee’s and Jasper’s dialogue. Because we remember the boy’s face 
from the photo, we become the ghost in this filmic image, and as the haint of Dylan, we 
are an agent still at work in Theo. And, perhaps it is in this moment we might 
understand the motivation behind Theo’s commitment to saving Kee and her unborn 
child because we have created the ghost who gives Theo purpose.   
The image of Dylan in the photograph on Janice’s vanity takes shape for us in a 
different way after Julian’s murder. We saw it earlier, but now only hear about it from 
Kee. If we remember it, we may add details about the child from both Julian and Kee’s 
descriptions, then, further, give him body, voice, and movement from Jasper’s 
description. We stay with Theo, listening to the scene in Jasper’s living room playing 
out in ‘real-time.’ From the other room, background in the shot, we hear Jasper and 
Miriam (Pam Ferris) sharing a joint, while Kee and Janice listen to their cosmic 
conversation. Theo stops at the bar, amused by Jasper’s explanation of faith and chance. 
The camera pans right as he stops to refill his whiskey bottle, splitting the frame in two. 
On the left half of the screen is Theo in a dark light and sharp focus, and on the right are 
the others in the more brightly lit room and softly out of focus. The others can’t see 
Theo—the mise en scéne both isolating Theo from the others, while also emphasizing 
our presence/non-presence with him. We are moved in so closely on him, his 
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momentary catatonia may seem like a blankness on which our own impressions for 
how a mourning father would react are mirrored. But Clive Owen’s performance as 
Theo does not mirror the viewer’s feelings; in this scene, we haunt Theo, inhabiting the 
space between the overheard background stories and his thousand-yard stare.  
The thousand-yard stare is generally used to describe a traumatized soldier’s 
dissociative symptom to detach from the real horrors he experiences while in battle. The 
term has come to also refer to catatonic symptoms which may occur in the victims of 
abuse, torture and other forms of prolonged and intense physical threat. For Theo, we 
can only imagine what he sees within that blank detachment. And as the long take 
continues, and the camera and Theo remain unmoved, we may believe the illusion that 
we, too, are in an intimate space (if not dissociative state), again measured in ‘real-time’ 
and intimate proximity, where Theo can conjure Dylan‘s haint.  
When Kee notices the photo, Theo stops and leans against the wall separating 
them. Again, we do not see the image of Dylan, but must recall it from earlier, just as 
Theo must. He listens as Jasper explains how chance brought Theo and Julian together, 
and by chance Dylan was born. On the split screen, we see only two faces clearly in 
focus—on the right, in the background among the group we see Janice, and in the 
foreground to the left is Theo in mid-close-up. Both are perfectly still. Theo is frozen by 
Jasper’s story of Dylan, and we may assume his physical reactions to the memories are 
appropriate. But what we perceive as Theo’s reactions to the haint of his son are more 
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likely the associated affects we ascribe in the co-creation of the haint. In this stillness of 
the filmic image, we participate in conjuring of the child; and though we seem to move 
inward, into the mind of character-image, it is the associations and sensations that we 
hold and feel that are made visual to us in Theo’s response. Here we may be ghosting the 
trauma-image as we assume Theo’s associated feelings of loss.   
We create the haint that haunts Theo from our remembered photographic image 
of the child and from the images in Jasper’s story—the details of what Dylan looked 
like, what he said, what he liked to do. Kee says, “Look, the baby has Theo’s eyes!” and 
we may remember the words of Julian earlier, “It’s hard to look at you, he had your 
eyes.” We assume Theo remembers Julian’s words as well, and we may assume this is 
also likely to evoke his grief and mourning for her. At this point in the film, we have 
been nearly-direct witness to Julian’s murder, we have seen the aftermath of infertility on 
governments, societies, and individuals, and we have seen how the loss of a child can 
unintentionally propel the lives of the parents in separate directions. As we stay with 
Theo who stares blankly and unmoved, our cognitive associations of the image of the 
child and our empathetic affections for Theo here, again, affirm our ghostly presence as 
an object of mourning. But, the scene ends in an unsettling way. We may want him to 
move towards the others and perhaps find some comfort, but instead we can only 
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watch him move back into the dark recesses of Jasper’s home and into his private 
isolating grief. 165 
From a narrative point of view, this moment in the film, where we are with Theo, 
haunted and frozen by grief, is the moment when Theo rejoins the living. From a 
therapeutic perspective, the thousand-yard stare may seem completely contrary to 
EMDR, but for Theo it is in this dissociative moment that he can re-contextualize not 
only why he will continue to protect Kee and the baby, but also why he is now willing 
to accept his fate, as Jasper might say. When awakened the next morning by the 
attacking Fishes, he can set out bolstered by the ghosts of Dylan and Julian, and those 
who will die with him on this journey to bring the new Dylan into this world.  
To the larger point about foreground and background images, because all images 
in Children of Men—the people, the events, the spaces—are traumatized images, our 
presence in the filmic world is substantiated in the layers of mediated images. Further, 
just as we witness instances in the film where others are inflicted with varying degrees 
of catatonia, there are moments in the filmic space where we can only witness the world 
like Janice—incapable of action. In some scenes the foreground images evoke intense 
sensations to fight/flight, and in other scenes background images evoke social 
 
165 This is also the scene that evinces my belief that the spirit of Baby Diego is the reincarnation of their 
son Dylan, who now awaits re-birth. The spirit to which Cuarón’s camera gives presence is a guiding 
spirit that also gives solace and comfort to his grieving human parents. The ghost revealed may give 
meaning to their sacrifice—by giving up their lives, his spirit can become human again. 
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engagement. To extend my assertion from Chapter One, we may ascribe subjectivity to 
a filmic character by associating emotional context and meaning to their performed 
physical responses to trauma.  However, before I can assert what the viewer’s 
transformation from silent witness to motivating spirit may mean, it would be helpful 
to first summarize one of the more widely accepted theories for explaining how and 
why the human body reacts to stress.  
Steven Porges describes and explains the evolutionary effects on the human 
body developed as physical responses to threats and stress as his Polyvagal Theory.166 
Current definitions of stress use operational terms, such as stressor for the originating 
stressing stimulus and “the behavioral and physiological response to the stressor” as 
stress.167 His theory defines stress operationally, as a function of the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS). Stress, in this sense, is a measure of compromise in the state of the ANS. 
Through our evolutionary development, our bodies have learned (as have all mammals, 
but especially primates) how to react to safe, dangerous, and life-threatening situations. 
Porges describes “the three stages of development in a mammal’s autonomic nervous 
system. Each of the three major adaptive behavioral strategies is supported by a distinct 
neural circuit involving the autonomic nervous system.“168 The three levels are: 
 
166 Polyvagal to mean multiple vagus nerve strands. 
167 The Polyvagal Theory, 66 (emphasis in original). 
168 Ibid, 16. In the Foreword, Bessell van der Kolk states the importance of Porges’ theory in clarifying 
“the relation between visceral state and emotional expression,” xiv. 
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immobilization—feigning death and/or behavioral shutdown, a response generated by 
the most primitive component, the oldest branch of the vagus, and registered in our 
body as slowed heart rate and respiratory function; mobilization—fight-or-flight 
behaviors, increased metabolic activity and increasing heart output; and social 
engagement—facial expressions, vocalizations, listening, dependent on the myelinated 
vagus, which fosters calm behavioral states.169 The Polyvagal Theory helps us better 
describe and understand how our bodies react to and store frightening (stress-inducing) 
images.  
Even though direct exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or 
sexual violence may not originate in a fictional image, I believe the comparison between 
our physiological responses, visceral sensations, and gut-feelings to a mediated image is 
appropriate because they can mimic the same responses we would experience in direct 
exposure. The concept of neuroception (the subconscious system for detecting threats 
and safety) is an essential function in Porges’s Polyvagal Theory. When we are 
frightened, neural circuits organize to induce fight-or-flight behaviors; when we feel 
safe, neural circuits disable our defense mechanisms.170 The most intense response to 
life-threatening situation is immobilization, which can cause potentially lethal 
 
169 Ibid, 16. 
170 Ibid, 19. 
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physiological changes.171 There are several examples of immobilization in Children of 
Men, demonstrating what Porges describes as the most primitive branch of the vagus 
nerve and the most severely damaging effect of PTSD. Furthermore, whether we are 
experiencing an event as a ghost or as a witness, our inability to free ourselves from an 
intense and traumatic scene (as in the attack on the car) has the effect of holding us in 
place, like Janice—literally frozen by fear. In several instances, the background images 
of trauma are juxtaposed against the frozen stares of the people inhabiting the scene: a 
news report on the television screen behind the crowd of blank faces in the coffee shop; 
or Theo’s cousin’s son Alex, at the dinner table, mindlessly playing an electronic game 
and taking his pills. When Theo is isolated and listening to Jasper draw a causal line 
between the public catastrophe and Theo’s personal one, we stay close on Theo, like an 
immobilized witness. 
Throughout Children of Men, the cause of the world’s infertility is never 
explained. There are wild conspiratorial rumors and serious scientific theories that 
attempt to explain the cataclysm that has robbed humankind of their hope for the 
future, but no one knows. Cuarón uses the static mid-close-up to haunt Theo’s personal 
inner world with our associated affects. We witness the isolation of an individual who 
 
171 Ibid, 14. For example, as a chronic response to persistent stress, immobilization can lead to infertility. 
Although in Children of Men stress is an effect of infertility, not the originating cause, the diegetic world 
that we witness is one in a state of constant compromise, further raising the chances of infertility.  
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must continue in this world without ever knowing the real cause of his or anyone’s 
suffering. Cuarón could have filmed the conversation in a more typical Hollywood 
style—cutting between Jasper and Miriam and Kee, or even cutting back and forth 
between Jasper’s dialogue and Theo’s reaction—and we would have heard the same 
story. However, the absence of movement for Cuarón’s camera enables our visceral 
responses to be reactions not just to the story, but to the steady gaze in the eyes of a 
character unable to understand why that which has happened to the hundreds of 
thousands around him has also happened specifically him. The camera is still, yet we 
are not passive in our response. In this scene, we see one man’s response to a 
remembered trauma, the memory of which we helped compose. What we witness in 
this scene is how the public trauma of a global catastrophe does not happen only to the 
collective mass of others; instead, it also happens to us all, as a personal trauma, one 
person at a time.  
5.4 Our ghostly presence under attack  
I will conclude this chapter with an analysis of a trauma-image from Children of 
Men, the scene “under attack,” because this scene exemplifies multiple ways in which 
the viewer may ghost the image. Cuarón’s long take is especially helpful for allowing 
viewers their ghostly presence.  Whereas in The Wall, Pölsler’s technic provides visual 
evidence of our ghostly presence by placing viewers inside of or outside of the wall 
surrounding the Woman, in Children of Men Cuarón enables our ghostly presence in the 
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fluid long take running in ‘real-time.’ The underlying question I have about the long 
take is related to process: how does the cinematic long take facilitate a viewer’s ghosting of the 
images, the events, the people, and the space onscreen? The answer may lie in the long take’s 
intensification of duration for the viewer, by which the emotional proximity between 
viewer and on-screen narrative is contracted. As I have tried to demonstrate above, this 
contraction can be an establishing function whereby the background contextualizes 
viewers’ emotional proximity to the diegetic world in which we are moved, or it may 
functionally allow Theo’s and other primary characters’ to mirror our emotional states. 
Another possible way in which the long take may bring viewers to a closer emotional 
proximity to the filmic characters is by immersing us temporally in the real-time action 
of a traumatic event.  
James Udden uses the term faux long take to indicate Cuarón’s, and his long-time 
collaborator, director of cinematography Emmanuel Lubezki’s disguised cuts.172 Citing 
the article, “The Human Project” by Joe Fordham for Cinefex, Udden describes the 
process by which Cuarón and Lubezki create the faux long takes through special effects 
that simulated real-time in scenes that are highly choreographed, digitally enhanced, 
staged and precisely edited to give the appearance documentary-like reality.173 The long 
 
172 “Child of the Long Take,” 32.   
173 Ibid, 35-36. Udden’s asserts that the viewers’ awareness of the artifice may undercut the long-
cuts intended effect; however, knowing the illusion does not preclude the viewer from enjoying 
and or participating in the illusion. This is in part how Richmond defines ‘technics.’  
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takes in Children of Men are filmic technics which create the effect of ‘real-time,’ thereby 
functioning as a temporal dimension in which viewers’ perceptions and responses co-
mingle with and co-create the traumatic-image-events we nearly-directly experience. 
The faux long take may achieve its desired effect when we experience the filmic 
traumatic image as manifested in our physical and emotional responses occurring in 
real-time.  
Moments of intense stress in a traditional narrative are usually followed by a 
release of that tension; however, by extending the moments of threat and danger and 
then prolonging the release with the addition of even more stress ‘beats’ that also are 
unresolved, Cuarón applies increasing pressure on our temporal experience playing out 
in real-time. The durational effect of the scene is compressed, not in time, but in the 
emotional pressure lacking release. In what is perhaps the most widely discussed and 
analyzed scene in Children of Men, the attack on the car, Udden points out that the faux 
long take, which presents documentary-like precision and “impossibly free” camera 
movements, required “two months to plan, eight days to shoot on three locations,” and 
many hours in digital post-production editing.174 As we experience the attack from the 
physically impossible position of a ghost stuck in the crowded interior of a small car 
during an attack, our affectual response is intensified by our inability to escape. Viewers 
 
174 Ibid, 31. 
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are held in place for nearly five minutes, and our stress is only released when the car 
stops long enough for us slip out and stay behind. 
The scene opens inside the moving car. We175 appear to move continuously, 
changing directions to focus on whomever is speaking, moving freely around and 
between the heads and faces of each of the five actors. The car is crowded car, yet our 
movements feel freer than in any scene before, perhaps because for the first time Theo 
and Julian are playfully reconnecting after so many years apart, and the threat of the 
outside world seems distant. For the first few moments in this scene, the playfulness 
and sexual flirtation between Theo and Julian seem to substantiate a feeling of 
hopefulness. Our emotional proximity to Theo and Julian,176 knowing the backstory of 
their shared loss of a child and nearly twenty years of separation is compressed. We are 
present in their intimate space.  
This space, however, becomes intensely intimate when the car suddenly becomes 
entrapped in an ambush.  Luke (Chiwetel Ejiofor) tries frantically to back up as a swarm 
of attackers appear outside of the driver’s side window, running towards the car 
brandishing clubs and other weapons, in waves coming out of hiding. Our movements 
within the tight space become frantic, spinning quickly around, watching as more 
attackers rush towards the car from all sides. As Luke speeds away in reverse, two 
 
175 Having said so much already about Cuarón’s camera as the viewer’s position in the filmic 
space, I’m using the first-person plural from now on to represent the camera’s point of view.  
176 Especially if we are the ghost of their son.  
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attackers on a motorcycle chase after us. A Molotov cocktail hits the hood, and flames 
cover the windshield. In less than thirty seconds, the mood within the car has gone 
from hope to terror. The narrative beats that usually signal a necessary change in a 
character’s action accumulate as the scene builds in intensity. We remain trapped in the 
cramped space, and without a cut to release the emotional pressure, the real-time that 
we share with the characters while under attack feels more immediate and urgent.  
We witness Julian’s murder from an intimately close position. Because our 
position as ‘viewer moved through the shared space of trauma-image’ is illusionary, we 
are nearly-direct witnesses to the diegetic trauma onscreen. We watch the motorcycle 
pull back to face the front of the backing car. One of the motorcycle attackers pulls out a 
gun, aims it at Julian, and shoots her in the neck. Her blood splatters over Theo and the 
others. Although this isn’t the first incident where the camera’s proximity to the trauma 
creates a visceral response for us, when drops of Julian’s blood splatter on the camera 
lens, we may experience an uncanny sensation similar to what we imagine a ‘live 
witness’ might feel. However, even though the proprioceptive effect is an illusion, and 
our witness is nearly-direct, the effect on viewers is palpable. The emotional responses 
that a trauma-image evokes for some viewers may be as haunting as an event 
experienced by a direct witness.  
As Theo grabs for Julian, desperately trying to hold her neck to stop the bleeding, 
we remain in a state of heightened tension—spinning rapidly from one character to the 
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next. The motorcycle pulls up beside Theo, and he kicks the door open, flipping the 
motorcycle and its riders back over the front hood of the car. Even though we have 
escaped these attackers, the intensity of the scene continues to build as the windshield 
shatters. We linger on Julian, dying in Theo and Miriam’s arms. Kee is panicked, Luke 
is yelling, and we pass a convoy of police cars heading towards the place where the 
ambush happened. As they pass, the camera spins again to watch for their response. 
Although we do not yet know why Kee is so important, we do know that Julian and the 
Fishes have taken great risks, from involving Theo in obtaining illegal travel papers to 
the loss of Julian’s life, in order to protect her. We have seen how the police treat 
refugees, and so we don’t want Luke to stop fearing more violence. Here again, we 
become ghosts—‘agents that are still at work’ on the other characters. By  ghosting the 
trauma-image, our presence/non-presence in the filmic space confirms that which has 
previously traumatized each character. We may not only experience heightened 
tensions through the rapid camera movements and extended long take, but our stress is 
also intensified considering what our absence may mean for each character. We assume 
we know why they are scared, and react as if their fears are our own. We haunt the 
character with our bodily sensations, our associated affects, and our associated 
cognition. 
We ghost the trauma-image from our own time. Ghosting the trauma-image in 2006 is 
a very different viewing experience than ghosting in 2020. My assemblage of mediated 
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images of white cops stopping and shooting black drivers has grown to grotesque 
proportions. But, for a first-time viewer in 2020, when one of the police cars catches up 
and orders Luke to stop the car, the viewer is likely to experience a different level of 
tension than a first-time viewer from 2006. The police officers approach the car on the 
driver’s side, training their guns on the passengers. When the officers see Julian dead 
and the state of the car and its inhabitants, they drop their guard for a brief moment. 
Luke jumps from the car and shoots them both. Confused by what Luke has just done, 
Theo jumps out the car, and we follow him. Luke orders Theo back in the car, but we do 
not get back in. Instead, we stay behind on the side of road, lingering with the two dead 
officers as Theo and the others drive away. We may be stunned by all that has 
happened in real-time, but as they drive off, we are finally released from the intimacy of 
the traumatic event. A first-time viewer in 2020 may experience this trauma-image, 
Luke shooting two officers, as a turn-about to the long series of unjust violence in his 
own time. The release from the trauma-image resonates differently for viewers 
depending on the ghosts that haunt them.  
The four-minute faux long take is intense and unrelenting. The attacks come in 
waves, and with each near-escape, another set of possible deadly outcomes appear. 
Whereas in other scenes the long take opens our perceptions to other possibilities and 
potential outcomes, in this scene the immediacy, intensity, and intimacy of the attack is 
made most obvious by our inability to cut away. By forcing us to remain in the intimate 
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space of trauma, Cuarón’s camera acts like our subconscious system for assessing 
threats. Our intuition for fight-or-flight shut-downs, and we can only react like the 
witness or victim of a trauma event whose bodily response is to freeze. Luke’s agency is 
to flee (driving away and violently escaping the police), and Theo fights back (kicking 
the door open on the attackers). But, we cannot act; we have no agency other than as 
witness to the murder of Julian from an intimately close place, held in place for the 
duration of the event by the long take.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Throughout the film, Cuarón’s camera positions viewers in such a way that our 
perception of the onscreen experience—our experience within the filmic space where 
we are present among the characters living through an event—is so convincingly ‘real’ 
our bodies respond as if we are direct witness to trauma.  Ghosting the image is a 
subjective experience that follows a recursive loop—we shape the image with what we 
know of the world, the image shapes our responses, and our responses shape how we 
experience the image again. We can assume from the opening scene that we are a ghost 
following Theo, and from this position we witness how others in this diegetic world 
react to the trauma of infertility. While some of these people are frozen in front of their 
screens repeatedly watching the images of the last-born child, others respond to the 
existential threat by fighting or fleeing. Julian’s response is to fight. What we hear of 
Theo’s life before would lead us to conclude that he has been immobilized by the death 
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of his son and the resulting loss of his love. Just as our ghostly presence brings purpose 
to Theo and facilitates his change, any time we take the position of ghost in filmic space, 
we are creating the purpose for haunting the characters we haunt. In CoM, we perceive 
the characters’ reactions to intimate trauma in the context of what we can only assume 
about persons who have experienced a world-wide, future trauma. We can never fully 
‘feel’ as the characters in the diegetic world onscreen ‘feel’, but the emotional, physical, 
psychological responses that we ‘feel’ when we witness filmic trauma is evidence that 
we are complicit in ascribing meaning to the image.  
The trauma-image differs from character-, event-, and spatial-images, in part 
because it can act like a force, for some viewers, holding the other images together. Just 
as an image’s aura or uncanny affect begins and remains with the viewer, our 
perception of future traumas can only be processed from the perspective of present-
viewer. Ghosting trauma-images, again, is similar to EMDR therapies, where patients are 
encouraged to recall the traumatic event image and describe it in detail, adapting and 
re-contextualizing the memory as an event in the safe distance of past. As therapeutic 
treatment, EMDR may help patients adjust how their body responds when the images 
are recalled again. Similarly, in Children of Men viewers may adapt and recontextualize 
the future trauma-images from the safe distance of the present. Because we are haunted 
by images from the present, we become the force holding character, event, and space 
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together; our witness to filmic trauma is an experience of re-contextualization whereby 
we give meaning to the trauma-images in the context of our ghostly presence.   
6 CODA: THE GHOSTS THAT LED ME HERE 
I saw Children of Men at the Tara Cinema in Atlanta, Georgia, over ten years ago. 
I have no idea what else we did that day, and can only imagine what we did just 
immediately before; but after the film ended, I remember remaining in my seat, 
hesitating to leave. After a couple of minutes my wife gestured her readiness to go, so 
we left in silence, as we usually do. This has been our habit for over twenty-five years, 
out of respect, perhaps, for thinking before speaking, forgiving each other some 
temporal distance from the image in order to process what we’ve seen, for making the 
images into ghosts whom we will inevitably talk about later. This is my favorite 
moment in the experience of watching a film, because this is when the film becomes 
philosophy, religion, politics, and idea. This is when the ghost of filmic images are 
birthed in my imagination.  
My wife does not remember it that way. For her, Children of Men happened many 
years ago, and has since been replayed on every screen in our house so many times, the 
images are a part of who we have become. The first time we saw it together, it was an 
event, with images of trauma and hope, and it has lived with us ever since. We share 
these ghosts, in our own way, over many years, and together we have come to 
understand that aspects of how we talk to each other, and how we think about our 
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times together are haunted by my obsessive belief that images can have meaning and 
purpose. We have our shared images from Children of Men in a bungalow outside of 
Santiago de Puriscal in Costa Rica—the characters’ voices drowned in an intense 
summer rain, leaving us no choice but to make-up our own director’s commentary. And 
as we have moved together closer to 2029, we have witnessed more terroristic political 
tactics coupled with extreme economical and environmental upheavels, and the ghosts 
from Children of Men have gained new purpose—reminding us to speak out and act 
when our own government separates children from their families on the border.  
I taught the film over two days in the summer of 2018 at the US Federal 
Penitentiary in Atlanta. The viewing experience was not ideal—the DVD player built-in 
to the library’s twenty-year old 35” inch TV on a rollaway cart, and the lights had to 
remain on because those are the rules. The students, men from their mid-thirties to 
sixties, sat in plastic chairs with attached half-desks—the kind of desks that were made 
for high-school students twenty years ago. The worst part, though, was the limited 
amount of time we had to spend together with the film. I had planned about thirty 
minutes to talk about visual narrative techniques, to point out a few ways that the 
characters’ backstories are told, before we started Children of Men. But, thirty-five 
minutes after I started talking, I decided it would be better to just pause the film during 
some scenes and talk over others so that when we discussed a particular image 
afterwards, they’d know which scenes I was referencing. I fed the students leading 
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prompts—“notice how the camera’s movement within the enclosed space makes you 
feel in this scene [the attack on the car].” I have shown this film to dozens of classes, I 
have watched it with my kids and their friends, and presented a paper on it, with video 
clips, to colleagues at SAMLA the day after the Bataclan attack in Paris, but this viewing 
was considerably different. There was a collective response in the room to the ending of 
that scene, when Luke shoots two police officers, which provoked for me an uncanny 
feeling unlike any other I had experienced before.  After the film ended, I asked for their 
first responses: "Black Lives Matter” to global warming; the book 1984, big brother, and 
surveillance societies; US immigration policies; children and the ghosts of children; the 
men’s families and their feelings of loss.  
The conversation had to end with little more than a couple of ten-second 
interjections on my part to redirect the group to another student who had been waiting 
to say something. I have spent the greater part of my life talking about images with (on 
average) seventeen to twenty-five-year old students taking first-year composition 
courses, creative writing workshops, or literature surveys. By now, I’m sure I have 
watched Children of Men in excess of a hundred times, but this viewing not only 
changed the appearance of the ghost living in my imaginative field, it also changed how 
this ghost would make me feel from that point forward. I think about these men and 
how the ghost images of Children of Men—the characters, the events, the space, and the 
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trauma—evoked such strong and heartfelt reactions from them, and my belief in the 
power of ghosts is further strengthened and more assured. 
Throughout the dissertation I have tried to use various methodologies for 
analyzing and explaining how and why some filmic images haunt us and how we 
might feel a part of the image onscreen, but my primary method remains the metaphor. 
Likewise, I would argue that my methodology tends towards the memoir. These two 
methods are how I come to all my writing, and in turn all my thinking about a subject. 
At times, I imagine myself different when it comes to formal academic inquiry, with all 
the benefits and struggles that being different implies. And so at times, despite my best 
efforts, I find my writing tends to be more confessional-lyrical than objectively 
analytical, more mystical than precise, more reliant on a speculative system relevant at 
times only to me.  
Write what you know. I know my experience with watching films, and that I might 
be able to describe those experiences in metaphor.  So, I propose ghosting images as a 
conceptual metaphor for the present experience watching a film, the memory of that 
experience, and the remembered images birthed in that experience. Although I have not 
fully engaged in the continuing debates within cognitive linguistics on conceptual 
metaphor, metonymy, and blending theory, these theories continue to shape my 
evolving understanding of what a metaphor may do for a reader. I look to Gilles 
Fauconneir and Mark Turner for understanding blended space and to George Lakoff for 
221 
conceptual metaphors. Together Fauconneir and Lakoff summarize the development of 
cognitive and neural linguistics in their essay “On Metaphor and Blending”177 as two 
empirically-based research approaches leading to different, though also overlapping, 
paradigms. Sandra Handle and Hans Jörg Schmid explain the shift in cognitive 
linguistics towards considering the functional aspects of metaphor in this way: 
Since metaphors are first of all ways of thinking about topics, they are not only 
informative about how speakers or writers conceive of a given issue. […] they 
can be and certainly sometime are used to consciously influence the hearers’ or 
readers’ perception of certain issues. Just as it matters whether a BELIEF is 
construed as POSSESSION one can acquire, buy, and sell, more or less at one’s 
discretion, or whether it is construed as a PET or a CHILD one has the moral 
obligation to take care of and cater to, metaphorical conceptualizations of current 
event or problems purposed and publicized by politicians or journalists are apt 
to affect our views of these issues. The language chosen to talk about something 
thus also has effects on the adressees’ minds, whose current metaphorical 
structures are therefore continuously updated by linguistic input.178 
Although the “moral obligation” in this quote reminds readers of the political frames 
around which this example of conceptual metaphor is employed179, it is relevant to note 
 
177 “On Metaphor and Blending.” Cognitive Science, Volume 5, Issue 1-2.  393-399.  
178 Windows to the Mind, 3 (capitalization in original). 
179 and the dangers that that implies. 
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that our affective responses to the metaphor are “continuously updated” as we re-frame 
its purpose in the context of our present experience. I believe ghosting images is an 
effective conceptual metaphor because it frames our experience with filmic images in 
the uncanny or auratic feelings that one who believes in ghosts may feel. 
For me, what remains essential in metaphor is its capacity for affirming belief. A 
metaphor works when we believe that one thing is another. Whether or not this belief is 
excited by an electrically charged journey down neural pathways, mapped in our 
cognitive awareness, or framed as the mixture of commonly held and individualized 
concepts, we believe a metaphor when the image creates the feeling for us that there is 
something more than what appears. The frame around the conceptual metaphor of 
ghosting filmic images is belief.  Likewise, I assert that ghosting is the best metaphor for 
describing our remembered images because for most of us, ghosts only exists when we 
believe that what we witnessed was what we witnessed. This is where I connect the 
metaphor to the memoir. Therapies like EMDR use narrative frames around which they 
may provide healing to traumatized patients.  By imaginatively/visually recreating the 
images of space, people, and events, trauma patients may interact with those ghosts and 
haunted places from a safe distance. Telling the story again in the present, with the past 
fully engaged, provides the speaker a way to give the story new meaning.  Just as the 
Woman from Die Wand/The Wall uses the journal to substantiate the ghosts that haunt 
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her, I use memoir to make claims about my ‘belief’ (in ghosts, in metaphors, or in 
images) that may not be substantiated in any other way.  
In this dissertation, I looked to answer a couple of questions about the affects of 
watching a film: How and why do we remember certain filmic images? and How do we 
experience our presence in a film? In other words, how are we haunted by and how do 
we haunt filmic images?  Ghosting images, especially those filmic images of characters, 
events, space, and trauma, may not precisely answer how memories are encoded and 
recalled, or why some memories induce unpleasant physical responses, but ghosting 
images does attempt to give us a way to talk about filmic images. Ghosting images may 
allow us to describe what we believe about filmic images; further, just as metaphor 
functions to frame the meaning we ascribe an image, ghosting may give purpose to our 
memories of filmic characters, events, space, or trauma. Whether we think the image 
instructive or divisive, sublime or corrosive, it exists and has meaning because we have 
thought it such.  I continue to hold that ultimately we may find pleasure, comfort, and 
even healing when we allow our first-person subjective experience to give purpose to 
our ghosts and to our hauntings.  Ghosting filmic images is how I imagine my experience 
watching a film. 
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